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Abstract 
 
After the fiscal profligacy of the 1970s and early 1980s, in the last 25 years several 
OECD governments undertook large fiscal consolidations, aimed at sustainably 
reducing public deficits and debt. Surprisingly, or not, some of these consolidations 
were characterized by large increases in private demand and output. Subsequently, a 
large body of theoretical and empirical literature on expansionary fiscal contractions, 
i.e. non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, has developed. 
This literature has been far from consensual, not only because theoretical predictions 
are somehow fragile, but also because empirical evidence is, at best, contradictory. 
However, it seems that investment plays a crucial role in the existence of a possible 
negative fiscal multiplier. Against this background, this thesis studies the investment-
related channel for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, with the aim of identifying 
the conditions under which a fiscal consolidation may have expansionary effects on 
short-term output. 
In this context, we develop a new-Keynesian DSGE model, which is calibrated for 
the Euro Area, with an expanded fiscal block that is gradually enhanced in order to 
simulate three alternative demand- and supply-driven transmission mechanisms of the 
investment channel: (i) the change in the composition of public expenditure; (ii) the 
relation between the level of the fiscal deficit, or debt, and the long-run interest rates; 
and (iii) the insertion of the fiscal consolidation in a broader economic reform, designed 
to increase markets’ competition. 
Among other conclusions, our simulations predict that a fiscal consolidation may 
give arise to non-Keynesian effects when: (i) the consolidation is conducted 
simultaneously with a structural change in the fiscal budget in favor of more productive 
spending; (ii) the initial state of the public finances is such that the long-run interest rate 
is sensitive to changes in the level of the public debt, so long as the consolidation is 
credible and based in cuts either on unproductive spending or weakly-productive public 
employment; and (iii) the consolidation is adequately combined with structural reforms 
increasing the competition in the markets. 
Some particular fiscal consolidations in European countries are rather supportive of 
our thesis main findings. 
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1 Introduction
"(...) while episodes of contractionary fiscal expansions, and expansionary
contractions, are a rather common finding, there is still disagreement on the
conditions under which a fiscal consolidation can raise output growth - or a
fiscal expansion reduce it - and on the channels through which such effects
might occur. Understanding these issues is obviously essential if one wishes
to know which policies might improve the likelihood of non-Keynesian
outcomes" (Giavazzi et al. (2005), p.5)
After the fiscal profligacy of the 1970s and early 1980s, in the last 25 years
several OECD governments undertook large fiscal consolidations, aimed at
sustainably reducing public deficits and debt. Surprisingly, or not, some of
these consolidations, although not all of them, were characterized by large
increases in private demand and output. Subsequently, a large body of theo-
retical and empirical literature on expansionary fiscal contractions, i.e. non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, has developed. This literature has been far
from consensual, apart from the evident acknowledgement that such effects
actually existed in some episodes. Different types of fiscal consolidations,
characterized by different sizes of the fiscal adjustment, different composi-
tions or distinct pre-consolidation states of public finances, seem to be linked
with different macroeconomic performances. The literature, then, suggests
that the traditional Keynesian short-run positive correlation between fiscal
policy and aggregate demand and output may be reversed if some conditions
are in place.
The controversies in the literature on the impact of fiscal contractions
and consolidations on the aggregate economic activity arise, not only be-
cause theoretical predictions are somehow fragile, but also because empirical
evidence is, at best, contradictory. Against this background, this thesis aims
at identifying the conditions under which a fiscal contraction may be effec-
tive both in reducing public debt and in stimulating output growth in the
short-term. The thesis thus attempts to tackle the issue raised in the above
quotation from Giavazzi et al. (2005): searching for the circumstances and
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possible channels under which non-Keynesian effects might prevail over the
conventional Keynesian effects. The analysis will be focused especially in the
Euro Area.
In this thesis we will claim that the currently prevailing theoretical ex-
planations for non-Keynesians effects of fiscal policy − which, with very few
exceptions emphasize the consumption channel (via the expectational effect,
the wealth effect or the substitution effect) −, are necessary but not suffi-
cient. Both the most relevant historical episodes of fiscal consolidations and
the recent results of the empirical literature show that, although private con-
sumption may rise after a fiscal contraction, the rise in private investment
must play a crucial role in the existence of a possible negative fiscal multi-
plier, and particularly in the length and persistence of the effects.1 In this
context, the main objective of this thesis is to explore the investment-related
channel for the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy.
Assuming that investment decisions are driven directly by real interest
rates and by expectations about future profits, the investment channel can
be explored either by looking at demand factors or at supply factors. On the
one hand, reductions in real interest rates associated with fiscal contractions
can generate a direct positive impact on investment. This can be thought
of as the traditional crowding-in effect presented in standard economic text-
books. However, this effect tends to be negligible unless when accompanied
by a second effect on real interest rates derived from a reduction in the risk
premium associated with high levels of public debt. On the other hand, when
fiscal policy affects private factors’ productivity (either directly or indirectly
via labor or product market reforms), an indirect supply-driven effect can
affect private investment. This channel essentially works through a pressure
on real wages and the expected present value of the net marginal product of
capital. While the demand-driven effect depends crucially on the initial state
of public finances, the supply-driven effect is essentially dependent upon the
composition of the fiscal adjustment and some institutional factors, like those
1Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1997b), Alesina et al. (2002) and Ardagna (2007)
explore the investment channel by investigating the impact of fiscal policy on the labor
market.
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related with the working and competitiveness of the labor market.
The thesis explores this range of possible transmission mechanisms of
the investment channel through model simulations, developed within a new-
Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Hence,
the thesis tries to reconcile the new-Keynesian framework with the main
results of the empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects. Unlike most of
the literature, where models of this class have been used for the analysis of
monetary policy, this thesis develops a new-Keynesian DSGE model for the
analysis of fiscal policy, which is then calibrated for the Euro Area.2 In so
doing, the thesis is closely related to a very recent new generation of new-
Keynesian general equilibrium models that include a more developed fiscal
policy block.3.
Modern new Keynesian DSGE models, firstly suggested by Smets and
Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005), extends the standard cashless
DSGE model with various types of nominal and real frictions considered rel-
evant for capturing the high degree of persistence present in macroeconomic
data. This thesis develops a medium-scale general equilibrium model of this
type, with a thorough set of fiscal budget components, devised for a possible
account of the evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. A DSGE
model like the one we develop allows for complex relations between the vari-
ables as well as for different transmission mechanisms, either demand-driven
or supply-driven. Within this model, we simulate several policy experiments
of fiscal consolidations in which a fiscal policy shock occurs in isolation from
other types of shocks to macroeconomic variables. Studying the problem
in the context of such experiments, should allow for a clear distinction and
understanding of the dynamic processes involved in the transmission of the
fiscal consolidation, thus solving possible limitations of the empirical and
historical studies.
In summary, there are three types of motivations for this thesis: histori-
2In models designed for monetary policy analysis, fiscal policy was represented, both
in new-Keynesian and neoclassical literature, by the very simple conventional lump-sum
taxes financing or the balanced budget policy rule.
3Bilbiie and Straub (2004), Coenen and Straub (2005), Galí et al. (2007) and Coenen
et al. (2008).
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cal/empirical; theoretical/methodological; and economic policy motivations.
The thesis is first motivated by the empirical and annedoctal evidence on
the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations, and the fact
that they still lack convincing explanations.
Secondly, it is motivated by the fact that the underdevelopment of the
theoretical studies on this subject leaves the way open for an inquiry on the
possible role of several yet unexplored theoretical channels through which
fiscal consolidations may be expansionary. More specifically, there seems
to exist an avenue for research on investment channels in the context of
a new-Keynesian DSGE model with a thorough treatment of fiscal policy.
The combination of a fiscal policy demand side intervention and a structural
supply side reform, prompted by the fiscal consolidation and/or by other
reforms associated to that consolidation (labor market or product market
reforms, say) is a novel path of research that we intend to explore.
Finally, the relevance of this investigation for the current European (and
particularly Portuguese) policy agenda is another source of motivation. The
high levels of budget deficits and/or public debts in some European coun-
tries4 (and also in the US and other OECD countries), combined with the
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are currently driving a
consolidation of the public finances in some European countries.5 Analyzing
the conditions under which these consolidations can be reconciled with the
existence of negative fiscal multipliers may be useful for policy recommenda-
tions aimed at helping fiscal authorities to manage the consolidation process.
In sum, a good understanding of the short-term impact of fiscal consolida-
tions is crucial for a proper implementation of a fiscal policy framework.
Chapter 2 lays the foundations and motivation for the thesis. There
we briefly review the literature on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal pol-
4Taking as reference values for public debt-to-GDP ratio the ones adopted by the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, several EU-15 countries have recently
exceeded that value: in 2005, seven countries presented debt ratios above 60% (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal), with four of them showing an
increasing path (France, Germany, Greece and Portugal).
5The thesis has been written before the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing depression,
in which fiscal stimulus programmes have widespread as a mean for contra-cyclical policy
and the sustainability of fiscal positions has transitory lost importance.
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icy, with a special focus on the references to non-Keynesian effects of fiscal
consolidations. The main conclusion is that, despite all the theoretical de-
velopments as well as improvements in data and in econometric techniques,
the magnitude and even the sign of the fiscal multiplier remains unclear.
In chapter 3 we begin the modelling work, developing a baseline new-
Keynesian DSGE model that, in view of our purposes, includes a further de-
tailed fiscal policy block than is usual in the literature. Our baseline model
is then calibrated for the Euro Area and used to perform some simulations
in order to understand the model’s dynamic reaction to a fiscal shock. These
simulations — systematically developed with two alternative scenarios for the
labor market (monopolistic and perfect competition) — show that it does not
predict non-Keynesian effects from a fiscal policy contraction. This result,
which is consistent with the standard new-Keynesian DSGE models litera-
ture, motivates our work throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the thesis: to
enhance the model with further transmission mechanisms that refine the re-
lation of fiscal policy to the macroeconomy. Specifically, we chose to explore
mechanisms within the investment-channel for possible non-Keynesian ef-
fects, previously identified in chapter 2, and to do it sequentially in order to
assess their individual role.
Chapter 4 explores a first possible transmission mechanism for the invest-
ment channel of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations — the change
in the budget composition during the fiscal adjustment. For that purpose,
and based on literature therein reviewed, we augment the baseline model
introducing government spending and public employment expenditures as
variables with a direct relation with total private factor productivity in the
intermediate goods sector. Such relation is then allowed to be more or less im-
portant, with public spending split into highly-productive, weakly and non-
productive spending — each calibrated with a realistic elasticity, according to
the literature — whereas public employment is alternatively calibrated with a
strong and a weak productivity effect (again, with elasticities in accordance
with the literature). We then simulate a wide variety of single and composite
fiscal shocks, with the latter changing the composition of the budget in favour
of “quality”, i.e. more productive expenditure. Among the set of conclusions
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obtained, three stand out. First, the success of fiscal consolidations, either
via public spending reductions or employment costs reduction, decreases with
the degree of their productivity. Second, consolidations through pure con-
tractions of weakly-productive or non-productive public spending generate
short-run contractions of output. Third, for consolidations that include a
change of the fiscal budget in favor of more productive spending, or a reduc-
tion in weakly-productive public employment (under perfect competition in
the labor market) the model predicts non-Keynesian effects.
In chapters 5 and 6 we alternatively explore two further transmission
mechanisms for the investment-channel of non-Keynesian effects, using the
model with productive public inputs developed in chapter 4 that from that
chapter onward constitutes our new-Keynesian DSGE model.
Chapter 5 is motivated by an extensive literature, both academic and from
policy makers, on the correlation between highly unfavorable initial states of
public finances, the success of fiscal consolidations and the appearance of
non-Keynesian effects. The causal chain is, in such initial states, as follows:
a successful fiscal consolidation permanently reduces the stock of public debt
and the probability of default on government bonds, inducing a reduction in
the sovereign long-term interest rate and in the whole range of long rates,
which leads to an increase in private demand, especially private investment.
We firstly develop our model by considering a direct relation between the
level of the public debt and the steady-state interest rate, with an elasticity in
accordance with the empirical estimates in the literature. Then, the enhanced
model is used to simulate a set of alternative fiscal consolidations. Differently
from the analysis until then, this channel involves the transition to a new
steady-state of the economy. In short, the simulations suggest that when the
long-term interest rate is sensitive to changes in the level of the public debt,
so long as the consolidation is credible and based in cuts on unproductive
spending or weakly-productive public employment, non-Keynesian effects do
arise.
Chapter 6 is motivated by literature, episodes and statements by pol-
icy makers suggesting that fiscal consolidations conducted within a broad
economic reform program, aiming at increasing the competition and overall
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efficiency of markets, are more prone to success and to be expansionary. In
the literature, this transmission mechanism is seen as possibly operating via
a more competitive environment in the labor market, in the product market,
or in both, as a result of more or less comprehensive reforms. Given the struc-
ture of our model, such reforms could appear in the (intermediate) products
market as well as in the labor market; and an increase in competition would
imply a reduction of (price and wage) markups.
We have circumvented the problems with the calibration of changes in
the markups following the reforms, assuming that a reform would reduce
the markups from their original (Euro Area) levels to the levels that have
been estimated in recent literature for the US. Then, a set of alternative
fiscal consolidations are simulated in three alternative scenarios of market
reforms: a pure product market reform (reduction of price markup); a pure
labor market reform (decline of wage markup); and an overall markets reform
(decline in both price and wage markup). As in chapter 5, the analysis now
involves the transitional dynamics to a higher steady-state output. Overall,
we conclude that fiscal consolidations based on spending contraction need not
depress output, if adequately combined with structural reforms that increase
the degree of competition in the markets to a realistic level. Our results
further suggest that product market reforms seem to have a higher potential
of generating non-Keynesian effects for fiscal consolidations in the Euro Area.
Finally, one major economic policy conclusion from these simulations is that
the more comprehensive the market reforms, the higher the probability of
success of the consolidation and the lower the sacrifice demanded to economic
agents.
In chapter 7, we review some particular fiscal consolidations in European
countries, highlighting their basic features and establishing regularities as
regards conditions for their degree of success, on the one hand, and of ex-
pansionary effects, on the other hand. We then compare the results obtained
in the previous chapters on the studied transmission mechanisms, with the
uncovered regularities. We conclude that the selected consolidation episodes
are rather supportive of our thesis main findings.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. First, we present a brief summary of what
7
we have learned about the conditions under which a fiscal consolidation may
simultaneously be successful and generate non-Keynesian effects. Then we
discuss some of the caveats of our study. Finally, we present avenues for
further research.
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2 Fiscal Policy and the Macroeconomy: A
Brief Review
Despite the efforts recently made in some countries, large fiscal adjustments
cannot be avoided in most OECD countries in coming decades. High current
levels of deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios combined with medium-
and long-term spending pressures on public finances, related, inter alia, to
population ageing, and the consequent increase in the demand for public
spending on health and long-term care, urge the need for fiscal consolida-
tions in most of the world.6 Table 2.1, below, shows the structural primary
surpluses required in 2006 to bring debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% in 2050, which
are dependent upon the impact of those long-term spending pressures on
public budget.
Table 2.1 – Structural primary surpluses required to bring debt to 60% of GDP by 2050 
OECD (2007) 
6Another source of spending pressures may come from the implications of climate
change, which may lead governments to implement some measures that increase public
spending like, for example, capital grants, tax credits or direct transfers for the develop-
ment of renewable energies.
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Against this background, there is little doubt that strong fiscal adjust-
ments are required: "Unless current policy settings change, the fiscal pres-
sures from health and pension costs mean that public debt is on an explosive
path" (Cournède and Gonand (2006), p.5).
Fiscal consolidations are usually seen as having high short-term contrac-
tionary effects on output, given the traditional Keynesian positive fiscal
spending multiplier. Is this really true or is it possible to conduct fiscal
consolidations without relatively high short-term output losses? Or even, as
some empirical evidence suggest, is it possible to reconcile fiscal consolida-
tions with a short-term output expansion, i.e. is the fiscal spending multiplier
negative?
2.1 The Fiscal Multiplier: Traditional Keynesian, Weak
Keynesian, Ricardian Equivalence and Non-Keynesian
Multipliers
There is a long standing debate about the macroeconomic effects of fiscal
policy, and currently there is yet no consensus on the interaction between
fiscal policy and short-term output growth.7 Every turning point in macroe-
conomic thinking has led to a change in economists’ view about these effects
and the behavior of fiscal authorities (Buti et al. (2002)).
Until the early 1970s, macroeconomic thinking was dominated by the tra-
ditional Keynesian view of a positive and larger than one fiscal multiplier,
which was the conventional wisdom both in academic and in policy-making
circles. Based on the well-known Keynesian demand-side transmission mech-
anisms, this view states that a fiscal policy contraction reduces current in-
come, thus reducing private consumption and output, and thus slowing down
aggregate demand and economic activity with an amplified impact. In other
words, fiscal policy was seen as an effective tool for cyclical stabilization.
The traditional view on the effects of fiscal policy is typical of the simple
Keynesian driven, short-term horizon models, like the IS/LM or Mundell-
7For more detailed surveys of the literature see, for example, Hemming et al. (2002a),
European Commission (2003), Capet (2004) and Briotti (2005).
10
Fleming, presented in standard macroeconomic textbooks. However, even in
these simple models the size of fiscal multipliers may be narrowed by some
factors like, (i) the presence of a productive capacity close to full employment,
(ii) a possible crowding-out effect over private investment, depending on its
sensitivity to possible changes in interest rates, and (iii) a possible external
offsetting effect, depending on the exchange rate regime and on the degree
of international capital mobility. Hence, even in the traditional Keynesian
framework, the fiscal multiplier, although positive, can be relatively small −
the so-called weak Keynesian multiplier.
In the second half of the 1970s, the consensus on the usefulness of fiscal
policy for stabilization purposes has been challenged. In an environment of
high inflation and unemployment (stagflation), following the expansion of
the modern welfare state (unemployment benefits, insurance against old-age
risks and sickness) during the 30 golden years, budget deficits rose and there
was a rapid accumulation of public debt. For the first time in decades there
was a conflict between cyclical stabilization and the long-term sustainability
of public finances.
Within this context, Barro (1974) revived the concept of Ricardian Equiv-
alence. He suggested that, under certain intertemporal optimizing assump-
tions, the fiscal multiplier could be null. According to this hypothesis, a tax
cut financed by public debt may fail to stimulate private demand because
households do not consider bonds as net wealth, as they discount the future
expected tax burden required to repay the debt, and hence fully offset the
decrease in public saving with higher precautionary private saving. In other
words, economic agents anticipate the future increase in taxes to pay back
the public debt and cut back their current consumption accordingly. How-
ever, this hypothesis has been questioned for its rather strong assumptions,
namely those of: (i) perfect capital markets with no liquidity constrained
agents; (ii) perfect foresight, altruistic and forward looking agents; (iii) inex-
istence of distortionary taxation. Ricardian Equivalence implicitly assumes
the existence of fully rational economic agents that are "(...) fully aware
of the government policy measure, that they appreciate its consequences and
are possessed of a correct model of the manner in which the macroeconomy
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operates." (Shaw (1997), p.63). In fact, a positive fiscal multiplier holds in
a economy with myopic private agents with finite lives, liquidity constrained
and subjected to distortionary taxes. Thus, although a useful starting point
for the theoretical analysis of the effects of fiscal policy, very few economists
would endorse it as a realistic description.
In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, two major research programs have
emerged in macroeconomics with opposite ideas about the short-term effec-
tiveness and usefulness of fiscal policy. On the one hand, new classical real
business cycle researchers, based on wage and price flexibility in an envi-
ronment of continuous market clearing, defend that fiscal policy can affect
output only temporarily and only if economic agents do not anticipate it.
Moreover, they state that fiscal policy should not be used to stabilization
purposes because it would only "(...) distorted output and employment away
from the optimal amounts chosen by firms and workers." (Snowdon and Vane
(1997), p.6). On the other hand, the new Keynesian researchers renewed the
traditional Keynesian framework by introducing neoclassical elements, such
as intertemporal optimization by forward looking agents forming rational
expectations (i.e., Ricardian agents), into models with market imperfections
and wage and price stickiness. In the resulting new kind of dynamic models
arised the possibility of smaller or even negative fiscal multipliers: "(...) a
policy innovation that would be contractionary in a static model may be ex-
pansionary if it induces significantly expectations of future policy changes in
the opposite direction." (Bertola and Drazen (1993), p.12)
The possibility of a negative fiscal multiplier − non-Keynesian effects of
fiscal policy on aggregate demand and output − has been firstly put for-
ward, in modern macroeconomics, by Feldstein (1980, 1982). Exploring the
link between current fiscal policy changes and their effects on private sector
expectations of permanent income changes, Feldstein argued that permanent
fiscal contractions can be expansionary provided that they create expecta-
tions of future tax cuts, and hence an increase in permanent income and thus
in private sector current expenditures. Clearly, Feldstein’s hypothesis only
holds if the change in current fiscal policy is seen by households as a signal of
possible future changes. A similar view, emphasizing the "benign impact on
12
expectations" (Fels and Froehlich (1986), p.184), has been expressed in 1981
by the German Council of Economic Experts, giving rise to what is currently
known as the German View8. Further refinements to this view were proposed
by Blanchard (1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993), by emphasizing the role
of debt stabilization in expectations, and Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997b),
by focusing on fiscal consolidation via cutting public spending as opposed to
raising taxation.
The outcomes from some European episodes of fiscal consolidations, par-
ticularly Denmark (1983-86) and Ireland (1987-89), firstly documented by
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), strongly suggested that non-Keynesian effects of
fiscal policy could actually exist.9 The ratio of the cyclically adjusted primary
deficit-to-GDP of Denmark and Ireland have fallen, in two years, by 10 per-
centage points and by 8 percentage points, respectively, while GDP average
growth has been, respectively, 3.6% and 3.7%. Following this annedoctal ev-
idence, and aware that "the questions are that of when and how" (Blanchard
(1990), p.111), since the 1990s a growing body of theoretical and (mostly)
empirical literature has been developed on the search for possible channels
and conditions under which fiscal consolidations may be expansionary.
In sum, although macroeconomic thinking is still largely dominated by
the Keynesian view, different theoretical models can predict different results
on the economic effects of a fiscal policy; differences not only in the magnitude
or persistence of those effects, but also in their sign.
2.2 Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy: A Theo-
retical Review
The likelihood of expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations depends on
whether the private consumption’s and/or private investment’s responses to
the consolidation are able to offset its direct negative effect over aggregate de-
mand and, hence, output. The costs of the fiscal contraction can be reduced
8For details see Hellwig and Neumann (1987).
9But also, for example, Belgium (1984-85), Portugal (1986), Italy (1994-95) and Greece
(1996).
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or even eliminated due to favorable expectational effects driving intertempo-
ral saving choices. Thus, the literature searching for non-Keynesian effects
may be effectively typified around two non-mutually exclusive consumption
and investment channels.10
2.2.1 Consumption channel
The consumption channel consists of the hypothesis that a fiscal policy con-
solidation may, under certain conditions, raise private consumption, poten-
tially because of three effects: a pure expectational effect, a wealth effect and
a substitution effect.
The pure expectational effect arises from an improvement in consumers’
expectations brought about by a fiscal consolidation that effectively reduces
uncertainty about future tax liabilities and therefore allows consumers to
decrease their precautionary saving (Feldstein (1982)).11 By eliminating the
need, or at least reducing the probability, for a stronger and disruptive con-
solidation in the future, the fiscal contraction raises the present discounted
value of disposable income, thus leading to an increase in private consump-
tion.12 These expectational effects are dependent on the size and persistence
of the fiscal contraction and are directly linked with its credibility. They also
apply best to situations of fiscal stress, where the budget deficit and/or debt-
to-GDP ratio is high or growing fast, cases in which a strong and persistent
fiscal adjustment signals a change in regime and a solution to the country’s
fiscal imbalance.
The wealth effect arises from the increase in wealth, generated by a fall in
interest rates which increases the market value of assets held by consumers
10Non-mutually exclusive because fiscal policy affects simultaneously private consump-
tion and investment. We argue, yet, that different authors and literature strands tend to
attach a different relevance to one of the two possible channels.
11For models incorporating this effect see, for example, Blanchard (1990), Bertola and
Drazen (1993), Sutherland (1997) and Barry and Devereux (1995, 2003).
12It should be noted that this expectational effect is also very important to the invest-
ment channel. By reducing uncertainty about the future, a fiscal consolidation leads to a
decrease in the option value of waiting by firms to take investment decisions (Blanchard
(1990)). However, the literature tends to emphasize this expectational effect on private
consumption.
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and also increases the opportunity cost of saving, leading households to in-
crease current consumption.13 This effect depends on the relation between
the fiscal contraction and interest rates, and can be seen as the consumption
counterpart to an analogous interest rate effect that we will discuss within
the investment channel.
It should be noted that, along with these two effects there is a negative
direct effect of the fiscal consolidation over consumption, associated to the
reduction in current disposable income. Thus, the consolidation only leads
to an overall increase in private consumption if the positive expectational
and wealth effects, over permanent income, are large enough to outweigh the
negative direct effect over current income. Given the negative correlation
between an higher permanent income and a lower current income, then the
final result clearly depends on the fraction of households that cannot bring
forward future incomes by borrowing, i.e., liquidity constrained consumers.14
Thus, the efficiency of the financial markets can be an important condition
for an expansionary fiscal consolidation.
The third effect, the substitution effect, relates to the replacement of pub-
lic consumption by private consumption. If consumers value social services
supplied by the public sector − such as educational, health care, cultural or
entertainment services − they will most likely increase private spending on
these items once they are no longer provided by the public sector (Giavazzi
and Pagano (1990)). In other words, if government spending is a resource
drain for households, the absorption of a smaller share of GDP by the public
sector creates room for the private sector to expand.
2.2.2 Investment channel
The investment channel consists of the hypothesis that a successful fiscal
consolidation induces a strong and permanent increase in private investment.
Alesina et al. (1998) argue that the major difference between an expansionary
and a contractionary fiscal consolidation is the stronger response of private
13See, for example, McDermott and Wescott (1996).
14For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Coenen and Straub (2005) and Galí
et al. (2007).
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investment in the former, that "is too robust to be attributed to the crowding-
in effect only" (Zaghini (2001), p.26). This stronger response is usually
explained either by a demand-side interest rate effect or by a supply-side
labor market effect.
The interest rate effect − which Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) refer to as the "credibility effect" − operates via the de-
crease in real interest rates brought about by the reduction of the risk default
premium prompted by the reduction of government borrowing requirements
associated with the fiscal consolidation.15 The decline in interest rates would,
then, spur aggregate demand through private investment. This effect, which
reinforces potential crowding-in effects, clearly depends on the initial state
of public finances, being more probable when the level of the debt-to-GDP
ratio before the consolidation surpasses some relatively high threshold.
The labor market effect emphasizes the increase in private investment
resulting from an enhancement of the labor market efficiency and the overall
competitiveness of the economy. Under certain conditions, a fiscal consolida-
tion induces a moderation in the wage claims by unions (either by increasing
the probability of unemployment or by increasing the costs of being un-
employed), therefore reducing real wages pressure, stimulating employment,
investment and output growth.16 This effect stresses the role of the compo-
sition of current fiscal policy, as it is assumed that consolidations resulting
from public spending cuts − especially government wage bills and welfare
payments − rather than from increasing taxes, lead to higher increases in
private investment.17 As they directly affect the labor market, spending cuts
induce market adjustments that reduce unit labor costs, increase profits and
increase investment growth. Clearly, the structure and institutions of the
labor market may play an important role in the development of this effect.
15Using a simple two period model, Afonso (2001) concludes that the reduction in the
risk premium is essential to the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy.
16See Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1997b) , Alesina et al. (2002) and Ardagna
(2007).
17Cournède and Gonand (2006) suggest that a fiscal consolidation based on raising taxes
would reduce the incentive of the private sector to save and invest, thus reducing private
investment and output.
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2.3 Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy: An Em-
pirical Review
In the last quarter of a century, an extensive empirical work has been done in
order to test for the existence and to identify the circumstances under which
fiscal consolidations may have expansionary effects on global economic activ-
ity. However, until now the empirical literature has failed to provide robust
stylized facts on the short-run effects of a fiscal policy shock and particu-
larly of a fiscal consolidation. This empirical literature may be effectively
divided into two main approaches: (i) cross-section or panel studies looking
at large fiscal adjustment episodes; and (ii) time series studies, based on the
specification and estimation of VARs.
2.3.1 Large fiscal adjustment episodes - analysis of events
In this branch of the empirical literature, panel data models are estimated
for specific fiscal adjustment episodes. A crucial first step of these studies
is the definition itself of "fiscal adjustment episode". This involves both
measurement and conceptual issues.
The measurement is generally based on the size of the structural budget
balance, i.e., the balance that would occur at potential rather than actual
output. This kind of studies use the notion of cyclically adjusted budget
balance, by correcting the actual budget balances for the cyclical behavior of
economic activity, which influences public budgets but are beyond the con-
trol of the authorities. In practice, however, there is no generally accepted
methodology for measuring the structural budget balance. Among them
the more frequently used, as we can see in table 2.2 below, are the mea-
sures presented by some European and/or international organizations like
the IMF - International Monetary Fund (IMF (1993)), the OECD - Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD (1993), Giorno
et al. (1995)), the European Commission (European Commission (1995)) or
the ECB - European Central Bank (Bouthevillain et al. (2001)) and by some
leading economists (see, for example, Blanchard (1993)).18
18Recently Afonso and Claeys (2008) derived a model-based indicator of structural bal-
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The conceptual definition and the identification of the specific fiscal ad-
justment episodes is another challenge to this literature, as several approaches
have been followed, leading to different turning points of fiscal policy. An-
other pitfall in this literature is that different studies are based in a different
number of fiscal episodes (Afonso (2006)). As expected, different measures
and definitions often provide different results, and so this literature is highly
heterogeneous.
Table 2.2, below, summarizes this strand of the empirical literature. The
results on the relation between fiscal policy and private consumption are
overall rather inconclusive. While, for example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996),
Perotti (1999), Giavazzi et al. (2000), Giavazzi et al. (2005), Afonso (2006)
and Carmignani (2008) found some evidence of non-Keynesian effects on
private consumption, Heylen and Everaert (2000), von Hagen et al. (2001),
Hjelm (2002), van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) and Hogan (2004) are incon-
clusive or even support the Keynesian view. However, when looking more
specifically at the relation between fiscal policy and investment, the generic
findings point to a large and persistent positive reaction of private investment
to successful fiscal consolidations, which does not seem possible to justify only
by simple textbook crowding-in effects. There is evidence of non-Keynesian
effects on investment both through demand-driven effects (McDermott and
Wescott (1996), Giudice et al. (2007)) and supply-driven effects (Alesina and
Perotti (1995), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina et al. (2002), Ardagna
(2004)).
Another set of conclusions refers to the analysis of the critical conditions
for an expansionary fiscal consolidation. Here, it is generally found that the
composition of the fiscal adjustment is crucial, with consolidations based on
spending cuts − especially government wage bills and welfare payments −
leading to larger non-Keynesian effects (Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina
and Ardagna (1998), Alesina et al. (2002), Ardagna (2004)). Another im-
portant condition is the initial state of public finances, which is related with
ance, which may be seen as a first step towards a " (...) economic indicator of discretionary
fiscal stance that takes into account both the cyclical short-run and the long-term supply
side aspects of fiscal policy." (Afonso and Claeys (2008), p. 114).
18
the initial values of deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios (McDermott and
Wescott (1996), Perotti (1999), Zaghini (2001), Afonso (2006)). Size and per-
sistence of the consolidation also seem to matter, but here the results are less
conclusive.
Our brief review of the literature, when jointly considering the channel
and the conditions for existence of non-Keynesian effects, suggests three main
conclusions: (i) non-Keynesian effects on private consumption, when present,
are essentially dependent on the size, persistence and composition of the fiscal
policy − which is clearly in agreement with the expectational effect discussed
in the last section; (ii) demand-driven effects on investment, related with the
expectational effect and with the interest rate effect, which are prompted
by confidence effects, are critically dependent on the initial state of public
finances; (iii) composition seems crucial for the existence of supply-driven
effects on investment.19
2.3.2 Structural VAR analysis - the spending fiscal multiplier
Paralleling a strand of empirical literature on monetary policy analysis, a
number of studies have recently used VAR models for the analysis of fiscal
policy, specifying and estimating VARs in order to identify the dynamic
responses of the main macroeconomic variables to fiscal policy shocks. Even
though not strictly directed to studying non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy
− but rather to analyze the sign and size of different fiscal multipliers − these
studies allow for some conclusions on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy.
19Some studies also analyze possible asymmetric/non-linear effects of fiscal policy. Gi-
avazzi et al. (2000) stresses that non-Keynesian effects are stronger for fiscal contractions
than for fiscal expansions. Besides several episodes of expansionary fiscal contractions,
only one contractionary fiscal expansion episode is generally emphasized in the literature
(Sweden, 1991-93). However, empirical results are still rather inconclusive.
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The use of VAR for fiscal policy analysis is somehow limited by the low
frequency of fiscal data and by difficulties in identifying the policy shocks,
mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, private agents may anticipate
the fiscal policy, due to the long time lags between its announcement and
its implementation, comprising lenghty and visible budget negotiations. On
the other hand, there is an automatic reaction of fiscal variables to economic
activity. Hence the existence of several alternative approaches to this iden-
tification in the literature. Four main identification approaches are usually
used: i) the recursive approach (Sims (1980)); ii) the event-study approach
(Ramey and Shapiro (1998)); iii) the Blanchard-Quah structural VAR ap-
proach (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)); and iv) the sign-restrictions struc-
tural VAR approach (Uhlig (2005)).20
For the purposes of this thesis, this literature has yet two additional
limitations. First, most studies − as we can see in table 2.3 − look at United
States (US) data and "the United States is an outlier in many dimensions
and (...) US responses to fiscal policy are often not representative of the
average OECD country (...)" (Briotti (2005), p.17). Second, VAR studies
have typically ignored the responses of different fiscal instruments to the
level of public debt (Favero and Giavazzi (2007), Claeys (2008)).
The VAR-based literature has typically found that tax cuts have a much
greater effect on output than government spending. In fact, it typically esti-
mates spending positive but small fiscal multipliers (lower than one on impact
and decreasing thereafter), and tax revenue multipliers relatively large and
persistent (always higher than one).21 As in the former strand of empirical
literature, while the results on the relation between fiscal policy and pri-
vate consumption seems uncertain (although predominantly Keynesian), a
strong negative effect of public expenditures on private investment has been
typically detected.22
Two somehow new conclusions have been brought by the most recent
20For more details see, for example, Perotti (2005), and for a comparative analysis see
Caldara and Kamps (2008).
21See, for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
22See, for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al. (2004), Perotti (2005)
and Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
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studies within this literature: first, Perotti (2005), Bilbiie et al. (2008) and
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) have found that the size of fiscal multipliers has
fallen gradually after the 1980s, which indicates a " (...) reduced cost of
fiscal consolidations in the 1990s." (von Hagen et al. (2002), p.35); second,
Perotti (2005) has detected that the spending fiscal multiplier may presently
be negative, especially in some European countries, which corresponds to the
presence of non-Keynesian effects on output.23
On the one hand, these findings may be explained by the relaxation of
credit constraints and the increased efficiency and sophistication of financial
markets, which have widened private access to asset markets, thus reducing
the number of liquidity constrained households and the dependence of con-
sumption on current disposable income. Moreover, the deregulation of finan-
cial markets and changes in the conduct of monetary policy, with more active
anti-inflationary policies, seem to be responsible for a stronger response of
real interest rates, which can also explain those findings. On the other hand,
the need for a fiscal consolidation is, since the 1990s, clearly more visible
in Europe than in the US, due to the political emphasis on consolidation
materialized in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, as
well as the public debate surrounding it (von Hagen et al. (2002), Brunila
(2002)). These public discussions have increased the awareness of the private
sector in Europe of how past fiscal measures affect present and future fiscal
policy, which may justify a different behavior of European agents as regards
fiscal stimulus relatively to that of the US private sector, leading to lower or
even negative fiscal multipliers.
Table 2.3, below, summarizes this strand of the empirical literature.
23In recent studies Pereira and Sagalés (2006), Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2007), Afonso
and Claeys (2008) and de Castro and de Cos (2008) also found some evidence of non-
Keynesian effects on output in some European countries.
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Reference Sample
Edelberg et al. US;
(1999) 1948-1996
Fatás and US;
Mihov (2001) 1960-1996
Blanchard and US;
Perot ti (2002) post-WWII
Burnside et al. US;
(2003) post-WWII
Gali et al . US;
(2005) 1954-2003
Perot ti (2005) US , UK , Australia,
Germany and
Canada;
1960-1980 and
1980-2000
Bilbiie et al. US;
(2006) 1957-1979 and
1983-2004
Pereira a nd P ortugal; Effects on output depends on the fiscal instrument;
Sagalés  (2006) 1977-2004 Evidence of K eynesian effects for both direct  and indirect taxes and for public
wages and public investment;
Evidence of nk effects for public transfers  and intermediate consumption
Favero and US;
Giavazzi  (2007) 1960-2002 Evidence of a smaller multiplier after 1980
Ramos and UK; Effects on output depends on the fiscal instrument;
Sagalés (2007) 1970-2005 Evidence of K eynesian effects for taxes, specially direct taxation;
Evidence of nk effects for public spending, specially current  spending
Clayes (2008) US; Some evidence of nk effects  on private consumption and output;
1965-2004 Initial conditions are crucial (high publi c debt)
Afonso and France, Germany, Some evidence of nk effects  on output in F rance and Portugal;
Clayes (2008) P ortugal and Spain; Keynesian effects in Germany and Spain
1970-2004
Caldara and US; Evidence of K eynesian effects on consumpt ion and output
Kamps (2008) 1955-2006
De Castro and Spain; Evidence of a short-run positive and greater than one fiscal multiplier;
De Cos (2008) 1980-2004 Evidence of a negative multiplier about four years aft er the fiscal shock;
However, a public wage bill shocks declines output, consumption and
investment after only 2 or 3 quarters
Mountford and US;
Uhlig (2008) 1955-2000 Evidence of a negative multiplier about two years after the spending shock;
only signifi cantly different from zero on impact
Note :   nk - non-Keynesian
Table 2.3 - Empirical evidence on the spending fiscal multipler
Results
Evidence of positive although small fi scal multiplier;
Some evidence of nk effects  on consumption and on residential investment
Evidence of positive and larger than one fiscal mult ipli er
Evidence of positive although small fi scal multiplier;
Some evidence of nk effects  on investment
Evidence of positive although small fi scal multiplier;
Some evidence of nk effects  on investment
Evidence of positive fiscal multiplier, that  can be either close to one or larger
then one
Before 1980, evidence of positive and larger than one fiscal  mul tipl ier in US and
positive but smaller fiscal multipliers in the remaining countries; After 1980,
evidence of substantially weaker multipliers, being negative in Germany, UK 
and Canada; Some evidence of nk e ffects on consumption, after 1980, in
Germany, UK and Canada; Some evidence of nk effects on investment in all
sample, but in US only after 1980
Evidence of positive although small fi scal multiplier;
Evidence of positive, although small, government spending multiplier, on impact;
Some evidence of nk effects  on investment; Consumption response is small and
Evidence of a smaller multiplier after 1980
Evidence of positive although small fi scal multiplier;
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2.3.3 Final remarks
In sum, although we have found some inconclusive and even contradictory
results, four conclusions can be derived from the literature. First, the empir-
ical relation between the fiscal policy and private consumption is ambiguous
and, hence, theories of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy based on a con-
sumption channel seem hard to motivate. Second, the relation of fiscal pol-
icy with private investment seems much more clear and thus the investment
channel seems to be a more fruitful avenue of theoretical research. Third,
the empirical evidence clearly supports the theoretical view that there are
some detectable critical conditions for a fiscal consolidation to generate ex-
pansionary effects: the size and persistence of the fiscal consolidation, the
initial state of public finances (high value of budget deficit-to-GDP ratio
and/or debt-to-GDP ratio) and, especially, its composition in terms of fiscal
instruments, with consolidations based in spending cuts leading to a higher
probability of non-Keynesian effects. Finally, it seems that the probability
of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy is larger in European countries than
in the US, and that it has increased in the last two decades.
Given these conclusions, and the aim of this thesis of identifying cir-
cumstances under which non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy might prevail
over conventional effects, we have decided to explore the investment channel,
looking at demand-side and at supply-side effects. Our analysis will be based
on model simulations, developed within a new-Keynesian DSGE model cali-
brated for the Euro Area, in which we intend to mimic a spending cut fiscal
consolidation. In the next chapter we provide the baseline macroeconomic
model to be developed in our subsequent analysis.
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3 The Baseline Macroeconomic Model
"Recent years have witnessed the development of a new generation of
New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (...)
that appears particularly suited for evaluating the consequences of
alternative macroeconomic policies" (Coenen and Straub (2005), p.436)
Since the early 1980s, several studies have used dynamic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models in order to analyze the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy. Most of these models were variants of the neoclassical growth
model with no market imperfections and have been used to analyze steady-
state (or long run) impacts of different fiscal shocks.24 The last decade has
witnessed the development of new-Keynesian DSGE models, built up from
explicit microeconomic foundations with inter-temporally optimizing agents
but in an environment of nominal rigidities (typically sticky prices). This
class of models, which is presently the most-favoured framework for policy
analysis, has been extensively used for monetary policy analysis.25 Yet, the
use of new-Keynesian DSGEmodels for fiscal policy analysis has been far less
usual, which explains the typical extreme simplicity of these models in their
fiscal policy block. Recently, Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al.
(2005) have developed a new generation of new-Keynesian DSGE models, by
incorporating into the standard model various types of nominal and real fric-
tions in an attempt to capture the high degree of persistence characterizing
macroeconomic data. Following those works, and given our purposes, we will
develop a version of these models that incorporates a further detailed fiscal
policy block.
Our baseline model represents a closed economy with identical infinitely
lived households, firms, a government and amonetary policy authority. House-
holds form rational expectations and derive their lifetime utility from the
24See, for example, Barro (1980, 1989), Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King
(1993).
25For details on the standard new-Keynesian DSGE model see, for example, Clarida
et al. (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
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consumption of privately produced goods as well as from leisure. In an ini-
tial stage the wage dynamics is driven by a monopolistic competitive market,
on the assumption that each household provides differentiated labor inputs,
thus having some monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit
wage equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal wages as in
the Calvo model.26 Households use their disposable income to consume, to
finance new investments and to purchase government bonds.
This economy produces a single final good and a continuum of intermedi-
ate goods. The final-good sector is perfectly competitive and the final good is
used for consumption and investment. There is monopolistic competition in
the market for intermediate goods, with firms producing differentiated goods
and thus having some monopoly power over prices, with their price-setting
following a dynamics a la Calvo. The model assumes that the monetary
authority follows a generalized Taylor rule which includes inertia in the form
of interest rate smoothing. Further sources of inertia include habit formation
in consumption and capital adjustment costs.
As for the government, it purchases final goods from the private sector
and finances its spending requirements with lump-sum taxes and with three
different types of distortionary taxes, namely over consumption, over labor
income and over capital income. The model also incorporates a fiscal rule
that guarantees that the debt dynamics is non-explosive.
3.1 Behavior of Decentralized Agents - Households
Households maximize an intertemporal utility function, separable in con-
sumption (C) and labor (l), over an infinite life horizon. The function is
given by:
Et
∞X
t=0
βtUθt
¡
Cθt , l
θ
t
¢
(1)
where the index θ represents a continuum of households that differ in that
they supply a differentiated type of labor, β is the discount factor and U θt is
26See Calvo (1983).
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the following instantaneous utility function:
Uθt = e
εbt
"
1
1− σc
(Cθt −Ht)1−σc −
eεNt
1 + σN
(lθt )
1+σN
#
. (2)
Utility depends negatively on labor supply, lθt , and positively on con-
sumption, Cθt , relative to a time-varying external habit variable, Ht, that is
assumed to be proportional to aggregate past consumption (habit formation
in consumption):
Ht = hCt−1. (3)
In equation (2) the parameters σc and σN represent, respectively, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion of households or the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution and the inverse of the elasticity of work
effort with respect to the real wage. εbt and εNt are two preference shocks
that affect the intertemporal substitution of households and the labor sup-
ply, and that are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process with
i.i.d.-normal error terms:
εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t ; (4)
εNt = ρNε
N
t−1 + η
N
t . (5)
Households face an intertemporal budget constraint given by:
Y θt +
Bθt − btBθt+1
Pt
= (1 + τ ct)C
θ
t + I
θ
t . (6)
This constraint means that current real disposable income, Y θt , and real
financial wealth27, which is hold in the form of government bonds Bθt , can be
used for consumption, Cθt , (including consumption taxes τ ct), and investment
in physical capital, Iθt . Government bonds are one-period securities with price
27P is the price level.
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bt, being btBθt+1 the current value of future holdings of government bonds28.
Current disposable income, Y θt , consists of the sum of labor income with
the return on the real capital stock and the dividends derived from the im-
perfect competitive intermediate firms, Divθt , deducted from the lump-sum
taxes, T θt and distortionary labor and capital income taxes, τnt and τkt :
Y θt = (1− τnt )wθt lθt + (1− τkt )rktKθt + δτktKθt +Divθt − T θt (7)
where wθt is the real wage, rkt the real rental price of capital services and
δ is the depreciation rate. It should be noted that capital income is not fully
taxed because allowance is made for depreciation (δ).
3.1.1 Consumption and savings behavior
Households maximize their objective function, given by equations (1) and
(2), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, given by equations (6)
and (7):
MAX Et
∞X
t=0
βt
(
eε
b
t
"
1
1− σc
(Cθt −Ht)1−σc −
eεNt
1 + σN
(lθt )
1+σN
#)
(8)
subject to,
(1−τnt )wθt lθt+(1−τkt )rktKθt+δτktKθt+Divθt−T θt +
Bθt − btBθt+1
Pt
= (1+τ ct)C
θ
t+I
θ
t .
(9)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is,
L = Et
∞X
t=0
βt
(
eε
b
t
"
1
1− σc
(Cθt −Ht)1−σc −
eεNt
1 + σN
(lθt )
1+σN
#
−
28As bt = 1Rt , where Rt is the nominal interest rate on bonds, btB
θ
t+1 =
Bθt+1
Rt
.
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−λt
∙
(1− τnt )wθt lθt + (1− τkt )rktKθt + δτktKθt +Divθt − T θt +
Bθt − btBθt+1
Pt
−
−(1 + τ ct)Cθt − Iθt
¤ª
. (10)
Maximization with respect to consumption and bonds holdings yields the
following first-order conditions:
∂L
∂Ct
= 0 =⇒ λt =
eεbt (Ct −Ht)−σc
1 + τ ct
; (11)
∂L
∂Bt+1
= 0 =⇒ Et
∙
−λt
bt
Pt
+ βλt+1
1
Pt+1
¸
= 0 =⇒ Et
∙
β
λt+1
λt
RtPt
Pt+1
¸
= 1
(12)
where Rt = 1/bt is the gross nominal rate of return on bonds and λt is the
marginal utility of consumption.
Aggregating equations (11) and (12), and using equation (3) we have:
Et
⎡
⎣β
eε
b
t+1 (Ct+1−hCt)
−σc
1+τct+1
eεbt (Ct−hCt−1)
−σc
1+τct
RtPt
Pt+1
⎤
⎦ = 1. (13)
3.1.2 Investment and capital accumulation
Households own the capital stock which they rent out to firms at a given
rental rate of rkt . They decide how much capital to accumulate in each
period given the depreciation rate (δ) and the costs (S(·)) of adjusting the
capital stock − which, following Smets and Wouters (2003), we model as a
positive function of changes in investment,29
Kt = Kt−1(1− δ) +
"
1− S
Ã
eε
I
t−1It−1
It−2
!#
It−1 (14)
29It is assumed that, in the steady-state, S (·) equals zero, and the first derivative, S0 (·),
also equals zero around the equilibrium.
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where εIt represents a shock to the investment cost function, which is
assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal
error term:
εIt = ρIε
I
t−1 + η
I
t . (15)
Households choose the capital stock and investment in order to maximize
their intertemporal objective function subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint, as described by (8) and (9), as well as subject to the capital
accumulation equation (14).
Building the Lagrangian,
L = Et
∞X
t=0
βt
(
eε
b
t
"
1
1− σc
(Cθt −Ht)1−σc −
eεNt
1 + σN
(lθt )
1+σN
#
−
−λt
∙
(1− τnt )wθt lθt + (1− τkt )rktKθt + δτktKθt +Divθt − T θt +
Bθt − btBθt+1
Pt
−
−(1 + τ ct)Cθt − Iθt − qt
"
Kθt+1 −Kθt (1− δ)−
"
1− S
Ã
eεIt Iθt
Iθt−1
!#
Iθt
##)
.
(16)
The first-order conditions are the following equations for the real current
value of capital stock (qt) and investment:
∂L
∂Kt+1
= 0 =⇒ qt = Et
∙
β
λt+1
λt
£
qt+1(1− δ) + (1− τkt+1)rkt+1 + δτkt+1
¤¸
;
(17)
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∂L
∂It
= 0 =⇒ qt
"
1− S
Ã
eεIt It
It−1
!#
= (18)
= qtS0
Ã
eεIt It
It−1
!
eεIt It
It−1
− Et
"
β
λt+1
λt
qt+1S0
Ã
eε
I
t+1It+1
It
!
eε
I
t+1It+1
It
It+1
It
#
+ 1.
3.1.3 Labor supply decisions and wage setting
Each household provides differentiated labor inputs, so that there is some
monopoly power over wages that results in an explicit wage equation. Nom-
inal wages are assumed to be sticky as in the Calvo model: households are
allowed to optimally adjust their wage each period with a constant probabil-
ity equal to 1− ξw. Each household reoptimizing his wage at a given period,
will set a new wage ewθt , taking into account the probability that he will not
be reoptimizing the wage in the near future. Following Smets and Wouters
(2003), we augment the Calvo model with the assumption that the fraction of
wages not reoptimized in a given period is partially indexed to past inflation:
W θt =
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
¶γw
W θt−1 (19)
where γw is the degree of wage indexation. When γw = 0 there is no in-
dexation, and the wages that cannot be reoptimized remain constant; when
γw = 1 there is perfect indexation to past inflation.
Households set their nominal wages in order to maximize their intertem-
poral objective function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, as
described by (8) and (9), as well as subject to the demand for labor, which
is:
lθt =
µ
W θt
Wt
¶−(1+λw,t)/λw,t
Nt (20)
where λw,t is a stochastic parameter that determines the time-varying wage
markup. It is assumed that λw,t = λw + ηwt , with ηwt i.i.d.-normal. The
aggregate labor demand, Nt, and the aggregate nominal wage, Wt, are given
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by the following Dixit-Stiglitz-type aggregator functions:
Nt =
∙Z 1
0
(lθt )
1/(1+λw,t)dθ
¸(1+λw,t)
; (21)
Wt =
∙Z 1
0
(W θt )
−1/λw,tdθ
¸−λw,t
. (22)
This maximization problem results in the following markup equation for
the reoptimized wage:
Et
∞X
i=0
βiξiwN
θ
t+i
⎡
⎣ ewt
Pt
⎛
⎝
³
Pt−1+i
Pt−1
´γw
Pt+i
Pt
UCt+i
(1 + τ ct+i)
⎞
⎠− (1 + λw,t+i)
U lt+i
(1− τnt+i)
⎤
⎦ = 0
(23)
where UCt+i and U lt+i are, respectively, the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal disutility of labor.
Following the Calvo model, and given equations (19) and (22), the law of
motion of the aggregate wage index is given by:
(Wt)−1/λw,t = ξw
∙
Wt−1
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
¶γw¸−1/λw,t
+ (1− ξw)(ewt)−1/λw,t . (24)
3.2 Behavior of Decentralized Agents - Firms
The model presents a closed economy that produces a single final good and
a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j, with j distributed over the
unit interval [0, 1]. The final-good sector is perfectly competitive, and the
final good is used for consumption and investment, while there is monopolistic
competition in the markets for intermediate goods.
3.2.1 Final-good sector
Following Galí et al. (2007), the final good is assumed to be produced using
the intermediate goods with the following constant returns technology:
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Yt =
∙Z 1
0
(yjt )
ε−1
ε dj
¸ ε
ε−1
(25)
where yjt denotes quantity of intermediate good of type j at date t and ε is
the constant elasticity of substitution.
At each period, the competitive final good producer maximizes its profit:
MAX
∙
PtYt −
Z 1
0
pjty
j
tdj
¸
(26)
where Pt is the overall price index of the final good and p
j
t are the prices
of the intermediate inputs. From (25) and (26), the demand for each inter-
mediate input and the price index can be shown to be:
yjt =
Ã
pjt
Pt
!−ε
Yt; (27)
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
(pjt)
1−εdj
¸ 1
1−ε
. (28)
3.2.2 Intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector each good j is produced by a firm j with
the following technology:
yjt = e
εatKαj,tN
(1−α)
j,t (29)
where α is a constant parameter, which can take values between 0 and 1, and
can be interpreted as the percentage change in output resulting from a 1%
increase in the capital output. εat is a productivity shock, assumed to follow
a first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term,
εat = ρaε
a
t−1 + η
a
t . (30)
Cost minimization implies that the marginal productivities ratio equals the
price of production factors ratio, thus,
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(1− α)eεatKαj,tN−αj,t
αeεatKα−1j,t N
(1−α)
j,t
=
wt
rkt
=⇒ wtNj,t
rktKj,t
=
1− α
α
(31)
which implies that the capital-labor ratio will be identical across all interme-
diate good producers and equal to the aggregate capital-labor ratio.
With the total costs given by,
TCt = wtNt + rktKt (32)
and given that, from equation (29),
Nt =
µ
Yt
eεatKαt
¶ 1
(1−α)
(33)
the firms’ marginal costs (MCt) are given by,
MCt =
∂TCt
∂Yt
¯¯¯¯
Kt fixed
=
∂TCt
∂Nt
∂Nt
∂Yt
=
1
eεat
w(1−α)t r
kα
t α
−α(1− α)−(1−α) (34)
which implies that the marginal costs are also independent of the intermedi-
ate good produced. Real profits of firm j are then given by:
profitjt =
Ã
pjt
Pt
−MCt
!
yjt =
Ã
pjt
Pt
−MCt
!Ã
pjt
Pt
!−ε
Yt. (35)
3.2.3 Price setting
Each firm produces a differentiated intermediate good and thus has some
monopoly power over prices. Nominal prices are sticky, by assumption, and
their dynamics is modelled as in the Calvo model, i.e., firms are allowed to
optimally adjust their prices each period with a constant probability equal to
1− ξp. In setting the new price, epjt , the reoptimizing firms take into account
the probability that it will not reoptimize in the near future. Following Smets
andWouters (2003), the Calvo model is augmented with the assumption that
prices that are not reoptimized in a given period are partially indexed to past
inflation:
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pjt =
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
¶γp
pjt−1 (36)
where γp is the degree of price indexation. When γp = 0 there is no index-
ation, and the prices that cannot be reoptimized remain constant. When
γp = 1 there is perfect indexation to past inflation.
A firm resetting its price in period t will seek to maximize the discounted
sum of future profits (given by equation (35)), using the relevant stochastic
discount factor Λt,t+i,
MAXepjt Et
∞X
i=0
(
ξipΛt,t+i
"Ã epjt
Pt+i
−MCt+i
!
yjt+i
#)
. (37)
Given equation (36), profit maximization by the producers that reopti-
mize their prices at time t results in the following first-order condition:
Et
∞X
i=0
⎧
⎨
⎩ξ
i
pΛt,t+iy
j
t+i
⎡
⎣ epjt
Pt
⎛
⎝
³
Pt−1+i
Pt−1
´γp
Pt+i
Pt
⎞
⎠− μ MCt+i
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ = 0 (38)
which shows that prices are set as a function of current and expected real
marginal costs, with a markup μ over these weighted marginal costs. The
gross "frictionless" price markup is,
μ =
ε
ε− 1 . (39)
Following the Calvo model, and given equations (28) and (36), the law of
motion of the aggregate price index is given by:
P (1−ε)t = ξp
∙
Pt−1
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
¶γp¸(1−ε)
+ (1− ξp)(epjt)(1−ε). (40)
36
3.3 Centralized Behavior - The Monetary Authority
and the Government
3.3.1 Monetary policy
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple
rule which includes inertia in the form of interest rate smoothing:
Rt = R
ρ
t−1
"µ
Pt
Pt−1
¶Φπ#1−ρ
(41)
with Φπ > 1.
Following Bilbiie and Straub (2004), Bilbiie et al. (2008), Galí et al. (2007)
and Pappa (2009), among others, our monetary policy-maker follows a simple
interest rate rule corresponding to a strict inflation targeting regime — a
particular case of the well-known Taylor rule30, placing a zero coefficient on
the output gap. It should be noted that this kind of rule is said to satisfy
the Taylor principle if and only if Φπ > 1, which is, in the absence of non-
Ricardian consumers, a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the
uniqueness of equilibrium in this class of models.
We model the monetary policy-maker reacting purely to deviations of in-
flation from the target, and not to fluctuations in the output gap, for two
main reasons. First, as we intend to isolate possible “purely fiscal” non-
Keynesian effects of a fiscal consolidation, we purposely assume the simplest
possible monetary framework; in fact, alternative frameworks including out-
put or the output gap in the interest rate rule may suggest lower (higher)
Keynesian (non-Keynesian) effects because of the immediate interest rate re-
sponse to the initial decrease in output. Second, as we are calibrating the
model to the Euro Area case, our policy rule seems more in line with the legal
mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB) — maintaining price stability
in the medium-to-long-run — and is further justified by the apparent lack of
consensus on the relevance of the output gap in the actual preferences and
reactions of the ECB.31
30Taylor (1993).
31See, for example, Aguiar and Martins (2005).
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3.3.2 Fiscal policy
The fiscal authority purchases consumption goods (Gt), collects four types
of taxes − lump-sum taxes (Tt) and distortionary taxes, over consumption
(τ ct), labor income (τnt ) and capital income (τkt ) − and issues debt (Bt+1),
which consists of one-period nominal discounted bonds, paying 1 unit at the
beginning of next period. The government budget constraint is,
Gt +
Bt
Pt
= Tt +
Bt+1
Pt
bt + τnt wtNt + τ
k
t r
k
tKt − δτktKt + τ ctCt. (42)
It should be noted that we will assume that all tax rates evolve exoge-
nously according to a first order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal
error term,
bτ ct = ρτcbτ ct−1 + ητct , (43)
bτnt = ρτnbτnt−1 + ητnt , (44)
bτkt = ρτkbτkt−1 + ητkt , (45)
with,32
bτ ct = τ ct − τ ctτ ct , bτnt = τ
n
t − τnt
τnt
and bτkt = τkt − τktτkt .
Letting bGt, bTt and bBt be the log-linear counterparts of the fiscal variables,
that is,
bGt = Gt −G
G
, bTt = Tt − T
T
and bBt = BtPt − BPB
P
and following Bilbiie and Straub (2004) and Galí et al. (2007), we assume
a fiscal policy rule of the form,
32In what follows, the − above a variable denotes its steady-state value.
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bTt = φb bBt + φg bGt (46)
where φb and φg are positive constants representing the elasticities of
lump-sum taxes with respect to government debt and government spending,
respectively. Under this fiscal rule, a necessary and sufficient condition for
non-explosive debt dynamics is given by,
β−1(1− φb) < 1.33 (47)
Finally, government spending is assumed to evolve exogenously according
to a first order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term,
bGt = εgt = ρgεgt−1 + ηgt . (48)
3.4 Market Clearing and the Final Model
3.4.1 Market clearing
The final good market is in equilibrium if production equals demand by
households, for consumption and investment, and by government:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (49)
The capital rental market is in equilibrium when the demand for capital
by the intermediate goods producers equals the supply by the households,
and the labor market is in equilibrium if firms’ demand for labor equals
labor supply at the wage level set by households. Finally, the capital market
equilibrium means that the government debt is held by domestic investors at
the market interest rate Rt.
3.4.2 The Final Model
In summary, the baseline model has fourteen equations: six for the house-
holds’ behavior − (13), (14), (17), (18), (23) and (24) −, four for the firms’
33For more details see Galí et al. (2007).
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behavior − (29), (31), (38) and (40) −, one for the monetary authority’s
behavior − (41) −, two for the government’s behavior − (42) and (46) −
and one market clearing equation − (49).
3.5 Linearization of the Baseline Model
In order to solve the model with the method of undetermined coefficients
suggested by McCallum (1998) and the generalized Schur decomposition sug-
gested by Klein (2000), both based on the seminal work by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) for linear rational expectations models, it is necessary to lin-
earize the model’s equations around the nonstochastic steady state. In this
section we present the main steps of the linearization process leading to the
full set of linear rational expectations equations. In what follows, and as pre-
viously used, a variable with a hat denotes its log deviation from steady-state.
The full linearization process is available upon request.
Consumption equation The consumption equation results from the lin-
earization of equation (13). By this equation we can conclude that in the
steady state,
R =
1
β
. (50)
Using a first order Taylor approximation, equation (13) is transformed
into,
Et
∙
εbt+1 − εbt −
σc
1− h
bCt+1 + σc(1 + h)
1− h
bCt − hσc
1− h
bCt−1 + bRt + bPt − bPt+1
+
τ c
1 + τ c
bτ ct − τ c1 + τ cbτ ct+1
¸
= 0. (51)
Denoting by bπt+1 = ³ bPt+1 − bPt´ the inflation at time t+1, equation (51)
can be written as,34
34Note that with εbt an exogenous shock defined by equation (4), Etεbt+1 = ρbεbt (because
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bCt = 1
1 + h
Et bCt+1 + h
1 + h
bCt−1 − 1− hσc(1 + h)
³ bRt − Etbπt+1´
−(1− h)τ
c(1− ρτc)
σc(1 + h)(1 + τ c)
bτ ct + (1− h)(1− ρb)σc(1 + h) εbt . (52)
Thus, current consumption depends (i) positively on a weighted average
of past and expected future consumption, with the corresponding elasticity
depending on the habit persistence parameter (h); and (ii) negatively on the
ex-ante real interest rate, with the interest rate elasticity of consumption
depending on the habit persistence parameter and on the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution (σc). Preferences shocks have also a
positive impact on current consumption and, as expected, the consumption
tax shock has a negative impact.
Investment equation The investment equation results from the lineariza-
tion of equation (18). Knowing that in the steady state S (·) = S0 (·) = 0
(see footnote 29, above), then,
q = 1. (53)
Using the first order Taylor approximation, equation (18) is transformed
into,
Et
n
S0 (·) bqt + βS0 (·) bqt+1 + [(1 + β)S00 (·) + (1 + β)S0 (·)] bIt
+ [S0 (·)− S00 (·)] bIt−1 − β [S0 (·) + S00 (·)] bIt+1 + [S0 (·) + S00 (·)] εIt
−β [S0 (·) + S00 (·)] εIt+1
ª
= [1− S (·)] bqt (54)
which is equivalent to,
Etηbt+1 = 0). Then εbt−Etεbt+1 = (1− ρb)εbt > 0. The same applies to the consumption tax
shock, thus Etbτ ct+1 − bτ ct = (ρτc − 1)bτ ct < 0.
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(1+β)S00 (·) bIt+S00 (·) bIt−1−βS00 (·)EtbIt+1+S00 (·) εIt−βS00 (·)EtεIt+1 = bqt (55)
and rearranging,
bIt = 1
1 + β
bIt−1 + β
1 + β
EtbIt+1 + ϕ
(1 + β)
bqt − (1− βρI)
1 + β
εIt (56)
where ϕ = 1/S00 (·).
Thus, current investment depends positively (i) on past and expected
future investment, with elasticities that depend on the rate of time preference
β, and (ii) on the value of installed capital, with an elasticity that is a
function of β and ϕ, a parameter summarizing the investment adjustment
costs. A positive shock to the adjustment cost function temporarily reduces
investment.
Value of capital stock equation The value of capital stock equation
results from the linearization of equation (17). Rearranging equation (12) we
have,
Et
µ
β
λt+1
λt
¶
= Et
µ
Pt+1
RtPt
¶
. (57)
Substituting into equation (17),
qt = Et
∙
Pt+1
RtPt
£
qt+1(1− δ) + (1− τkt+1)rkt+1 + δτkt+1
¤¸
. (58)
Using the first order Taylor approximation, and rearranging,
bqt = β(1− δ)Etbqt+1 − ³ bRt − Etbπt+1´+ β(1− τk)rkEtbrkt+1
+ρτk(δ − βrk)τkbτkt + ηqt . (59)
It is easy to conclude that, around the steady-state,
42
rk =
1
β − δτk + δ − 1
1− τk . (60)
Thus, the current value of the capital stock depends positively on its
expected future value and on the expected rental rate, and negatively on the
ex-ante real interest rate. As expected, it depends negatively on the capital
income tax rate as (δ − βrk) is always negative.35 In equation (59) we have
considered an equity premium shock (ηqt ) that affects positively the value of
installed capital, which is meant to capture changes in the cost of capital
that may be due to stochastic variations in the external finance premium,
and is assumed to follow an i.i.d.-normal process.
Capital accumulation equation The capital accumulation equation re-
sults from the linearization of equation (14). Around the steady state,
K = (1− δ)K + [1− S (·)] I ⇔ I = δK. (61)
Using the first order Taylor approximation in order to linearize equation
(14),
bKt = (1− τ) bKt−1 + [1− S (·)− S0 (·)] I
K
bIt + S0 (·) I
K
bIt−1 − S0 (·)
K
εIt . (62)
Rearranging and using equation (61), we obtain:
bKt = (1− δ) bKt−1 + I
K
bIt−1 ⇔ bKt = (1− δ) bKt−1 + δbIt−1. (63)
Inflation equation The inflation equation derives from the linearization
and aggregation of equations (38) and (40). Since this linearization involves
some burdensome mathematical work, we have decided to present the main
steps in appendix (appendix A.1). The final linearized equation can be ex-
35It can be easily be proven that, (δ − βrk) = (1−β)[δ(1−τ
k)−1]
1−τk < 0.
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pressed as:
bπt = γp
1 + βγp
bπt−1 + β
1 + βγp
Etbπt+1 +
+
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)¡
1 + βγp
¢
ξp
£
(1− α)bwt + αbrkt − εat ¤+ ηpt . (64)
Current inflation depends positively on past and expected future inflation
and on current real marginal costs, which are a positive function of real
wages and the rental cost of capital. The elasticity with respect to changes
in past inflation is essentially dependent on the degree of price indexation
(γp) while the elasticity with respect to changes in marginal costs depends
crucially on the degree of price stickiness (ξp). The productivity process (εat )
impacts negatively on inflation. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), we
have introduced a "cost push" shock (ηpt ) into the inflation equation (64),
which affects positively the price markup, and thus inflation. This shock is
assumed to follow an i.i.d.-normal process.
Real wage equation The real wage equation derives from the linearization
and aggregation of equations (23) and (24). Once more the main steps of the
linearization process are presented in appendix (appendix A.2). The final
linearized equation can be expressed as:
bwt = β
1 + β
Et bwt+1 + 1
1 + β
bwt−1 + β
1 + β
Etbπt+1 − 1 + βγw
1 + β
bπt
+
γw
1 + β
bπt−1 − (1− βξw)(1− ξw)
(1 + β) ξw
³
1 + (1+λw)σNλw
´ × (65)
×
∙bwt − σN bNt − σc
1− h(
bCt − h bCt−1)− τ c
1 + τ c
bτ ct − τn1− τnbτnt − bεNt
¸
+ ηwt .
The real wage is (i) positively related to past and future expected real
wage, past and future expected inflation, labor demand, current consumption
and tax rates (consumption and labor income); and (ii) negatively related
to current inflation and past consumption. The elasticities of real wage with
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respect to inflation are dependent on the degree of indexation of the non-
optimized wages (γw). In turn, the elasticities with respect to labor demand
and consumption are intrinsically related to the degree of wage stickiness
(ξw). There is also a positive effect on the current real wage from a labor
supply preference shock (bεNt ). We have introduced a shock to the wage
markup (ηwt ) that affects positively the real wage, which is assumed to follow
an i.i.d.-normal process.
Labor demand function The labor demand function results from the
linearization of equation (31), which has been derived from firms’ cost mini-
mization for a given installed capital stock. Rearranging equation (31),
wtNt
rktKt
=
1− α
α
⇐⇒ Nt =
(1− α) rktKt
αwt
. (66)
Linearizing around the steady state,
bNt = −bwt + brkt + bKt. (67)
Labor demand depends negatively on the real wage, with a unit elasticity,
and positively on the real rental price of capital and on the capital stock.
Production function The production function is deduced from the lin-
earization of equation (29), from which we get:
bYt = εat + α bKt + (1− α) bNt. (68)
Monetary policy rule The model assumes that the monetary author-
ity follows a simple interest rate rule as expressed by equation (41). If we
linearize that equation around the steady-state we get,
bRt = ρ bRt−1 + (1− ρ)φπbπt + ηRt . (69)
The interest rate reacts to current inflation but exhibits persistence, with
a degree of smoothing ρ. It is also assumed that there is a monetary policy
shock which is a temporary i.i.d. normal interest rate shock (ηRt ).
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Government budget constraint and fiscal policy rule Linearization
of the government budget constraint (equation (42)) around a steady-state
yields,
bBt = 1β bBt−1 + 1β γgγb bGt − 1β γtγb bTt + bRt − 1β γwnτ
n
γb
(bτnt + bwt + bNt)
− 1
β
γkτkrk
γb
brkt − 1β γkτk(rk − δ)γb (bτkt + bKt)− 1β γcτ
c
γb
(bτ ct + bCt) (70)
where, γg =
G
Y
, γt =
T
Y
, γb =
B
P
Y
, γwn =
wN
Y
, γk =
K
Y
and γc =
C
Y
.
As expected, debt depends positively on government spending and on the
debt service (past debt and real interest rate), and negatively on taxes.
As regards fiscal policy, recall that we have allowed a fiscal policy rule of
the form,
bTt = φb bBt + φg bGt. (71)
Goods market equilibrium condition The goods market equilibrium
condition results from the linearization of equation (49). Knowing that in
the steady state,
Y = C + I +G =⇒ C
Y
= 1− I
Y
− G
Y
=⇒ γc = 1− γi − γg (72)
since, from equation (61), γi = δγk, then,
γc = 1− δγk − γg. (73)
Applying the first order Taylor approximation to equation (49) and using
the result in (72), we obtain:
bYt = ¡1− δγk − γg¢ bCt + δγkbIt + γg bGt. (74)
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3.6 Calibrating and Solving the Model
3.6.1 Solving the model
In summary, after the linearization process the model has twelve equations
and twelve endogenous variables: consumption, interest rate, inflation, in-
vestment, real current value of capital stock, rental rate of capital, capital
stock, real wage, labor demand, output, government bonds and lump-sum
taxes. The equations are (52), (56), (59), (63), (64), (65), (67), (68), (69),
(70), (71) and (74). The stochastic behavior of the model is driven by twelve
exogenous shock variables: four shocks arising from technology and pref-
erences (εb, εI , εaand εN ), three "cost-push" shocks (ηQ, ηp and ηw), a
monetary policy shock (ηR) and four fiscal policy shocks ( bGt, bτ ct , bτnt and bτkt ).
Hence, our baseline model is now ready to be solved. In order to apply
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method, the model must be written in the state-
space form:
AEt(Xt+1) = BXt + CZt; (75)
Zt = ρZZt−1 + η
Z
t , Etη
Z
t+1 = 0 (76)
where Xt is a [(n+ k)× 1] vector of endogenous variables, consisting of a
(n× 1) vector of non-predetermined variables in time t and a (k × 1) vector
of predetermined variables in t, Zt is a (z × 1) vector of exogenous variables,
and A, B and C are coefficient matrixes.
Compliance of our model with this structure implied rewriting its equa-
tions as follows:
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Consumption equation:
1
1+hEt
bCt+1 + 1−hσc(1+h)Etbπt+1 = bCt − h1+h bCt−1 + 1−hσc(1+h) bRt+
+ (1−h)τ
c(1−ρτc )
σc(1+h)(1+τc)
bτ ct − (1−h)(1−ρb)σc(1+h) εbt
Investment equation:
β
1+βEt
bIt+1 = bIt − 11+β bIt−1 − ϕ(1+β)bqt + (1−βρI)1+β εIt
Value of capital stock equation:
β(1− δ)Etbqt+1+Etbπt+1 + β(1− τk)rkEtbrkt+1 = bqt + bRt−
−ρτk(δ − βrk)τkbτkt − ηqt
Capital accumulation equation:
0 = bKt − (1− δ) bKt−1 − δbIt
Inflation equation:
β
1+βγp
Etbπt+1 = bπt − γp1+βγpbπt−1 − αμpbrkt − (1− α)μp bwt + μpεat − ηpt
where, μp =
(1−βξp)(1−ξp)
(1+βγp)ξp
Real wage equation (monopolistic competition in labor market):
β
1+βEt bwt+1 + β1+βEtbπt+1 = h1 + μw1+mkwσN i bwt − 11+β bwt−1 + 1+βγw1+β bπt
− γw
1+βbπt−1 − μwσN1+mkwσN bNt − μwσc(1+mkwσN )(1−h) bCt+
+ μwσch
(1+mkwσN )(1−h)
bCt−1 − μw1+mkwσN εNt −
− μw
1+mkwσN
τc
1+τcbτ ct − μw1+mkwσN τn1−τnbτnt − ηwt
where, μw =
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)
(1+β)ξw
and mkw = 1+λwλw
Labor demand function:
0 = bNt + bwt − brkt − bKt
Production function:
0 = bYt − α bKt − (1− α) bNt − εat
Monetary policy reaction function:
0 = bRt − ρ bRt−1 − (1− ρ)φπbπt − ηRt
Government budget constraint:
0 = bBt − 1β bBt−1 + 1β γtγb bTt − bRt + 1β γwnτnγb bNt + 1β γwnτnγb bwt+
+ 1β
γkτkrk
γb
brkt − 1β γkτk(δ−rk)γb bKt + 1β γcτcγb bCt−
− 1β
γkτk(δ−rk)
γb
bτkt + 1β γcτcγb bτ ct + 1β γwnτnγb bτnt − 1β γgγb bGt
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Fiscal policy rule:
0 = bTt − φb bBt − φg bGt
Goods market equilibrium condition:
0 = bYt − ¡1− δγk − γg¢ bCt − δγkbIt − γg bGt
3.6.2 Calibrating the Model
This section presents the numerical values assigned to the parameters of
the linearized baseline model. Each period is assumed to correspond to a
quarter. Since our baseline model has been built upon Smets and Wouters
(2003), with parameter values estimated for the Euro Area, we closely follow,
when possible, their values.
We use Smets and Wouters (2003) values throughout concerning (i) the
preferences and technology parameters and (ii) the inertia and price and wage
setting parameters:
(i) regarding the preferences and technology parameters, the discount
factor (β) is calibrated to 0.99 implying a annual steady-state real interest
rate of 4%; the depreciation rate (δ) is set to 0.025 (10% annual); the capital
share (α) is equal to 0.3 (which implies a labor share of 0.7); and the inverse
elasticity of substitution (σc) and of work effort (σN) are 1 and 2, respectively;
(ii) as for the inertia and price and wage setting parameters we have
calibrated both the degree of price indexation (γp) and the degree of real
wage indexation (γw) as 0.75; also the Calvo parameter on prices (ξp) and the
Calvo parameter on wages (ξw) are both set to 0.75 in the baseline calibration;
and the inertia parameters related with investment adjustment costs (ϕ) and
consumption habit (h) are set to 4 and 0.7, respectively.
A difference between our parameter values and those used by Smets and
Wouters (2003) concerns the steady-state values of the wage markup (λw)
and of the price markup (μ). Smets and Wouters (2003) set those values
equal to 1.5, by increasing the values estimated by Griffin (1996) for the
United States. Our values are set at, respectively, 1.3 and 1.35, following the
values used by Bayoumi et al. (2004) and Jonsson (2007), which have been
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estimated for the Euro Area.36
Another difference regards the baseline policy parameters since, in view
of the purposes of the thesis, our monetary policy framework has been sim-
plified, while the fiscal policy block is much more detailed. The parameter
values are as follows: we set the degree of interest rate smoothing (ρ) and
the size of the response of the monetary authority to inflation (φπ) equal to,
respectively, 0.8 and 1.5, values commonly used in empirical Taylor rules; as
regards the parameters describing the fiscal policy rule (φg and φb), following
Coenen and Straub (2005), we have calibrated both to 0.1, which satisfies
the necessary and sufficient condition for non-explosive debt dynamics given
by equation (47); the autoregressive parameters of the fiscal policy shocks
are set to 0.9, while the autoregressive parameters of all other shocks are set
to 0.85.
In what regards the steady-state values, we set the ratios of government
spending and private investment relative to GDP both equal to 0.2, which
corresponds more or less to their average value in the Euro Area over the
period 1981Q1:2005Q437. Given those values, the steady-state ratio of the
private consumption to GDP becomes equal to 0.6. The quarterly value of
the ratio of real government debt relative to GDP is set to 2.4, which is in
accordance to the Stability and Growth Pact reference value of a government
debt ratio parameter of 60% at the annual steady-state. Finally, as regards
distortionary taxation, following the average values for Euro Area calculated
by Coenen et al. (2007), we set the steady-state values of the consumption
tax rate (τ c) and the labor income tax rate (τn) equal to a reasonable value
of 0.2.38 As for capital income tax rate (τk), we found a widely range of
values in the literature, going from 0 (Coenen et al. (2007)) to 40% (Cavallo
(2005)). Hence, we set the steady-state value of capital tax rate in an average
36Christopoulos and Vermeulen (2008) estimated an identical value for the Euro Area’s
price markup: 1.37.
37European Central Bank’s Area-wide Model database, update 6 (September 2006),
which has been originally published in Fagan et al. (2005).
38Coenen et al. (2007) found, for Euro Area, average values for consumption and labor
income tax rates of, respectively, 18.3% and 24%. The labor income tax rate includes
social security contributions by employees.
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value of 20%.39
Table 3.1 below presents the calibrated values of the parameters of the
baseline model.
Table 3.1 - Parameters values 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Discount factor - β 0.99 Consumption habit - h 0.7 
Inverse elasticity of substitution - σc 1.0 Inverse elasticity of work effort - σΝ 2.0 
Investment adjustment costs - ϕ 4.0 Depreciation rate - δ 0.025 
Degre of price indexation - γp 0.75 Calvo's parameter on prices - ξp 0.75 
Degre of real wage indexation - γw 0.75 Calvo's parameter on wages - ξw 0.75 
Share of capital input - α 0.3 Wages markup - λw 0.3 
Steady-state I/Y - γi 0.2 Steady-state G/Y - γg 0.2 
Steady-state C/Y - γc 0.6 Steady-state (B/P)/Y - γb 2.4 
Prices markup - μ 1.35 Degree of interest rate smoothing - ρ 0.8 
Taylor rule inflation - φπ 1.5 Elasticity of taxes to debt - φb 0.1 
Elasticity of taxes to spending - φg 0.1 Consumption tax rate - τc 0.2 
Labor income tax rate - τn 0.2 Capital income tax rate - τk 0.2 
AR parameter of fiscal policy shocks 0.9 AR parameter of other shocks 0.85 
 
3.7 The Effects of (negative) Government Spending
Shocks
Once our baseline model has been set out, we are ready to simulate a gov-
ernment spending negative shock and analyze the reaction of the different
variables, in order to have an initial understanding of the model’s dynamic
effects of fiscal policy.40 As we will see in detail in the next chapter, these
shocks mimic a fiscal consolidation in the sense that they are modelled with
a very high persistence, specifically as AR processes with a root close to 1
(0.9), so that they have a gradual, strong and persistent impact on public
39We have done some sensitivity tests, and we have found that the results are robust to
a reasonable variation in the tax rate values. Hence, the choice of these values does not
seem to be relevant, since we obtain very similar results with different calibrations.
40It should be noted that the techniques we use to solve the model ensure symme-
try of the responses to shocks with equal absolute value but different signs. Thus, it is
straightforward to extrapolate the effects of a positive government spending shock.
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debt. As usual we base the analysis on the inspection of the impulse response
functions to the shock (figure 3.1).
FIGURE 3.1 - Government spending shock (negative)
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The decrease in government spending generates a wealth effect which is
caused by the decrease in the present value of future taxes. By anticipating
the lower tax burden, households increase consumption and leisure, thus
reducing labor supply. In an environment of monopolistic competition and
sticky prices, there is also a labor demand effect: in response to the decline
of aggregate demand, only a few firms are able to lower prices; all other firms
necessarily react by lowering production, which leads to a decrease in labor
demand. Hence, these two opposite forces that drive a decrease in labor
generate a undefined effect on the real wage. Given the real wage stickiness,
real wages are not much affected. Our results show that there is a real wage
increase, although of a very small magnitude. As we will see below, this
result is highly dependent on the level of labor market competition.
Paralleling the wealth effect, there is an intertemporal substitution effect.
Given the monetary policy framework, the decrease in prices and inflation
leads to a fall in the real interest rate, leading households to anticipate con-
sumption. At the same time, the real interest rate reduction induces an
increase in private investment, which is also triggered by the decrease in the
marginal productivity of capital (due to the decrease in labor), and conse-
quently on the rental price of capital.
In sum, a cut in government spending is followed by a rather small in-
crease in private consumption and a relatively strong increase in private
investment: the impact on investment is about 5 to 6 times higher than the
impact on consumption. Combined with the direct negative effect of the cut
in government spending, these impacts on private demand do not hinder a
relatively small decrease of output.
These results are generally in line with those obtained by Smets and
Wouters (2003), with one major difference: Smets and Wouters (2003) found
a strong crowding-out effect on investment (just like us) and also on consump-
tion (the effects on consumption and investment are of similar magnitude).
These difference may be explained by two main reasons, related with both
our fiscal and monetary policy framework: (i) in order to avoid an explo-
sive path for the public debt, our model includes a fiscal policy rule that
generates a decrease in current lump-sum taxes in response to a lower gov-
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ernment spending and debt; this decrease in current taxes, induces a lower
decrease in future tax burden, and thus reduces the wealth effect; since it is
the present value of future taxes that matters for inter-temporally optimiz-
ing households (Bilbiie and Straub (2004)), than there is a lower increase in
private consumption; (ii) our interest rate rule attaches a zero coefficient to
the output gap; therefore there is not an interest rate reaction to the output
decrease, which reduces the intertemporal substitution effect.
Hence, the model indicates that there is a positive, although small effect
of government spending on economic activity, because the effects over con-
sumption and investment are insufficient to compensate the direct negative
effect of the cut in public spending.
3.8 Extensions to the Baseline Model
By exploring the literature on new-Keynesian models specifically designed to
analyze the effects of fiscal policy, we found two major possible extensions to
the baseline model: (i) the introduction of a share of non-Ricardian house-
holds and (ii) the presence of a perfectly competitive labor market. We end
this chapter discussing these variants of the baseline model and explaining
why only the latter will be explored, later on in the thesis.
3.8.1 Non-Ricardian households
Some empirical studies have detected a strong positive correlation between
private consumption and public spending.41 Motivated by this some-how
puzzling evidence, some authors, like Coenen and Straub (2005), Bilbiie et al.
(2008) and Galí et al. (2007), based on the idea proposed by Mankiw (2000),
have recently inserted into their new-Keynesian dynamic models a sub-set of
households with non-Ricardian behavior. These households decide consump-
tion on the basis of a rule of thumb, according to which all current disposable
income is consumed. Hence, they do not participate in financial markets and
are immune to the wealth effect.
41See inter alia Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Monacelli
and Perotti (2008).
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In spite of a mounting interest in this topic by a recent specific literature,
we have decided not to include non-Ricardians consumers in our model on
the basis of three main arguments. First, the empirical relation between fis-
cal policy and private consumption seems far from clear cut, as alternative
studies have found inconclusive and even opposite results.42 Second, since
the focus of this thesis is to explore the investment-related channel of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, we deliberately chose not to exhaustively
develop the possible consumption-related channel. Third, some authors have
recently questioned the introduction of these consumers in new-Keynesian
models due to the extreme dependence of the results on parameterization,
specifically on the share of non-Ricardian consumers.43 In the words of Mona-
celli and Perotti (2008, p.32), the results of this literature ”rely on an extreme
form of market incompleteness to generate the increase in private consump-
tion”. This criticism seems to be even more important regarding the Euro
Area, because ”the estimated share of non-Ricardian households in the euro
area is relatively small, suggesting that financial deregulation over the last
two decades has lowered financial-market participation costs (...)” and so ”
there is only a fairly small chance that a government spending shock crowds
in consumption (...)” (Coenen and Straub (2005), p.439).
A fourth reason that may also be invoked concerns possible technical
problems associated to the inclusion of non-Ricardian consumers in new-
Keynesian dynamic general equilibriummodels. As some authors have noted,
under certain parameter calibrations the equilibrium may not be unique.44
These technical problems are very likely to be more severe in our model,
which extends the usual new-Keynesian framework with a much more de-
tailed fiscal policy block.45
42For empirical works that found a negative correlation between private consumption
and public spending see, inter alia, Perotti (1999, 2005), Giudice et al (2004), Giavazzi et
al (2000, 2005) and Afonso (2006).
43Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and Kühn et al. (2009).
44See Gali et al (2004, 2007) and Bilbiie (2008).
45We have performed some model simulations that confirmed this presumption.
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3.8.2 Perfectly competitive labor market
Galí et al. (2007) introduce, as an alternative specification of the labor mar-
ket, a perfectly competitive market, with the main objective of comparing
the results of the effects of a fiscal policy shock. This variation to the baseline
model could indeed prove to be interesting for the purposes of this thesis.
In fact, as the review in chapter 2 has shown, the theoretical literature on
the investment-related channel for non-Keynesian effects suggests that an in-
crease in the labor market efficiency and competitiveness may be crucial for
the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects of a fiscal consolidation. Actually,
in the throughout sensitivity checks to which we have submitted the base-
line model (mostly not reported) have shown that the introduction of perfect
competition in the labor market is the main feature than can qualitatively
change the results. Hence, we now explain the changes to the model caused
by this alternative assumption, as well as describe its dynamics in response
to a government spending shock.
Alternative labor supply - perfectly competitive labor market As-
suming a perfectly competitive labor market, each household chooses the
quantity of hours supplied given the market wage. This is done by maxi-
mizing the intertemporal objective function (8) subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint (9). With the Lagrangian given by (10), the first-order
condition yields the following equation for the real wage:
∂L
∂lt
= 0⇒ λt(1− τnt )wt = eε
N
t eε
b
tNσNt . (77)
Using (11) and rearranging, we obtain
(Ct − hCt−1)−σc(1− τnt )wt = eε
N
t NσNt (1 + τ
c
t) . (78)
Alternative real wage equation - perfectly competitive labor market
An alternative real wage equation is derived from the linearization of equation
(78),
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bwt = σN bNt + σc
1− h(
bCt − h bCt−1) + τ c
1 + τ c
bτ ct + τn1− τnbτnt + εNt . (79)
The real wage is (i) positively related to the quantity of labor, current
consumption and tax rates (consumption and labor income); and (ii) neg-
atively related to past consumption. There is also a positive effect on the
current real wage from a labor supply preference shock (bεNt ).
The effects of a negative government spending shock The main
effects of a negative government spending shock of the same magnitude of
the shocks considered above, in an environment of a perfectly competitive
labor market, are shown in figure 3.2.
A comparison of these results with the effects of a fiscal spending cut in
an environment of monopolistic competition in the labor market (figure 3.1)
shows that the main difference occurs in the response of real wages: within
a perfectly competitive labor market, real wages clearly decline upon the
impact of the shock, in contrast to what happens in figure 3.1. Hence, as
competition increases in labor market, real wages tend to decrease in response
to a government spending reduction. This is a result already documented in
the theoretical literature on non-Keynesian effects based on the investment-
related channel.46 Its main origin is the moderation of wage claims by house-
holds (unions) induced by the government spending cut, resulting from the
fact that these cuts generate a labor demand reduction and thus increase the
probability of unemployment.
46See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1997b), Alesina et al. (2002) and
Ardagna (2007).
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FIGURE 3.2 - Government spending shock (negative)
(perfectly competitive labor market)
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Figure 3.2. further shows that while the response of private consumption
is similar to the monopolistic competition scenario, the crowding-in effect
on investment is higher on impact and, thus, the overall impact on output
is lower. The main reason is that a lower real wage induces a reduction in
firms’ marginal costs and, hence, an increase in profits, generating an upward
pressure on investment and private consumption. Note, however, that this
does not necessarily leads to a further rise in private consumption, because
the offsetting effect of the lower real wage, via the well known intratemporal
substitution effect, tends to depress private consumption.
3.9 Final Remarks
The simulations performed so far show that the baseline model does not
predict non-Keynesian effects of a fiscal policy contraction, in spite of the
strong crowding-in effect over investment.
In this chapter we have shown the most relevant fiscal policy simulations
and deliberately omitted some additional simulations that we have performed
in order to inspect for possible non-Keynesian effects in alternative policy in-
struments. Although there is some agreement in the literature that achieving
fiscal consolidation by increasing the tax burden is likely not to succeed, and
that a strong and persistent fiscal consolidation must be based on expenditure
cuts (von Hagen et al. (2002)), we have simulated some (positive) government
revenue shocks, by increasing tax rates. The results, which are documented
and very briefly commented in appendix A.3, show that the baseline model
predicts that shocks in different tax rates do not lead to non-Keynesian effects
over output.
This chapter has laid down the foundations for the purpose in this thesis−
to explore the investment-related channel for the existence of non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal consolidations on short-run output in a new-Keynesian DSGE
model. We now have a baseline model fully specified, calibrated, solved,
and with a understood dynamic reaction to a fiscal shock. The simulations
performed so far suggest that the model must be enhanced with further
channels refining the relation of fiscal policy to the macroeconomy.
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In view of the literature assessed in chapter 2, and given our choice to
explore the investment-related channels for possible non-Keynesian effects,
three transmission mechanisms may be added to the model. In the following
chapters we sequentially introduce such mechanisms: in chapter 4, the pro-
ductive effect of government spending; in chapter 5, the demand-driven effect
of the impact of public deficits/debt on interest rates risk premium; and in
chapter 6, the supply-side effect of an enhancement of the labor market effi-
ciency and the product market competition, linked with possible structural
reforms on these two markets. It should be noted that these three transmis-
sion mechanisms are closely linked with the critical conditions found, both,
in the theoretical and the empirical literature on the non-Keynesian effects
of fiscal policy: the composition of the fiscal adjustment, the initial state of
public finances and the supply-side transmission mechanism of fiscal policy.
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4 The Composition: Productive Government
Spending and Employment
"In a follow-up to the process initiated in Lisbon, the Commission and
EcoFin Council underscored that the "quality" of public finances plays a
crucial role for growth and employment. More specifically, they outlined the
necessity to (...) shift resources towards productive expenditures in health,
education and physical infrastructures, and to ensure the sustainability of
public finances." (Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008), p.172)
A consensual conclusion in the literature on the effects of fiscal policy on
growth is that "not all kinds of government spending should be treated alike
when it comes to reforming public finances." (Afonso et al. (2005), p.31).
Changes to different types of public spending, not only have a different direct
impact on debt, and so on public finances consolidation, but also induce a
different dynamic behavior on other macroeconomic variables. In this chapter
we inspect the impact of fiscal consolidations, achieved through changes in
qualitatively different items of fiscal expenditure, on output. In order to do
so, we disaggregate the composition of public spending into three types of
productive public expenditures: (i) highly productive spending; (ii) weakly
productive spending; and (iii) public employment.
This chapter considers a structural change to the baseline model, includ-
ing public spending in the production function of intermediate goods.
The introduction of government spending in the production function of
the private sector follows the seminal work by Aschauer (1989a) admitting
a direct relationship between government spending and the productivity of
the private factors. This productivity effect, outlined, for example, by Finn
(1998), is one channel through which the government can influence the eco-
nomic activity.
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4.1 Theoretical and Empirical Motivation
Much of the literature focusing on the effects of fiscal policy treats govern-
ment spending as consisting entirely of unproductive expenditure on goods,
overlooking the productive and the employment components of public spend-
ing. However, "In practice, government expenditure is on a variety of goods,
some of which are intended to enhance the productive capacity in the econ-
omy" (Turnovsky (2000), p.255)
Macroeconomists have known for a long time that public spending is an
important input in the production of total output, but only recently did
the mainstream literature begin paying attention to this feature of public
spending.47 Using aggregate annual data for US (1949-1973) Ratner (1983)
has been the first to suggest an empirical model explicitly adding public
spending to the neoclassical production function and to present econometric
evidence consistent with that hypothesis. Costa et al. (1987), also within
this production function framework, have used regional data (from the 48
US contiguous states, 1972) to perform a cross-section estimation in order to
study the role of public capital in regional development, finding significant
evidence of its relevance. Barro (1990) has introduced government expendi-
ture as an argument in the production function of a theoretical endogenous
growth model.
This strand of literature received an important impulse with Aschauer’s
(1989a, 1989b, 1990) study of the effects of public inputs on output and pro-
ductivity. Testing the hypothesis that the decrease in productive government
services in the United States had been crucial for the productivity slowdown
of the early 1970s, Aschauer (1989a) found a strong positive relationship be-
tween the stock of non-military public structures and equipment and total
output. In that study, he has estimated an elasticity of 0.39 for the sample
period 1949-1985, a figure considered surprisingly high by several authors.
Aschauer’s controversial results stimulated a large body of empirical re-
search testing their robustness, which has yielded mixed results: on the one
hand, Munnell (1990, 1992), Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992), Bajo-Rubio
47See, for example, Arrow and Kurz (1970).
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and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), Finn (1993) and Eisner (1994), among others, ob-
tained results consistent with Aschauer’s; on the other hand, Tatom (1991,
1993), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Pinnoi (1994) and Evans and Karras (1994),
among others, did not find significant productive impacts of public inputs.48
Aschauer’s results have been criticized especially because they imply
that public inputs seem more productive than private capital. Most of
the criticism has focused on possible econometric problems such as non-
stationarities, omitted exogenous variables and reverse causation.49 How-
ever, even when these econometric problems have been accounted for, the
ambiguity remained, with several studies concluding in favor of Aschauer’s
hypothesis, and others concluding against it.
Subsequently, an alternative approach based on cost and profit functions
and using co-integration techniques has been developed (see, for example,
Berndt and Hansson (1992), Shah (1992), Lynde and Richmond (1993),
Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), Morrison and Schwartz (1996), Demetriades
and Mamuneas (2000) and Abdih and Joutz (2008)), with results quite in
agreement with Aschauer’s.
Considering the whole literature, it can be argued that public inputs
are clearly relevant in the production process − either by directly providing
intermediate services to private sector firms, or by complementing private in-
puts in production − and thus raise marginal productivity of private capital
and labor. Yet, there is controversy on the magnitude of the contribution:
"Government capital serves as an input into private-sector production, aug-
menting output and productivity. Here, there is conceptual agreement, but
researchers disagree about the magnitudes involved." (Holtz-Eakin, 1993, p.
231).
Moreover, the literature suggests that different types of public expendi-
ture yield different magnitudes for the respective elasticity of private factor
productivity. Public capital stock, and especially non-military "core" in-
frastructures (highways, airports, electric and gas facilities, water systems,
48For a comprehensive survey on this empirical literature see Gramlich (1994).
49When output growth is high, incomes are rising rapidly and then the government can
provide more public goods and services; i.e., the correlation can reflect a demand-side
rather then a supply-side causal relationship.
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sewers, mass transit), directly raise the productive capacity of private firms,
and are the most productive government expenditures. The output elasticity
of this type of public capital stock may be higher than 0.3.50 Other types of
government spending, generally considered as a whole set of non capital ex-
penditures (including, among others, education, health care, entertainment,
culture, national defense and environment) provide a lower contribution to
private production.51 The productive role of this kind of public inputs may
be generally neglected, as the positive effects from their services may be
offset by the negative impact of the allocation of resources to other unpro-
ductive government spending, like the regulatory and bureaucratic processes
and other current wasteful expenses.
The corollary of the results and arguments reviewed above is that gov-
ernments should be able to achieve productivity gains by altering the com-
position of government spending from weakly to highly productive expenses.
Then, a criterious selection of the type of public expenditure cut in fiscal
consolidations may minimize the possible negative impact of these cuts on
the performance of the economy and may even generate a positive impact
(i.e., a non-Keynesian effect). Thus, we conjecture that a possible channel for
non-Keynesian effects is centered on the switching from weakly productive
government spending to highly productive spending, as this might reconcile
the fiscal consolidation with an increase in global productivity. In the next
sections we assess this conjecture.
4.2 Changes to the Baseline Model
In this section we contribute to the literature by extending the baseline new-
Keynesian DSGEmodel with a break up of public spending into three types of
50In fact, several studies have found elasticities in the range 0.3 − 0.4. For example,
Aschauer (1989a), 0.39; Munnell (1990), between 0.31 and 0.39; Garcia-Milà et al. (1996),
0.37; Fernald (1999), 0.35; Abdih and Joutz (2008), 0.39.
51While Aschauers’ estimated elasticities are insignificant, Garcia-Milà and McGuire
(1992) found a positive correlation between these other types of government spending,
especially education, and total output, estimating an elasticity in the range of 0.07 to 0.16
for the US (1969-1983). Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) also emphasized the role of
wage payments going to teachers and professors.
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productive public expenditures: (i) highly productive spending; (ii) weakly
productive spending; and (iii) public employment. When thinking of (i),
highly productive spending, our first association is with expenditures with
public capital; yet, there are items of current public spending that may also
increase private factors productivity, like basic education, security and jus-
tice, and basic health care.
The literature is very scarce as regards inclusion of government expen-
ditures in the production function within DSGE models.52 More recently,
Pappa (2009) has incorporated both productive government spending and
public employment in a new-Keynesian DSGE model. Our exercise differs
from hers’ in several respects: first, her model features less sources of nom-
inal and real frictions and is thus less likely to be data-consistent; second,
she explicitly identifies productive public spending with public investment;
finally, her aim is to study the transmission of fiscal shocks to labor markets
and not any fiscal consolidation.
We now develop our model in order to account for productive public
expenditures.
The production function given by equation (29) is now replaced by:
yjt = e
εatKαj,t
¡
Npj,t
¢(1−α) ³Glpt ´γ ³Ghpt ´η (Ngt )ν . (80)
The production function (80) features constant returns to scale with re-
spect to private inputs;53 and differs from the standard production function
in that public spending has three components, Glp, Ghp and Ng, respectively,
low productivity (or unproductive) spending, high productivity spending and
public employment. The three types of public expenditures are incorporated
52Finn (1998) and Cavallo (2005) explicitly incorporate productive public spending and
public employment but in a purely neoclassical DSGE model.
53In the empirical literature there is no clear preference between constant returns to
scale in all inputs or only in the two private inputs. Turnovsky and Fisher (1995, p.753)
argue that "(...) our assumption of linear homogeneity in the two private factors views
infrastructure as providing economies of scale in production. An alternative assumption
discussed by Aschauer (1989) is to assume that the production function is linearly homo-
geneous in all three factors of production. It turns out that the choice between these two
alternative formulations makes little difference, as long as one assumes FKL>0 in this
alternative specification."
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in the production function as separate inputs enhancing the productivity of
private factors. We assume that these public inputs are freely made available
by the government at the beginning of each period.
The parameters γ, η and ν, the output elasticities of each of the com-
ponents of public spending, determine the interaction between public and
private inputs in production. Depending on their value, an increase in gov-
ernment spending or employment has large, small or null effects on output (a
value of zero means that the public input is unproductive). From the litera-
ture reviewed in the last subsection, we conjecture that a value between 0.15
and 0.2 for the highly productive components of government spending would
not risk any overvaluation of the possible productive role of public spending;
we have furthermore chosen to be conservative and so we have calibrated
parameter η with the value 0.15. As regards the low productivity spend-
ing we have calibrated parameter γ with two alternative values (0.05 and 0)
and have assessed both parameterizations subsequently. Regarding the pub-
lic employment parameter (ν), we have considered it as productive as the
high productive government spending (0.15) and as the weakly productive
government spending (0.05), in alternative calibrations.54
All government spending variables are assumed to evolve exogenously
according to a first order autoregressive process with i.i.d.-normal errors,
bGlpt = εglpt = ρglpεglpt−1 + ηglpt , (81)
bGhpt = εghpt = ρghpεghpt−1 + ηghpt , (82)
bNgt = εNgt = ρNgεNgt−1 + ηNgt . (83)
Labor demand by private firms is derived from the firms’ cost minimiza-
tion for a given installed capital stock and a given stock of public inputs.
Thus, equation (31) and equation (66) are replaced by,
54These alternative calibrations are also important to test the model’s sensitivity to
these central parameters.
66
wtN
p
t
rktKt
=
1− α
α
⇐⇒ Npt =
(1− α) rktKt
αwt
. (84)
The new production function implies that the firms’ marginal costs (MCt)
are now given by,
MCt =
1
eεat
w(1−α)t r
kα
t
³
Glpt
´−γ ³
Ghpt
´−η
(Ngt )
−ν £α−α(1− α)−(1−α)¤ . (85)
The fiscal authority now purchases two types of final goods from the
private sector (Glpt and G
hp
t ), hires labor (N
g
t ), finances its spending require-
ments with lump-sum taxes (Tt) and distortionary taxes − over consumption
(τ ct), labor income (τnt ) and capital income (τkt ) − and issues debt (Bt+1).
Wages are equal in the public and private sector, as we assume that (i) work-
ing hours can be moved costlessly across the two sectors, and (ii) the private
and public labor supply are perfect substitutes, as working for private firms
or for the government brings households exactly the same marginal disutil-
ity.55 Thus, the new government budget constraint, which replaces equation
(42), is given by,
Glpt +G
hp
t +wtN
g
t +
Bt
Pt
= Tt+
Bt+1
Pt
bt+τnt wtNt+τ
k
t r
k
tKt−δτktKt+τ ctCt. (86)
Finally, the model is closed with two types of aggregate constraints. First,
labor supply must equate labor employed by the private firms and by the
public sector,
Nt = N
p
t +N
g
t . (87)
Second, aggregate production must equal the demand for goods by the
private and public sector, and hence equation (49) must be replaced by,
55Some recent literature shows that there is indeed a significative positive correlation
between private and public sector wages, even though their average levels differs (Afonso
and Gomes (2008), Lamo et al. (2008)).
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Yt = Ct + It +G
lp
t +G
hp
t . (88)
After the linearization process, equations (64), (67), (68), (70) and (74)
are replaced by,56
bπt = γp
1 + βγp
bπt−1 + β
1 + βγp
Etbπt+1 + (1− βξp)(1− ξp)¡
1 + βγp
¢
ξp
x
x
h
(1− α)bwt + αbrkt − γ bGlpt − η bGhpt − ν bNgt − εat i+ ηpt , (89)
bNpt = −bwt + brkt + bKt, (90)
bYt = εat + α bKt + (1− α) bNpt + γ bGlpt + η bGhpt + ν bNgt , (91)
bBt = 1β bBt−1 + 1β γglpγb bGlpt + 1β γgmpγb bGhpt − 1β γtγb bTt + bRt − 1β γwnτ
n
γb
(bτnt + bNt)−
− 1
β
γkτkrk
γb
brkt + 1β γkτk(δ − rk)γb (bτkt + bKt)− 1β γcτ
c
γb
(bτ ct + bCt) +
+
1
β
γwng
γb
bNgt + 1β (γwng − γwnτn)γb bwt, (92)
where γwng =
wNg
Y
,
bYt = γc bCt + δγkbIt + γglp bGlpt + γghp bGhpt , (93)
and a new equation is introduced,
bNt = ϑnp bNpt + ϑng bNgt (94)
where, ϑnp = N
p
N
and ϑng = N
g
N
, are the steady-state ratios of private and
public employment to total employment. Following Cavallo (2005), Ardagna
56Full linearizations are available upon request.
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(2007) and Afonso and Gomes (2008), we calibrate these parameters as,
respectively, 0.84 and 0.16. Following Finn (1998) and Pappa (2009), the
steady-state ratios of the low productivity government spending, high pro-
ductivity government spending and public wage bill to output (γglp , γghp and
γwng) are calibrated as, respectively, 0.07, 0.03 and 0.1.57
4.3 Fiscal Consolidations in the Developed Model
There is a growing consensus in the literature that the success of a fiscal con-
solidation, i.e. the size and the sustainability (persistence) of debt reduction,
clearly depends on the "quality" of fiscal adjustments.58 "Quality" concerns
to the relative contribution of different public budget components, i.e., to
the composition of the fiscal adjustment. In the literature, "good quality"
fiscal adjustments are defined as those with a strong emphasis on government
spending cuts rather than on raising taxes, and particularly on the reduc-
tion of current expenditures (public consumption and social transfers) and
some politically sensitive items of the budget, such as public employment
and public sector wages.
Typically, the association between cuts in politically sensitive expendi-
tures and a higher probability of success of fiscal consolidations is seen as
the result of the fact that such cuts signal a stronger commitment to pub-
lic finances sustainability. In our model there are no comparable credibility
effects but rather the general equilibrium effects of fiscal shocks (leading to
fiscal consolidation) that have different roles in the production of intermedi-
ate goods and income.
We now analyze the impact of shocks to each of the different fiscal com-
ponents on debt, in order to verify which may lead to a sizable and persistent
fiscal consolidation. As we have referred in chapter 3, our fiscal policy shocks
mimic a fiscal consolidation in the sense that they are modelled with high
persistence, as AR processes with a root close to 1, and are thus expected to
57This last value is roughly in accordance with the value presented by the European
Commission for the European Union for 2007, which was around 11% (see Afonso and
Gomes (2008)).
58See, for example, von Hagen et al. (2002) and Guichard et al. (2007).
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have a gradual and persistent impact on public debt.
In figure 4.1 we show the dynamic path of the deviation of the public
debt ( bBt) as a result of a unitary shock to government spending, both non-
productive and weakly productive. In figure 4.2 we show the path of bBt as
a response to a unitary shock to both highly and weakly productive public
employment. In both figures we show the results of simulations under the
baseline labor market and the alternative perfectly competitive market.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show results that are in the line with the literature:
(i) cuts in the less productive government spending and public employment
(i.e. unproductive spending and weakly productive employment) are more
likely to generate strong and persistent fiscal consolidations; (ii) cuts in pro-
ductive public spending, even if weakly productive, generate a rather limited
and not sustained response of debt;59 (iii) cuts in highly productive public
employment also generate a rather timid and less persistent response of debt
and may even induce a medium- to long- term increasing path for debt.
FIGURE 4.1 - Impact of government spending cut on debt
59We did not consider a fiscal consolidation entirely based on cuts in the highly-
productive government spending because, on the one hand, it seems economically un-
sustainable, from a long-term output growth view, to reduce the most productive ex-
penditures, and, on the other hand, our preliminary results show an rather insignificant
short-run impact on debt, followed by an clear medium- to long-run increase in debt path.
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FIGURE 4.2 - Impact of public employment reduction on debt
There are two additional results that worth to be mentioned. First, as
a rule, shocks to all budget spending components generate a larger fiscal
consolidation the more competitive is the labor market. This rule knows
only one exception: when the fiscal consolidation is achieved through a per-
sistent shock in non-productive government spending, the debt dynamics is
independent of the degree of competition in the labor market. Second, fiscal
consolidations appear gradually and, in the case of the most effective shocks,
takes between 40 and 60 quarters to fully develop.
4.4 Dynamic Effects of the Fiscal Consolidations - Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks
In this section we present and discuss the general equilibrium effects of the
fiscal shocks on types of spending and employment that have been identified
as achieving a fiscal consolidation, in the previous section.
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4.4.1 Non-productive government spending (negative) shock (γ =
0)
Figure 4.3 shows the results from a non-productive government spending
negative shock. These turn out to be qualitatively very similar to the results
presented in section 3.7 (public spending shock in the baseline model).60
While there is a small increase in private consumption, a marked crowding-
in effect on private investment occurs, but is insufficient to offset the direct
negative impact of the spending cut on output. As argued in section 3.7, these
results derive, essentially, from a combination of (i) a wealth effect, which
raises consumption and reduces labor supply, (ii) a demand effect, which leads
to a reduction in labor demand; and (iii) a intertemporal substitution effect.
The strong increase in investment can be explained, besides the wealth effect,
by a lower interest rate in response to a lower inflation, and by a decline in
the rental price of capital.
It should be noted that, results are within the alternative scenario of a
perfectly competitive labor market, which we have already documented in
section 3.8.2 above. While the response of private consumption is identical,
the crowding-in effect on investment is slightly higher on impact and, thus,
the overall impact on output is slightly lower. As we have seen, the main
reason for this difference is the decline of the now flexible real wage.61
4.4.2 Weakly-productive government spending (negative) shock
(γ = 0.05)
The reaction of the relevant macroeconomic variables to a weakly-productive
government spending shock is quite different (figure 4.4). Although the ef-
fect on private consumption remains small (albeit with a different sign), the
60In the following figures we have replaced the IRFs of the interest rate, which closely
follow the (reported) inflation rate dynamics, by the IRFs of the capital rental price, which
will be useful in some of the discussions. We also replace the figure depicting the fiscal
shock by the figure with the debt dynamics, as we now finally focus on the issue of fiscal
consolidation.
61Due to this similarity, we have decided not to present the figures concerning the per-
fectly competitive labor market. This will also occur in the case of the weakly-productive
government spending cut. All these impulse response functions are available on request.
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reduction of public spending crowds-out investment. This leads to a stronger
negative impact on output when compared to the shock analyzed in the pre-
vious sub-section.
FIGURE 4.3 - Non-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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The differences to the case of a shock to non-productive public spending
are caused by a direct negative impact of the government spending cut on the
productivity of private factors, which generates a negative effect on wealth,
that offsets the positive wealth effect that derives from a lower present value
of taxes. Hence the strong negative direct impact on capital demand (and
so on investment) and on labor demand, and the corresponding fall in wages
(relatively small due to the stickiness in wages) and in the rental price of
capital.
In the alternative labor market scenario (perfect competition, figures not
reported), the main difference concerns a smaller negative impact on invest-
ment and, hence, a lower contraction of output. Again, the explanation lies
on the higher decline of the flexible real wage, which induces a reduction in
firms’ marginal costs and, hence, an increase in profits, generating an upward
pressure on investment.
In sum, comparing the dynamic effects of the non-productive and weakly-
productive government spending cuts, follows for three main conclusions: (i)
the decrease in output is almost twice as large when government cuts the
weakly-productive spending; (ii) the final effect on private consumption is
small in both cases, although with a different sign; (iii) the reaction of invest-
ment is opposite, as it increases when unproductive government spending is
reduced and decreases when the cut is on weakly-productive public spending.
Overall, we conclude, on the one hand, that the direct effect of the weakly
productive spending shock on the productivity of the private inputs clearly
prevails over the indirect effects, pushing down private consumption and,
mostly, investment. One the other hand, we conclude that the smaller size
and persistence of the fiscal consolidation generated by the weakly-productive
government spending cut, induces a lower positive wealth effect and, hence,
a smaller crowding-in effect on private consumption and investment.
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FIGURE 4.4 - Weakly-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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4.4.3 Switching from less to higher productive government spend-
ing
The simulations performed so far with the developed model have focused on
the reduction of a single component of government spending. The reductions
have, irrespectively of the class of spending cut, generated contractionary
fiscal consolidations, i.e., consolidation with no evidence of non-Keynesian
effects. However, it is well known that, in an environment of limited public
resources and binding fiscal constraints, fiscal policy makers may redirect
spending towards more productive activities (Afonso and Furceri (2008)).
Although this kind of switching can induce, in the short-run, a smaller and
less intensive fiscal consolidation, in the medium- to long-run they may gener-
ate a stronger and, possibly, more persistent consolidation, due to a positive
impact on growth.
We now use our developed model in simulations in which there is a switch-
ing from non- or weakly- to highly-productive public spending. Such sim-
ulations are, on the one hand, devised to account for realistic features of
fiscal consolidations in the real world, when policy makers try to minimize
the social costs of consolidations; on the other hand, our simulations will
aim at uncovering thresholds for combinations of shocks that may, in our
model, generate non-Keynesian effects driven by a strong increase in private
investment. Actually, it seems that a fiscal consolidation may be successful
and yet generate non-Keynesian effects if the government reduces their non-
or weakly-productive expenses while it increases the highly-productive.
We have performed four different experiments of a switching from low
productivity spending to high productivity spending, always with the de-
crease in the low productivity spending fully compensating the increase in
the high productivity spending ( bGlpt = − bGhpt ): (i) γ = 0 within a perfectly
competitive labor market (figure 4.5); (ii) γ = 0 with monopolistic competi-
tion in labor market (figure 4.6); (iii) γ = 0.05 within a perfectly competitive
labor market (figure 4.7); and, (iv) γ = 0.05 with monopolistic competition
in labor market (figure 4.8).
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FIGURE 4.5 - Switching from non-productive to highly productive spending
(perfectly competitive labor market)
FIGURE 4.6 - Switching from non-productive to highly productive spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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FIGURE 4.7 - Switching from weakly-productive to highly productive spending
(perfectly competitive labor market)
FIGURE 4.8 - Switching from weakly-productive to highly productive spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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Overall, the main conclusion is that replacing less productive public
spending with highly productive spending can generate a decrease in public
debt and positive effects on output (i.e., non-Keynesian effects), driven by a
strong increase in private investment. Two notes are in order regarding these
results. First, although there is no overall reduction of public expenditures,
in all cases the fiscal deficit improves because of the increase in taxes gener-
ated by higher output. Second, as before, the main transmission mechanism
leading to the non-Keynesian effects is the wealth effect over investment,
crucially associated with the credibility of the consolidation process.
We have further analyzed whether non-Keynesian effects arise in cases in
which the increase in the highly productive government spending is smaller
than the decrease in the weakly productive spending. Such combinations
would improve the budget balance more rapidly and thus enhance the fis-
cal consolidation credibility. In particular, we aim at finding the threshold
for the percentage of the low productivity spending cut that needs to be
compensated by an high productivity spending increase in order to generate
non-Keynesian effects. Four experiments have been made, and results are
summarized in table 4.1.
non-productive weakly-productive
spending spending
highly- perfect
productive competition
spending monopolistic
threshold competition
Table 4.1 - Thresholds for spending switching
Switching from:
0.40 0.70
0.650.35
Quantitatively, the results show that, with our developed model and our
calibration, non-Keynesian effects appear when the highly productive spend-
ing is increased by about 40% of the reduction in the non-productive spend-
ing and 70% of the reduction in the weakly-productive spending. Hence,
if the government reduces the non-productive (weakly-productive) spending
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by 10% of its steady-state level, he should increase the highly productive
spending by about 4% (7%) of its steady-state level. These values are rather
similar in the two analyzed scenarios (perfectly competitive and monopolistic
competitive labor market).62
4.5 Dynamic Effects of the Fiscal Consolidations - Pub-
lic Employment Shocks
In this section, we report the main results of simulating a negative shock to
public employment, which can be thought of as a reduction in the number
of public employees and/or in public wages. As we have seen in section 4.3,
a cut in the highly productive public employment only generates a fiscal
consolidation in the monopolistic competition labor market scenario (figure
4.2). That consolidation is, yet, rather small and unsustained. Hence, we
will only analyze the case of a consolidation via a reduction of the weakly-
productive government employment.63
The results concerning the monopolistic competition scenario are qualita-
tively similar to the results obtained with the weakly-productive government
spending cut (figure 4.9). The reduction in public employment generates two
contradictory wealth effects: on the one hand, the decrease in public spending
increases wealth by decreasing the present expected value of the tax burden,
generating an upward pressure on both private consumption and investment;
on the other hand, the direct negative impact on private factors productiv-
ity induces a negative effect on wealth, leading to a decrease in investment
and, though to a lesser extent, in consumption. Since the direct effect is
stronger, the final result is a small decline in private consumption and a
62The thresholds presented allow for visible non-Keynesian effects. Some inferior values
may also allow for medium-term non-Keynesian effects, but with a negative impact and
short-run effect on output. We have disregarded such cases as they do not correspond to
the concept of non-Keynesian effects.
63We have done some simulations for shocks with highly-productive public employment
that confirmed its failure in achieving non-Keynesian effects. These simulations are avail-
able upon request.
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strong contraction of investment, inducing a contractionary effect on output.
FIGURE 4.9 - Weakly-productive public employment
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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In contrast, in a version of our model with perfect competition in the
labor market, results differ substantially (figure 4.10). There is now clear ev-
idence of non-Keynesian effects, driven by an increase in private investment.
The strong crowding-out effect on investment in the monopolistic competi-
tion scenario, becomes a strong crowding-in effect in the perfect competition
scenario.
This can be explained essentially by two reasons.
First, the reduction in public employment tends to put a marked down-
ward pressure on real wages via two mechanisms: (i) the negative impact
on private factors productivity tends to generate a decrease in labor demand
and, hence, in wages; (ii) lower public employment decreases the probability
of being employed in the public sector, inducing a lower reservation utility
for private sector workers and, hence, lower pressure on wage bargaining.
Following these dynamics, the decline in real wages is now visibly larger in a
flexible labor market: the impact decrease in real wages is more than three
times that of the monopolistic competition. Lower real wage means lower
marginal costs, higher profits and, hence, higher investment.
Second, the fiscal consolidation tends to be stronger and more persistent
in the perfect competition scenario (figure 4.2), which tends to generate a
larger positive effect on wealth, and thus an upward pressure on private
investment.
In sum, these results suggest that a contraction of (weakly-productive)
public employment may induce a fiscal consolidation and promote non-Keynesian
effects, provided that the labor market features a high degree of competition.
Hence, the advantages of combining fiscal policy consolidations with some
structural reforms in the labor market − an interesting result that will be
further explored in chapter 6.
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FIGURE 4.10 - Weakly-productive public employment
(perfectly competitive labor market)
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4.6 Summary and Final Remarks
This chapter has explored one of the possible transmission mechanisms, iden-
tified in chapter 2, for the investment channel of non-Keynesian effects of
fiscal consolidations — the change in the composition of public expenditure.
In order to motivate the chapter, we firstly reviewed the theoretical and
empirical literature that considers how and which items of government ex-
penditure may be directly related to total factor productivity; and secondly
tried to ascertain literature studying how cuts in those items of expenditure
could generate different patterns of fiscal consolidation and of the dynamic
response of the main macroeconomic variables.
This chapter then contributes to the literature by incorporating into the
new-Keynesian DSGE model developed in chapter 3 some classes of public
expenditure possibly involved in the investment channel for non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal consolidations. Specifically, the baseline model has been en-
hanced with the introduction of government spending and public employment
expenditures as variables with a direct relation with total private factor pro-
ductivity in the intermediate goods sector. Such relation has been allowed to
be important or unimportant, as public spending has been split into highly-
productive and weakly or non-productive spending, and public employment
has been alternatively calibrated with a strong and a weak productivity effect.
The production elasticity of each class of public spending and employment
have been calibrated according to evidence in the literature.
Our analysis has been laid down in successive steps, all replicated, as a
rule, for models with monopolistic and, alternatively, perfect competition in
the labor market.
First, we have assessed the ability of cuts in public spending and employ-
ment, for a realistic range of their impact on productivity, to generate fiscal
consolidations — i.e. sizeable and sustained deviations from the debt-ratio
from its starting level.
Second, we have studied the general equilibrium effects of fiscal consol-
idations based on the reduction of weakly-productive and non-productive
spending; and further studied consolidations based on the switching from
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less to more productive public spending.
Third, we have studied the general equilibrium effects of fiscal consolida-
tions based on the reduction of weakly-productive public employment.
The main conclusions are the following.
The success — dimension and sustainability — of fiscal consolidations, ei-
ther via public spending reductions or employment costs reduction, decreases
with the degree of their productivity.
So long as consolidation involves the contraction of expenditures with
some productivity, its success increases with the degree of competition in the
labor market.
Consolidations through pure contractions of weakly-productive or, alter-
natively, non-productive public spending, generate short-run contractions of
output and as such do not generate non-Keynesian effects. However, the ef-
fects on investment are opposite in these alternative routes for consolidation.
Cuts in unproductive spending generate the wealth effect associated to the
fall in the discounted value of future taxes and a fall in the price of capital
that visibly stimulate investment in the short-run, albeit by less than would
be necessary to compensate the negative impact of the reduction in public de-
mand. Cuts in weakly-productive spending generate a negative wealth effect
due to the reduction of overall productivity that surpass the standard wealth
effect associated to the fall in future taxes (which is, by itself, smaller as the
consolidation is weaker); as a result, investment crowds-out and output falls
twice as much as does in the case of unproductive spending consolidations.
If the consolidation is conducted simultaneously with a structural change
in the fiscal budget in favor of more productive spending — a cut in weakly
(or non) productive spending together with a symmetric increase in highly-
productive spending — then our model predicts the existence of non-Keynesian
effects. The spending switch generates the standard wealth effect associated
to expected future taxes as well as a direct increase in productivity, which
both stimulate investment (and, although to a lesser extent, consumption)
and create a net short-run increase of output. This increase expands taxes
and triggers an improvement in the fiscal deficit and a sustained decrease
in public debt. The non-Keynesian effects are larger when the labor market
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features monopolistic competition, because the increase in labor demand due
to the rise in productivity leads to a smaller rise in the real wage than in
a perfectly competitive market, and thus to a larger net increase in profits
and investment. A thorough sensitivity analysis has allowed the detection of
thresholds for the spending switch: fiscal consolidation and non-Keynesian
effects exist as long as highly-productive spending increases by 70 percent of
the reduction in the weakly-productive spending (or 40 percent of the cut in
non-productive spending).
Consolidation through a reduction in weakly-productive public employ-
ment (cuts in highly-productive employment have been disregarded, as the
model does not predict a proper consolidation in such case) yields results
similar to those of a reduction in weakly-productive public spending in our
baseline model. Actually, output falls more markedly in this case because
the increase in inflation triggers an increase in the interest rate that further
depresses investment. However, in a version of the model with perfect com-
petition in the labor market, such a route for consolidation does generate
some short-run increase in output, as a large positive reaction of investment
arises. The change in the behavior of investment and in the overall dynamics
is associated to a larger fall in real wages: in a perfect competition labor mar-
ket, the fall in the demand for labor by the government decreases real wages
throughout the market, reducing marginal costs, increasing profits and conse-
quently private investment. Additionally, the consolidation develops quicker
and the wealth effect further stimulates investment.
We have argued, in this chapter, that the literature supports an enhance-
ment of our new-Keynesian DSGE model to account for some productive
role of public spending and/or public employment. With such an enriched
model, we have detected conditions for the existence of non-Keynesian ef-
fects within a first transmission mechanism of the investment channel. In
the subsequent chapters we retain the model developed in this chapter and
use it to explore two other transmission mechanisms that, as will be shown,
have their own role in the literature of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal pol-
icy. They are: the demand-side transmission via the reduction of expected
interest rates (chapter 5); and the interaction between the fiscal adjustment
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and structural reforms increasing the degree of competition in the markets
(chapter 6).
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5 The Initial State: Public Deficits/Debt and
Interest Rates
"Empirical research indicated that the Keynesian multiplier was much
smaller than earlier analyses had assumed, reduced by a crowding out of
interest sensitive spending caused by an induced increase in the demand for
money and by the effect of the larger national debt on long-term interest
rates." (Feldstein (2009), p.2)
The investment-related channel of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy
may operate via the link between the levels of budget deficits and govern-
ment debt, and interest rates, especially long-term interest rates. Some au-
thors have already highlighted this channel (See Alesina and Perotti (1997a),
Afonso (2001) and Ardagna (2009)). Yet, in the literature, as far as we know,
only Coenen et al. (2008) have explicitly incorporated this channel in a new-
Keynesian DSGE model. Our analysis differs from theirs in three regards: (i)
while they aim to study possible long run benefits of a fiscal consolidation,
we properly focus on the possible non-Keynesian short-run effects; (ii) while
we use the version of our model developed in chapter 4, they do not consider
productive government spending and public employment and, hence, do not
consider the "quality" of the composition of the fiscal adjustment; and (iii)
we explicitly consider the structural supply-side effect of the demand-side
policy of fiscal consolidation.64
In short, this investment channel works when and if market participants
believe that a successful fiscal consolidation will permanently reduce the stock
of public debt and, thus, the probability of a default on government bonds. As
a result, the market participants ask for a lower risk premium, with the con-
sequent reduction in the interest rate.65 This leads to an increase in private
64Coenen et al. (2008) compare a general expenditure-based consolidation with a
revenue-based consolidation.
65This argument follows the usually called portfolio effect (see Caporale and Williams
(2002)): when investors consider government bonds of higher quality (less risky and more
liquid), they switch from low quality debt into government bonds, which leads to an
increase of its price and to a decrease of its yield/interest rate.
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demand, especially private investment, therefore providing an expansionary
effect of the fiscal contraction. Moreover, the literature has suggested that
a non-linearity could exist in the relation between interest rates and budget
deficits. Specifically, the change in the risk premium and interest rates may
depend on the level of public debt, as it determines the risk of default on
government bonds. Some recent empirical evidence also seems to support
this non-linear relation.
We begin this chapter presenting a review of the literature on this subject.
We conclude that, at a theoretical level the debate remains open. Yet, econo-
metric and annedoctal evidence, as well as remarks by leading economists and
policy makers, almost all indicate that increases in expected future deficits
and government debt tend to raise long-term interest rates.66
We then enhance our model to allow for an explicit relation between the
level of public debt and long-term interest rates; and then use the developed
model to simulate the effects of fiscal consolidations that lead to a fall of
long-term interest rates according to a set of calibrations suggested by the
reviewed literature.
5.1 Interest Rates and Budget Deficits/Debt: A The-
oretical View
Economic Theory yields ambiguous predictions as regards the effects of public
deficits on interest rates. The simplest theoretical approach to this question
is the standard textbook IS/LM framework: an higher budget deficit, caused
by an increase in government spending and/or a decrease in revenue, raises
the interest rate, generating a crowding-out effect. However, even in the
basic IS/LM framework, fiscal policy can have no effect on interest rates in
a small open economy within an environment of high international mobility
of capital.
An alternative simple approach to the issue may be based in the national
account identity (Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Gale and Orzag (2002)):
66For a review of literature see Barth et al. (1991), Gale and Orzag (2002), Laubach
(2004) and European Commission (2004).
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S + (T −G) = I +NFI (95)
where, S is private saving, T is government revenue, G is government
spending (and so (T − G) is public saving), I is domestic investment and
NFI is net foreign investment. This identity may be interpreted as describing
the two sides of the market for loanable funds. An increase in the budget
deficit corresponds to a decrease in public saving and implies, at least, one
of three effects: (i) an increase in private saving; (ii) a decrease in domestic
investment; and/or (iii) a decrease in net foreign investment.
We detected, at least, four approaches in the literature concerning the
relation between public deficits/debt and interest rates, which overall create a
rather mixed scenario, with some views predicting a positive relation between
the level of public debt and long-run interest rates, but others generating
ambiguous predictions.
First, the conventional approach predicts a combination of the three ef-
fects referred to above, suggesting that the most important is likely to be
the one over investment (Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)). Since households
smooth their consumption over time, the increase in private saving is smaller
than the fall in public saving. The consequent reduction in national saving
relative to current investment generates: (i) a shortage of funds that puts
upward pressure on interest rates as firms compete for a limited pool of funds
to finance their investment projects; and (ii) an increase in the government
debt held by the public, given that the government persuades investors to
hold the additional bonds offering an higher interest rate − hence a positive
correlation between public deficits/debt and interest rates.
Second, the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, predicts that, under cer-
tain assumptions, the decrease in public saving is entirely offset by an increase
in private saving, so that the interest rate remains constant.67 In particular,
a tax cut does not affect interest rates if, for a given amount of government
spending, consumers fully anticipate the future tax burden needed to repay
67For more details on the Ricardian Equivalence theorem see, for example, Elmendorf
and Mankiw (1999), pp.1640-1659, and Seater (1993).
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the resulting debt and save all their additional current disposable income.
However, it is widely accepted that the assumptions of the Ricardian Equiv-
alence hypothesis do not hold in practice, as agents face liquidity constraints,
have limited horizons and/or taxes are distortionary. Moreover, observed
changes in current and future deficits do not seem to correspond to a pure
shift in the timing of taxes and so, even in an otherwise Ricardian world a
temporary increase in government spending leads to a fall in domestic saving
and to an increase in interest rates (Laubach (2004), Faini (2004)) − hence
the results are ambiguous.
A third and more recent approach, is based on the idea that the "new
economy" era of global capital mobility implies a different relationship be-
tween fiscal imbalances and interest rates. In short, the growing integration
of emerging markets into the world economy depresses interest rates, because
these fast-growing developing countries have a high propensity to save but
are unable to employ their savings domestically, to a large extent because of
capital market insufficiencies, and thus channel their savings to global finan-
cial markets and industrial countries (Caballero et al. (2008)). Under this
hypothesis, fiscal imbalances do not necessarily transmit to higher interest
rates. Hauner and Kumar (2006), however, did not find evidence of this
hypothesis, and have argued that these capital flows are transitory and "old
economy" forces explaining interest rates are likely to prevail − hence the
ambiguous results.
Finally, a fourth approach is based on the market-discipline hypothe-
sis (Schuknecht et al. (2008)). Its main argument is that long-run interest
rate spreads on government bonds signal the financial markets’ assessment of
the sustainability of a governments’ fiscal position. A weaker fiscal position
(higher deficit or debt ratios) implies an higher credit risk, and so financial
markets impose some fiscal discipline on governments demanding higher in-
terest rates − hence a positive correlation between public deficits/debt and
interest rates.
The positive relationship between budget deficits and interest rates un-
der the conventional approach features a time dimension in the sense that
interest rates are affected not only by current or past deficits/surpluses, but
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also by expectations of future deficits/surpluses; this means that anticipated
future deficits/surpluses may affect long-term interest rates today, as these
are determined by a weighted average of expected short-term interest rates
in the future: "In other words, dissipating future surpluses imposes economic
costs not only in the long-term, but may also drive up long-term interest
rates today and thereby hamper economic activity in the short-term" (Gale
and Orzag (2002), p.11).
Focusing on our research purposes, we may infer the corollary of the re-
viewed theory regarding fiscal consolidations: a credible decline in present
and future budget deficits, and thus in debt, tends to lower expected future
short-term interest rates, and therefore tends to lower present long-term in-
terest rates immediately. This theoretical view seems highly confirmed by
statement of leading economists. We report two different historical episodes.
In the first, Feldstein (1986) refers to the rise of deficits and debt as pressing
up interest rates in the 70s:
"An anticipated future budget deficit means a smaller amount of funds at
that future date to finance investment in plant and equipment. Restricting
that investment will require a higher real rate of interest. Similarly, the an-
ticipated budget deficit means that individuals will have to be offered a higher
yield in the future to induce them to hold the larger amount of government
debt in their portfolios. Both of these effects raise the expected future in-
terest rate and therefore (...) they raise the current long-term rate as well"
(Feldstein (1986), p.13).
In the second, Taylor (1995) addresses the relation debt−interest rates in
the 80s−90s’ context of fiscal consolidations:
"Economic research - both theory and econometric models - provides evi-
dence that lower budget deficits will lower real interest rates, increase invest-
ment, and thereby increase productivity growth and real incomes" (Taylor
(1995), p.151).
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5.2 Interest Rates and Budget Deficits/Debt: Empir-
ical Evidence
In spite of the mixed theoretical scenario pictured in the previous section,
the conventional view suggests a positive correlation between budget deficits,
public debt and interest rates. This correlation is not apparent in the recent
history, as the deterioration of public budgets across industrialized countries
(Japan, US, EU) has coexisted with interest rates at very low levels. Yet, this
could be the result of the specific historical circumstances of the recent years.
We now look at the literature on the empirical evidence on this correlation.
We will find a rather mixed picture, as coefficients of fiscal policy variables
in interest rate regressions span from positive and significant to insignificant,
and as significant estimates vary widely.
The most widely known structural macro-econometric models (developed
by the Congressional Budget Office or the Federal Reserve Bank in the US,
the IMF or the OECD) feature economically significant effects of budget
deficits on interest rates. An unweighted average of the coefficients in these
models indicates that an increase of one percentage point (pp) in the primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio induces an increase in the interest rates of 10-year gov-
ernment bonds by about 50 basis points (bp) after one year. This sensitivity
increases to 60 bp in the case of deficits caused by spending (Gale and Orzag
(2002)).
In the last three decades an extensive empirical literature has attempted
to estimate the relationship between interest rates and deficits/debt, with a
special focus on the US economy. In a comprehensive review of this literature
(until 1989), Barth et al. (1991) find that out of the existing 42 studies, 17
found significant positive effects of deficits on interest rates,68 19 did not
found significant positive effects,69 and 6 found mixed results.
More recently, Laubach (2004) has pointed out that this literature lacks
controlling for factors such as the response of monetary policy and automatic
68See, for example, Feldstein (1986), Wachtel and Young (1987), Cebula (1988) and
Barth and Bradley (1989).
69See, for example, Evans (1985, 1987), Bradley (1986), Plosser (1987) and Kolluri and
Giannaros (1987).
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stabilizers to the business cycle, which may mask the effect of current deficits
on interest rates.70
Given this empirical problem, the most recent literature has focused on
the relation between long horizon forecasts of budget deficits/debt and in-
terest rates, along two alternative approaches. First, event analysis have
looked at changes in interest rates (and other asset prices) on the day of the
release of new information about the future budget outlook. Second, the an-
nouncement effect methodology (Knot and de Haan (1999)) has used current
projections/expectations of future deficits obtained from macroeconometric
methods such as VARs, or using official budget projections based on the
analysis of current and announced future fiscal policies.71
In a closer examination of the 42 papers analyzed in Barth et al. (1991),
Gale and Orzag (2002) found that studies incorporating deficit expectations
in addition to current and past deficits tend to find economically and statisti-
cally significant positive correlations. Of the 19 papers finding no significant
positive effect, only one did take deficit expectations directly into account,
twelve did not take expectations into account (and the same happened with
4 out of the 6 papers that have found mixed results), and the remaining six
only considered expectations indirectly. Moreover, they found that VAR ex-
pectations may probably be poor measures of agents’ expectations of budget
deficits, as these are dependent on a political process and, hence, can change
dramatically: a VAR approach "often produces poor forecasts because it as-
sumes that expectations are based on a mechanical projection of past variables
and because it typically incorporates only a very limited number of variables
(...) A VAR projection is thus fundamentally backward-looking, and fails to
incorporate information that may be widely available to market participants
about future events" (Gale and Orzag (2002), p.21-22).72
70A cyclical downturn may result in a deterioration of the government budget due to the
automatic fiscal stabilizers, while the monetary policy response is inducing a fall in interest
rates, which produces a negative correlation between the budget deficits and interest rates
(Laubach (2004)).
71Budget projections produced by several institutions like, in the US, the Congressional
Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget, or the European Central Bank,
in EU.
72Elmendorf (1993) compared the performance of VAR forecasts relative to some pub-
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Extending the literature review from 1989 onwards until 2002, Gale and
Orzag (2002) examined 16 additional studies, from which 11 found positive
significant effects73 and 5 found mixed effects.74 Overall, from the 58 papers
in this literature only one did take deficit expectations explicitly into account
and still produced insignificant results, which strongly indicates that there is
a positive correlation between expected deficit/debt and long-term interest
rates.
As regards the magnitude of the elasticity, although the estimates vary,
its average is consistent with the parameters of the structural macroecono-
metric models: an increase of one pp in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is
associated with an increase in long-term government bonds interest rates of
about 40 to 50 bp.
European Union evidence Almost all the studies referred to above an-
alyze the relation between budget deficits/debt and interest rates in the US,
while evidence for the case of the European Union is much more scarce.
Studies of the EU have focused on micro analysis of the behavior of
interest rate spreads (Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), Faini
(2004), Paesani et al. (2006)) or on event studies (Afonso and Strauch (2007),
Ardagna (2009)). Overall, Faini (2004, p.490) concludes that "The main con-
clusion that emerges from such literature is that fiscal policy, however mea-
sured, matters but its effects are quite small, namely a one per cent increase
in the deficit to GDP ratio would raise interest rates on government bonds
by around 10 basis points. While not negligible, this effect is substantially
smaller than that estimated in the US literature". Some of these results are
presented in table A.1, in appendix A.4.
licly available budget projections, and concluded that these projections were much better
proxies of deficit expectations. He also concluded that when replacing the VAR forecasts
by those projections the findings of some studies, like Evans (1987) and Plosser (1987),
could be overturned. Miller and Russek (1996) used three different econometric methods
in order to estimate the relation between expected budget deficits and long-term interest
rates. They found evidence of a significant positive link, except with the VAR methodol-
ogy, with which they found mixed results.
73See, for example, Miller and Russek (1991, 1996), Elmendorf (1996), Kitchen (1996),
Tavares and Valkanov (2001) and Canzoneri et al. (2002).
74See, for example, Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994).
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The fact that, within the Euro Area, interest rates on euro-denominated
bonds issued by different governments have been quite similar since the be-
ginning of the monetary union, is itself informative about the small sensitivity
of interest rates to public debt. As Codogno et al. (2003) and Bernoth et al.
(2004) argue, existing spreads should reflect differences in liquidity (liquid-
ity risk), and, mainly, differences in the creditworthiness of sovereign issuers
(risk of default), which should increase with the debt, deficit and debt-service
ratio.75
Actually, IMF (2009) have showed that, within the Euro Area, long-term
government bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany began rising significantly
only after the outset of the current 2007/09 financial crisis, but have done so
especially for economies where the risk of default is high and rising (figure
5.1).76 Thus, it is fair to conclude that currently the governments of Euro
Area countries are paying significant risk premiums, related with their fiscal
performance.
FIGURE 5.1 – Long-term government bond yield spread vis-à-vis Germany 
 
IMF (2009), p.30 
75Pagano and von Thadden (2004) concluded that, after the start of EMU, the liquidity
premiums have vanished. Hence, the interest rates’ yield spreads should essentially be
affected by default risk premiums.
76Highly indebted economies (like Greece and Italy) and also Ireland, where government
guarantees provided to the financial sector amount to more than 250% of GDP.
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Non-linearities It has been argued in the literature that the positive re-
lation between debt/deficit and interest rates is non-linear, in the sense that
the correlation coefficient increases with the level of the debt. Higher stocks
of public debt raise the public’s concern about long run sustainability, which
renders the adjustment required to stabilize the debt larger and, thus, raises
the risk of default and leads market participants to ask for an higher risk
premium. As argued by Faini (2004), there is a circularity between the debt
stabilizing primary surplus and the interest rate: an higher interest rate leads
to an higher debt service, an higher debt stabilizing primary surplus, and thus
an higher interest rate, and so on and so forth.
At an empirical level, Faini (2004) found that in the high-debt countries
within the EU, fiscal deficits tend to have a stronger impact on interest rates.
This non-linear effect has also been stressed by Ardagna et al. (2007): in a
cross-section analysis of 16 OECD countries, for the period between 1960
and 2002, they found evidence of significant effects of fiscal imbalances on
long-term interest rates− on average a one pp increase in the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio is associated with a 10 bp rise in the interest rate on 10-year
government bonds. However, this effect seems to be significant only when
the public debt to GDP ratio is above a threshold that they estimated to be
around 65%.
For a panel of 16 OECD countries, with data for the period between
1960 and 2002, and using an event analysis methodology, Ardagna (2009)
found that the relation between budget deficits and interest rates depend on
the countries’ initial fiscal conditions − such as the level of public debt −
and also on the type of fiscal consolidation. The fiscal adjustments typically
associated with larger reductions in interest rates fulfilled three conditions:
(i) occurred in countries with high levels of budget deficit and/or high stock
of public debt; (ii) generated a permanent and significant reduction in the
public debt; and (iii) were implemented by cutting government spending.77
Specifically, nominal (real) long-term interest rates on government bonds
77Cutting expenses generates a credibility effect, as agents believe that the government
is able to generate a persistent decrease in public debt. This effect is stronger if the changes
affect some structural and politically sensitive components of government spending, like
the government wage bills.
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have decreased, on average, by 124 bp (97 bp) around such episodes of sharp
fiscal consolidations.78
Public debt direct effect The empirical evidence surveyed thus far es-
sentially refers to a relation between budget deficits and long-term interest
rates. However, as already seen in the last subsection, the level of the public
debt may have an important influence on that relation, namely when debt is
above a certain threshold.
Actually, the strand of literature empirically studying the relation be-
tween public debt and long term interest rates has found some evidence of a
positive, although small, direct correlation (see table A1 in appendix A.4).
Generally, estimates of the effect of a one pp change in the expected deficit-
to-GDP ratio on long term interest rates are 5 to 10 times larger than the
estimates of the effects of such a change in the expected debt-to-GDP ratio.
For the US, Laubach (2003) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) have found
that a one pp increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio increases the expected real
interest rate, on average, by 20 to 40 bp, while a one pp increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio increases the expected real interest rate by a merely 3 to 5 bp.
Evidence for a wider range of industrial countries is quite similar: Kinoshita
(2006), using panel data for 19 industrial countries, reports a deficit-to-GDP
impact of 20 to 25 bp, and a debt-to-GDP impact of 1 to 3 bp;79 Ardagna
et al. (2007), with their panel of 16 OECD countries, have found an effect of
about 10 bp of a change in deficit-to-GDP ratio, and of 0 to 4 bp in the case of
a change in debt-to-GDP ratio. For the Euro Area, Chalk and Tanzi (2002)
estimated a 1 to 6 bp change in the real interest rate for a one pp change
in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and Faini (2004) has found a debt-to-GDP
effect of 5 to 7 bp.
Based on his estimates, for 19 OECD countries (1971-2004), Kinoshita
78Ardagna (2009) presents a wide set of alternative estimations for the effect of an
increase in the expected budget deficit on the long-run interest rate: under "normal"
conditions, 25 to 33 bp; under a decrease of 3 pp in public debt after two years, 54 to 62
bp; under a decrease of 5 pp in public debt after two years, 76 to 85 bp; in situations of a
high initial debt, 66 to 71 bp; after a larger government spending cut, 48 to 55 bp.
79These effects are raised, respectively, to 70−90 bp and 4−5 bp when fixed country
effects are included in the regression.
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(2006) has suggested that a simultaneous increase (or decrease) in the public
debt and the budget deficit would generate considerably larger effects on
the long-run interest rates than changes in the public debt alone. We thus
argue that when studying fiscal consolidations the proper calibration should
include the combined effects on long term interest rates of the reduction of
public debt and of the budget deficit − as consolidations are, by definition,
sustained (and, thus, deficit-based) debt-to-GDP ratio reductions.
Summary Overall, the empirical literature on the relation between deficits/debt
and long-term interest rates allows for the following main conclusions. First,
there is a positive relation; second, the sensitivity of interest rates to deficit/debt
seems to be smaller in Europe than in the US; third, the estimated ef-
fects are stronger in studies that use long-term interest rates and/or budget
deficits/debt projections, instead of short-run interest rates and/or current
deficits/debt (which is clearly linked with the forward looking behavior of
financial markets’ participants); fourth, the level of the public debt stock has
a strong influence on the relation, as the elasticity seems to be higher when
the public debt-to-GDP ratio is above a given threshold, and maybe is an
increasing function of the debt-to-GDP ratio; fifth, the direct effect of debt
seems to be significantly smaller than the budget deficit effect.
5.3 TheModelWith a Public Debt−Interest Rate Chan-
nel
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous section, we now enhance
our model of chapter 4 introducing a direct relation between the level of
public debt and the equilibrium long-term interest rate. We will then use
the developed model in order to assess whether fiscal consolidation policies
may generate non-Keynesian effects in the context of such a model with
dependence of the real equilibrium interest rate on the level of public debt.
As in the previous chapter, we will simulate a set of alternative fiscal
shocks that mimic a fiscal consolidation in the sense that they have a per-
sistent impact on public debt over several years (see figures 4.1 and 4.2).
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Fiscal consolidation now affects the long-term real interest rate and long-run
investment, so a persistent decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio generates an
higher steady-state capital stock and an higher potential output (European
Commission (2004)). Therefore, the model now considers a structural effect
of the fiscal consolidation. Hence, differently from the analysis so far, there
is a structural supply-side effect of the demand-side fiscal policy action. As
the model has been enhanced with the new debt−interest rate channel with
everything else constant, and we will simulate the shocks considered in the
previous chapter, this chapter should allow for the detection of changes in
the results due to the new channel.
Technically, the analysis will develop in three steps: first, we extend
our model in order to account for the link between government debt (B)
and the long-term real interest rate (R), which is equal to the inverse of
the households’ discount rate (β);80 second, we describe the models’ long-
term relation between the parameter β and equilibrium output, in order to
account for the changes in the steady-state variables affected by changes in
the equilibrium interest rate; third, the transition path to a new steady-
state after some fiscal shock is then derived by adding-up both the dynamics
present in the previous chapter and the transition of the economy into a
different steady-state.
As before, we will consider three different types of fiscal shock in the two
usual scenarios (a perfectly competitive labor market and a labor market
characterized by monopolistic competition): i) a non-productive government
spending shock; ii) a weakly productive government spending shock; and iii)
a weakly-productive public employment shock.
5.3.1 Government debt and long-term real interest rate
The extension of our model in order to account for the relation between
government debt (B) and long-term real interest rate (R) follows closely
Coenen et al. (2008). They allow upward deviations of the debt ratio (Bt
Y
)
from the steady-state level (B
Y
) to have a direct and positive effect on the
80See equation (50).
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real equilibrium interest rate, which is by definition equal to the inverse of
the households’ discount rate (R = 1β ). The relation is given by:
Rt =
1
βt
=
1
β
+ θ
µ
Bt
Y
− B
Y
¶
. (96)
The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of the equilibrium real interest
rate to changes in the expected debt-to-GDP ratio. Our baseline calibra-
tion of this parameter is 0.003125, implying that a one pp reduction in the
annual public debt-to-GDP ratio (relative to its steady-state level) results
in a decline of the annualized equilibrium real interest rate of 5 bp. This
is in line with the range of estimates reported in the literature for the pure
direct impact of public debt changes on long term interest rates. Hence, our
starting point is a rather conservative calibration, as this elasticity seems to
be larger when the fiscal consolidation is generated by a cut in government
spending.
5.3.2 Steady-State Analysis
This section describes the steady-state (SS) of the model. Some SS relations
have already been described in previous chapters, such as the SS real interest
rate (equation (50)), the SS real current value of the capital stock (equation
(53)), the SS real rental rate of capital (equation(60)) and the SS capital
accumulation equation (equation(61)).
From the conditions for cost minimization (equation (84)) and profit max-
imization (equation(85)) by the producers we get to,
wNp
rkK
=
1− α
α
(97)
and
1
μ
= w(1−α)
³
rk
´α ³
Glp
´−γ ³
Ghp
´−η ¡
Ng
¢−ν
α−α(1− α)−(1−α). (98)
The SS optimal labor supply can be directly derived from equation (23),
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for a monopolistic competitive labor market, or equation (78), for a perfectly
competitive labor market, respectively:
£
(1− h)C
¤−σc
(1− τn)w = (1 + λw)N
σN
(1 + τ c) (99)
and
£
(1− h)C
¤−σc
(1− τn)w = NσN (1 + τ c). (100)
Finally, the SS production function, the labor market clearing condition
and the goods market equilibrium condition can be written as,
Y = K
α
Np
(1−α)
³
Glp
´γ ³
Ghp
´η
N g
ν
, (101)
N = Np +Ng (102)
and
Y = C +Glp +Ghp + I ⇔ C
Y
= γc = 1−
Glp
Y
− G
hp
Y
− I
Y
. (103)
After combining and rearranging the previous steady-state equations (all
the equations and derivations are presented in appendix A.5), we obtain
the following analytical solution for steady-state output, under monopolistic
competition in labor market,
Y
(σN+σc)
=
(1− τn)w(1+ασN )α(ασN )
³
Glp
´(γσN ) ³
Ghp
´(ησN )
Ng
(νσN )
(1− α)(ασN )
³
rk
´(ασN )
(1− h)σcγσcc (1 + τ c)
³
1 + N
g
Np
´σN
(1 + λw)
(104)
and the following under a perfectly competitive labor market,
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(σN+σc)
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(1− τn)w(1+ασN )α(ασN )
³
Glp
´(γσN ) ³
Ghp
´(ησN )
Ng
(νσN )
(1− α)(ασN )
³
rk
´(ασN )
(1− h)σcγσcc (1 + τ c)
³
1 + N
g
Np
´σN . (105)
Two features of equations (104) and (105) are noteworthy:
First, an increase in the discount rate (β) increases the SS values of
investment through the reduction in the SS real capital rental price;81 as
the lower cost of capital induces capital accumulation, then the steady-state
output increases.
Second, the reduction in the cost of capital, which may be seen as an
income effect, induces an increase in the demand for labor, which leads to an
higher SS real wage and an higher SS output.
Thus, a decrease in the long-term real interest rate, clearly induces an
increase in the steady-state values of private investment and output.
5.4 Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Consolidations
This section reports the effects on output, private consumption and invest-
ment of the three different types of fiscal consolidations mentioned in the
previous section. We will be using the new-Keynesian DSGE model with
productive public inputs and a channel between public debt and the long-
term interest rates developed in that section.
Following the process of implementation described above, each model sim-
ulation will be conducted in three steps: (i) calculation of the new discount
rate generated by the public debt decrease, using equation (96); (ii) computa-
tion of the new steady-state values for the relevant macroeconomic variables,
solving the system of steady-state equations; (iii) derivation of the transition
path to the new steady-state by adding-up both the dynamics present in the
previous chapter and the new dynamics of the transition of the economy into
the new steady-state.
81Equation (60): rk =
1
β−δτ
k+δ−1
1−τk .
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5.4.1 Fiscal consolidations and the discount rate
We consider the three different types of fiscal consolidation analyzed in chap-
ter 4, under the two usual labor market scenarios (perfectly competitive and
monopolistic competitive): i) a non-productive government spending shock
(γ = 0); ii) a weakly productive government spending shock (γ = 0.05);
and iii) a weakly-productive public employment shock (ν = 0.05). Having
in mind the purposes of our study and given that we have found in chapter
4 that, even without the interest rate effect, a fiscal consolidation induced
by weakly-productive public employment produces non-Keynesian effects in
a perfectly competitive labor market, we will skip this case.
We first calculate the new discount rate (β). Given that
Bt
Y
− B
Y
= bBtB
Y
= 2.4 bBt (106)
we use equation (96).82 Results are summarized in table 5.1 below.
Public
employment
shock
γ=0 γ=0.05 ν=0.05 γ=0 γ=0.05
Notes: 1) See equation (96) for relation between the parameters in the table.
2) Coefficient θ  in equation (96) is calibrated as 0.003125.
for selected fiscal consolidations
Government
spending
shock
Government
spending
shock
-0.614 -0.2208 -0.7392
1.00751.007691.00931
Monopolistic competition Perfect competition
-0.622 -0.3624
Table 5.1 - New discount rate and steady-state interest rate
0.99078 0.99237 0.99201 0.99121
1.00808Rt
0.99198
1.00887
Y
B
Y
B t −
tβ
Recall that, with our calibration, a reduction of 1 pp in the debt-to-GDP
82 bBt is the percentage deviation of real public debt from the steady-state value (Bt−BB ).
104
ratio induces a decrease of 5 bp in the long-term real interest rate. Hence,
the positive relation between the discount rate and the success of the fiscal
consolidation in the table. In accordance to the consolidation effects of each
fiscal shock already detected in the previous chapter, β decreases with the
degree of the public spending productivity and increases with the degree of
competition in the labor market, everything else constant.
5.4.2 The new steady-state and the transitional path
Given the new discount rates, we now proceed to compute the new steady-
state values of the main macroeconomic variables. Then, we derive the tran-
sition path to the new steady-state, adding-up both the dynamics present in
the previous chapter and the transitional dynamics into the new steady-state
(structural supply-side effect). Figures 5.2 to 5.6 show the new steady-state
and the transition path for each of the fiscal shocks leading to the consolida-
tion (and labor market environment).
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the simula-
tions may be summarized as follows.
First, none of the five consolidation strategies generate non-Keynesian
effects on impact (i.e. immediately after the fiscal shock).
Second, the larger non-Keynesian effects occur when the consolidation is
based in the cut of non-productive government spending, in which output
surpasses its original steady-state level since period 2 (both in monopolistic
and perfect competitive labor markets). When the consolidation is based on
the cut of the weakly-productive public employment, there is a positive effect
on output on impact, but the rather strong negative impact on investment
(see figure 4.10) induces a new decrease in output. Then, non-Keynesian
effects appear from around the fifth quarter. In both consolidations, the
steady-state effects induced by the decrease in the long-term interest rate
generates a strong positive impact on private investment that, in two to
five quarters, offsets the direct negative impact of the fiscal contraction on
output.
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FIGURE 5.2 - Non-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.3 - Non-productive government spending
(perfect competition)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.4 - Weakly-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.5 - Weakly-productive government spending
(perfect competition)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.6 - Weakly-productive public employment
(monopolistic competition)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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Third, when the fiscal consolidation is based on the reduction of weakly-
productive government spending, output exceeds its original steady-state
level 3 years after the shock (under a perfectly competitive labor market).
When the labor market has monopolistic competition, output crosses its pre-
vious steady-state 5 years after the shock. In these cases, it seems that is
debatable to classify such delayed effects as non-Keynesian effects. This re-
sult may be explained by two reasons: (i) even without the long-term interest
rate effect, a consolidation through weakly-productive government spending
was associated with the higher contraction of short-run output (see figure
4.4); moreover, (ii) the steady-state effects are rather limited because, as we
have seen in chapter 4 (figure 4.1), this type of consolidation induces a weak
and not sustained response of debt and, thus, generates only a small decrease
in the long-term interest rate.
5.4.3 Sensitivity analysis to the parameter θ
The parameter θ, which measures the sensitivity of the equilibrium real in-
terest rate to changes in the expected debt-to-GDP ratio, has been calibrated
so far in the presumption that a 1 pp reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio
induces a decrease of 5 bp in the long-term real interest rate. In the last
subsection we have seen that with such calibration none of the five cases
generate non-Keynesian effects on impact. Table 5.2 below shows the size
of the long-term interest rate decrease that would be necessary to generate
non-Keynesian effects on impact.
Monopolistic Perfect
competition competition
γ=0 7.42 bp 6.08 bp
γ=0.05 37.91 bp 16.83 bp
ν=0.05 5.51 bp ---
Table 5.2 - Sensitivity analysis
As we have stressed before, in view of our literature review at the outset
of this chapter, the value of 5 bp is a rather conservative value. As discussed
in section 5.2, it could be argued that values between 5 and 10 bp may be
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plausible. As Table 5.2 shows, values slightly higher than 5 would actually
generate non-Keynesian effects on impact in all cases except when the fiscal
consolidation is based on the reduction of the weakly-productive government
spending. Here, the probability of the existence of non-Keynesian effects
remains very low.
5.5 Dynamic Effects of a Fiscal Consolidation Under
Imperfect Credibility
The adjustment of long-term interest rates to the public debt consolidation
clearly depends on economic agents’ expectations. Since agents participating
in financial markets tend to take their decisions with a forward-looking per-
spective, the credibility of the fiscal consolidation is crucial to the possible
impact on interest rates. Until now, we have analyzed a perfectly credible
fiscal consolidation, that generated an immediate reduction in the long-term
interest rate.
However, if economic agents have some doubts about the success of the
fiscal consolidation, they may not anticipate the interest rate decrease. In or-
der to account for such a possibility, we now consider two additional scenarios
with respect to the fiscal consolidation credibility: (i) a medium-credibility
consolidation and (ii) a low-credibility consolidation.
5.5.1 Medium-credibility consolidation
In this scenario, economic agents have some doubts about the success of the
fiscal consolidation and, hence, they only anticipate immediately half of the
expected decrease in long-term interest rate. We assume that the other half
will be anticipated when the debt-to-GDP ratio reduction equals 1
3
of the total
expected reduction. Table 5.3 shows, for the five consolidating strategies, the
period in which the 1
3
reduction is reached, and the corresponding values for
the discount rate.
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Public
employment
shock
γ=0 γ=0.05 ν=0.05 γ=0 γ=0.05
Period t:
1/3 debt reduction
Notes: 1) See equation (96) for relation between the parameters in the table.
2) Coefficient θ  in equation (96) is calibrated as 0.003125.
Government
spending
shock
Table 5.3 - Medium-credibility consolidation
0.99078 0.99237 0.99201 0.99121
0.99099
0.99198
0.990610.991000.991190.99039
Monopolistic competition Perfect competition
6 4
Government
spending
shock
6 4 5
1β
tβ
Figures 5.7 to 5.11 show the new steady-states and the transition dy-
namics of the main macroeconomic variables, for each of the 5 cases of fiscal
shocks/labor market competition. Differently from the previous pictures,
the economy has now an intermediate steady-state, corresponding to the im-
mediate reduction in the long-run interest rates and the final steady state,
obtained after completion of 1/3 of the fiscal consolidation.
The main conclusions of these simulations may be summarized as follows.
First, as expected, the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects has been re-
duced, in comparison to the baseline case of perfect credibility seen in the
previous section.
Second, the larger non-Keynesian effects occur when the consolidation is
based in the cut of non-productive government spending, in which output
exceeds the level of the original steady-state in periods 3 and 4, respec-
tively, with perfect competition and monopolistic competition in the labor
market. When government cuts the weakly-productive public employment,
non-Keynesian effects appear in the fifth quarter.
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FIGURE 5.7 - Non-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition; medium credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
114
FIGURE 5.8 - Non-productive government spending
(perfect competition; medium credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.9 - Weakly-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition; medium credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
116
FIGURE 5.10 - Weakly-productive government spending
(perfect competition; medium credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.11 - Weakly-productive public employment
(monopolistic competition; medium credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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Third, the results in the case of a fiscal consolidation based on the re-
duction of weakly-productive government spending in the perfect credibility
scenario hold in the medium credibility scenario.
Fourth, non-Keynesian effects on impact would require a 1 pp reduc-
tion in the debt-to-GDP ratio induced a decrease of: (i) 12.38 bp and 15.07
bp, respectively in the perfect competition and monopolistic competition
labor markets, when the consolidation is based on non-productive govern-
ment spending cuts; (ii) 33.97 bp when the consolidation is based on weakly-
productive government spending cuts in the scenario of a perfectly competi-
tive labor market; (iii) 11.21 bp when the consolidation is based on weakly-
productive public employment. Hence, immediate non-Keynesian effects are
completely ruled out if the fiscal consolidation lacks credibility, even to a
medium extent.
5.5.2 Low-credibility consolidation
In this scenario we assume that the fiscal consolidation completely lacks
credibility at its outset. We assume that credibility arises when 1
3
of the debt
reduction is accomplished, but that from that moment onwards economic
agents fully anticipate all the reduction of long-term interest rates. This
implies that the discount rate only increases in period t but then it does go
up to the value shown in table 5.3.
Figures 5.12 to 5.16 show in the upper panel the original and final steady-
states — with the shift occurring at 1
3
of the fiscal consolidation — and in the
lower panel the transition path.
The main conclusions are the following.
First, as expected, the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects has been fur-
thermore reduced, in comparison to the previous simulations.
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FIGURE 5.12 - Non-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition; low credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.13 - Non-productive government spending
(perfect competition; low credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.14 - Weakly-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition; low credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
122
FIGURE 5.15 - Weakly-productive government spending
(perfect competition; low credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 5.16 - Weakly-productive public employment
(monopolistic competition; low credibility)
Steady-state
IRFs - Transitional path
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Second, the larger non-Keynesian effects occur when government cuts
the weakly-productive public employment, where persistent non-Keynesian
effects appear in the fifth quarter. When the consolidation is based on the cut
of non-productive government spending, non-Keynesian effects arise slightly
later, in both labor market scenarios, namely around a year and a half after
the fiscal policy shock.
Third, the results in the case of a fiscal consolidation based on the reduc-
tion of weakly-productive government spending have remained identical to
those of the other two credibility scenarios.
Fourth, irrespective of the value of the discount rate, there is never non-
Keynesian effects on impact in all of the fiscal consolidation cases.
5.6 Summary and Final Remarks
This chapter has explored another possible transmission mechanism, among
those identified in chapter 2, for the investment channel of non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal consolidations — the relation between the level of the fiscal
deficit, or debt, and the long-run interest rates.
In order to motivate the chapter, we firstly reviewed the theoretical and
empirical literature that considers how long-run interest rates may be af-
fected by the level of the fiscal deficit and debt. At a theoretical level we
have found that although some approaches may lead to ambiguous predic-
tions, there seems to have emerged a consensual hypothesis that fiscal profli-
gacy is associated with higher long-run interest rates. We have presented
quotes from well known academics involved in policy making pointing out
that episodes of mounting fiscal indiscipline have been associated with in-
creasing interest rates, while more recent episodes of fiscal adjustment have
engendered declining interest rates. Our survey of the empirical literature
has found some heterogeneity of results but, clearly, a positive correlation
between fiscal deficits or debt and long-run interest rates is uncovered in
studies that properly look at the structural and prospective state of public
finances and its relation to interest rates that are actually long-term ones.
On the basis of this finding we conclude that at the heart of the relation
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deficit/debt-interest rates are the expectations about the fiscal stance and
sustainability, which puts the relation at the center of the fiscal consolida-
tion processes that we aim to study. Two additional results in the literature
are relevant for our analysis. First, while the estimates for the relevant elas-
ticity seem somewhat smaller in the European case (comparing to the US
case), overall the literature offers useful benchmarks for a calibration of the
relation. Second, the relation seems to depend upon the initial state of the
public finances, and thus it may be argued that it should be larger in episodes
of fiscal consolidations.
The chapter then contributes to the literature by incorporating into the
new-Keynesian DSGE model developed in chapter 4 (the baseline model of
chapter 3 enriched with productive public spending and employment) a direct
relation between the level of the public debt and the steady-state interest
rate. The transmission mechanisms in our model, in addition to the standard
demand-side effects and the effects on total factor productivity considered
since chapter 4, now include a structural supply-side effect consisting of the
impact of fiscal consolidation on the steady-state of the economy.
Technically, we proceed in three steps. First, we model the relation be-
tween the fiscal debt and the discount factor — which determines the steady-
state interest rate — and calibrate the relation in agreement with the estimates
for the elasticity given by the reviewed empirical literature. Second, we derive
the steady-state of the economy explicitly solving for the relation between
the discount factor (steady-state interest rate) and the main macroeconomic
variables. Third, we derive the transitional path from the initial steady-state
to the final steady-state with a simultaneous response to the fiscal shock.
Following the basic approach of the previous chapter we have considered
three alternative fiscal shocks leading to the fiscal consolidation, namely re-
ductions in weakly-productive public spending, in unproductive public spend-
ing and in weakly-productive public employment. All shocks have been sim-
ulated in two different models regarding the labor market, one with mo-
nopolistic competition the other with perfect competition. We have skipped
the case of the employment-led consolidation in a perfectly competitive labor
market, as in chapter 4 was clear that non-Keynesian effects would arise even
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without the new transmission mechanism.
We considered as benchmark the case of perfect credibility of the fiscal
consolidation, in which the discount factor shifts immediately with the fiscal
shock and, thus, the steady-state of the economy jumps instantaneously. The
simulations have shown that in none of the fiscal consolidations output in-
creases immediately after the tightening fiscal shock. It may be argued that
there are non-Keynesian effects in the case of consolidations based on unpro-
ductive spending and weakly-productive employment, in which output sur-
passes the initial level as soon as in the second and fifth quarter, respectively.
In contrast, fiscal consolidations entirely based on cuts in weakly-productive
spending can not be considered to generate non-Keynesian effects, as output
exceeds its initial level only after three or five years, respectively, for perfect
competition and monopolistic competition labor markets. As a sensitivity
analysis, we have computed the reduction of the steady-state interest rate
per percentage point of debt reduction that would generate immediate non-
Keynesian effects — i.e. increases in output since the first period of the fiscal
adjustment. We have found magnitudes that are plausible in light of the
literature in the first three cases — between 5.5 and 7.4 basis points — but not
in the case of cuts in weakly-productive spending — between 16.8 and 37.9
basis points.
As a sensitivity check to our baseline results, we have assumed two alter-
native scenarios with more pessimistic assumptions regarding the credibility
of the fiscal consolidation. In fact, the baseline results assume perfect credi-
bility: it is assumed that the economic agents instantaneously believe in the
consolidation and thus there is an immediate jump in the steady-state inter-
est rate, and all the adjustments run under the new steady-state. Specifically,
we assumed a scenario of medium-credibility in which only half of the reduc-
tion in the steady-state interest rate occurs on impact and the remaining fall
in the long-run rate occurs when the public debt reaches one third of the
total adjustment; and a low-credibility scenario, in which agents only believe
in the consolidation once the public debt falls by one third of the total planed
reduction, at which moment they adjust completely their expectations of the
long-run interest rate (i.e. the steady-state interest rate switches to its new
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value).
Table 5.4 summarizes the results under the baseline and these alternative
credibility scenarios. As expected, the lower the credibility the less prevalent
are the non-Keynesian effects. However, in the medium-credibility scenario,
consolidations based on unproductive spending and weakly-productive em-
ployment, generate higher levels of output after three to five quarters, de-
pending on the instrument and the labor market structure. Thus, such a
decrease in credibility generates a very slight shift forward of the effects, in
comparison to those obtained under perfect credibility. Overall, the possi-
bility of increases in output on impact changes more substantially and the
required fall in the interest rate per percentage point of debt reduction is
above the 10 basis points threshold that has been identified in the literature.
In the scenario of low credibility, the results change more markedly. In the
case of a fiscal consolidation based on weakly-productive spending, output
surpasses its initial steady-state level only after more than six quarters, which
can hardly be classified as a non-Keynesian effect. The exception is the re-
sult of a consolidation based on cuts in weakly-productive employment, in
which there is hardly a change in the horizon within which output surpasses
its initial level. Overall, there is no realistic calibration that would generate
non-Keynesian effects on impact.
TABLE 5.4 - Non-Keynesian effects in a NK-DSGE model with productive public spending 
and employment and a debt-interest rate channel
Fiscal shock Productive Perfect Medium Low Perfect Medium Low
elasticity credibility credibility credibility credibility credibility credibility
γ=0 (++) (++) (+) (++) (++) (+)
γ=0.05 (--) (--) (--) (-) (-) (-)
Employment ν=0.05 (+) (+) (+) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: (++): output exceeds initial level within 4 quarters after the fiscal shock.
(+): output exceeds initial level within 4 to 8 quarters after the fiscal shock.
(-): output exceeds initial level within 8 to 16 quarters after the fiscal shock.
(--): output exceeds initial level more than 16 quarters after the fiscal shock.
n.a.: non available.
Monopolistic competition Perfect competition
Spending
To sum-up, the simulations in this chapter suggest that when the initial
state of the public finances is such that the long-run interest rate is sensitive
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to changes in the level of the public debt, so long as the consolidation is cred-
ible and based in cuts either on unproductive spending or weakly-productive
public employment, non-Keynesian effects do arise. Evidently, if such a con-
solidation is based on shifts from less to more productive expenditures of
the sort examined in chapter 4 (simulations not presented), non-Keynesian
effects would be even more marked.
The results in chapter 4 and in this chapter suggest that the structure
of markets — at least of the labor market — often affect the output results
of fiscal consolidations. In the next chapter we explore yet another channel
for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, considering scenarios in which the
fiscal consolidation coincides with some degree of deregulation in the goods
as well as the labor market.
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6 The Supply-side Effects: Markets Reforms
and Competition
"The beneficial effects of (public) expenditure reforms can be reinforced if
they are conducted as a part of a comprehensive reform programme where
macroeconomic or structural bottlenecks elsewhere in the economy are
eliminated at the same time." (Hauptmeier et al. (2007), p.294)
This chapter explores a third investment-related channel for possible non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations. The channel is open when the fiscal
consolidation is combined with deregulating reforms that create a more com-
petitive environment, either in the products market or in the labor market.
There are some references to this supply-side channel for non-Keynesian ef-
fects in the literature as, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a and
1997b), Alesina et al. (2002) and Ardagna (2007). However, as far as we
know, there has been yet no explicit incorporation of this channel in a new-
Keynesian DSGE model. Moreover, the literature is rather biased toward
the study of the regulation and competition of the labor market, with that
of the product market and price markup hardly seen in studies of the effects
of fiscal policy.83
Although still lacking a strong theoretical foundation or a large corpus of
hard empirical evidence at a macro level, there is anecdotal evidence of fiscal
consolidations associated to increased competition leading to productivity
gains and stimulating private investment and output, especially in an envi-
ronment of monopolistic competition.84 Hence our conjecture in this chapter:
that a fiscal consolidation, either by a positive direct impact on competition
levels, or by a combination with structural reforms improving competition
83In this kind of models, markups are usualy assumed as exogenous parameters. There
is some literature of DSGE models with endogenous markups, but that are not especially
concerned with fiscal policy (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Gali
(1995)). An exception is Costa (2004) who uses a Cournotian monopolistic framework,
with endogenous price markup, to analyse fiscal policy effectiveness.
84For surveys see, for example, Ahn (2002) and Schiantarelli (2005).
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may generate non-Keynesian effects. We next review the literature motivat-
ing the simulations subsequently presented in this chapter, looking both at
the direct effect and the junction of a demand side intervention and a supply
side reform.
6.1 Theoretical and Empirical Motivation
A standard result in the literature is that the fiscal multiplier is higher under
monopolist competition and is positively associated to the markups, due
to a profit multiplier.85 In short, an increase in government spending and
aggregate demand and output generates an increase in profits and, hence,
higher levels of consumption and investment; yet, the usual wealth effect
that dampens the multiplier, tends to be less severe if firms and workers
have more monopoly power.
Several results in the previous chapters have pointed to such an effect in
our model’s responses to a fiscal shock. In fact, overall we have found smaller
contractionary impacts of the fiscal consolidations for perfectly competitive
labor market than for a market of monopolistic competition. The fiscal
multiplier is higher with a monopolistic competitive labor market because
of the effects of profits on investment, while in a perfectly competitive labor
market the stronger reaction of the real wage generates lower marginal costs,
putting an upward pressure on profits and investment, that dampens the
multiplier.
Thus, we conjecture that the higher the degree of competition in both
product and labor markets, the smaller the fiscal multiplier and the larger
the probability of non-Keynesian effects.
Competition and macroeconomic performance It is well known from
microeconomic and industrial organization theory that perfect competition
delivers a better resource allocation and, thus, higher efficiency than monop-
olistic competition. It is also well known that this result holds at a macroe-
conomic level (see, among many others, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)).
85See, among others, Dixon (1987), Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989).
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There is ample evidence in the literature linking competition to efficiency
and growth through several mechanisms; in fact, competition: (i) promotes
a shift of market shares from lower to higher productivity firms and of wages
from lower to higher productive workers and, hence, a more efficient allo-
cation of productive factors (Griffith and Harisson (2004)); (ii) stimulates
technical efficiency, at the firm level (Green and Mayes (1991)) and at the
industry level (Baily and Gersbach (1995)); (iii) increases the incentives to
reduce x-inefficiencies and to improve the efficiency of the organization of
work both by managers and workers, leading to a direct and positive effect
on productivity of the existing firms;86 (iv) enhances the incentives to higher
investment in research and development as well as human capital, as firms
and workers try to differentiate their products and labor skills (Nickell (1996),
Bassanini and Ernst (2002)).87
Fiscal policy and competition We firstly address a branch of the lit-
erature about possible direct effects of fiscal consolidation on the degree of
competition. The results are heterogeneous and may be summarized as fol-
lows.
On the one hand, the elasticity approach has argued that a fiscal contrac-
tion may increase the elasticity of demand and reduce the price markup.88
This approach is based on the assumption that ”it seems reasonable to argue
that public spending is less price-elastic than private spending for the most
economies”(Dixon and Rankin (1994), p.189); the argument goes, then, that
86As explained by the agency costs literature − including the seminal paper by Nickell
(1996) and, for example, Disney et al. (2003) and Djankov et al. (2002) − the reduction
of inefficiencies in labor organization derives from the fact that, in a more competitive
environment, (i) it is easier for owners to monitor managers because it is easier to com-
pare across firms, and (ii) the increased probability of losing market shares and, thus, of
bankruptcy, induces managers to make a higher effort in order to avoid that scenario.
87However, some authors have argued that the capacity and the determination of a
firm to invest in innovative processes is intrinsically related with the existence of above-
normal profits, because monopoly rents reward successful innovations. Hence, the final
effect of product market reforms over innovation may be ambiguous. Some very recent
studies suggest that the relation between competition and innovation is non-linear with
an inverted-U shape: innovation is adversely affected by extreme environments such as a
high competition and a monopoly (Griffith and Harisson (2004), Aghion et al. (2005)).
88See, for example, Dixon and Rankin (1994) and Jacobsen and Schultz (1994).
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since the elasticity of demand for goods and services is a weighted average
of private and public elasticities, a fiscal contraction and the resulting de-
crease of the share of public spending would increase the aggregate elasticity
of demand.
On the other hand, it has been argued that a fiscal contraction and the
fall in aggregate demand generates a fall in profit making opportunities, re-
ducing new entries and, hence, increasing firms’ market power and markups
( Molana and Zhang (2001), Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996)). However,
Costa (2004) argues that if less spending decreases factors’ productivity, in-
creasing marginal costs, then the price markup should fall, in a sticky price
environment.
Another line of literature has focused on the relation between public
spending, regulation and competition. Some authors have argued that in
order to increase competition and also minimize the squandering of public
resources, governments should reduce the regulatory procedures that increase
firms’ costs and act as formal barriers to entry (Alesina et al. (2005)). Official
organizations have also stressed this argument in recent times: ”restrictions
on competition - such as limitations on entry, price, output, or production
methods - are very costly ways to promote public interest; have often been
ineffective; and therefore should be avoided” (OECD (1997), p.6). However,
we argue that the relation between regulation and competition is not straight
forward, as in some sectors more competition requires a more sophisticated
regulatory environment, involving higher public spending.
The literature appears more consensual regarding the labor market, as it
seems more likely that a fiscal consolidation generates a lower wage markup.
A fiscal consolidation based on the reduction of public employment and/or
public wages increases the probability of unemployment or the costs of being
unemployed, reduces workers’ bargaining power and, hence, the wage markup
( Alesina et al. (2002), Ardagna (2007)). Fiscal consolidations in general
reduce the demand for labor and thus restraint workers’ wage claims.
Overall, the direct link between a fiscal consolidation and market compe-
tition is rather ambiguous especially in the case of the goods market. Yet,
there is room to argue that a consolidation based on productive public spend-
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ing and/or public employment may reduce the wage markup, and, possibly,
the price markup, via direct links.
Fiscal policy and product and labor market reforms We now briefly
review the literature focusing on the effects of consolidations combined with
structural reforms of labor or product markets that enhance competition.
The concept of product market reform is generally associated to the re-
duction of the costs of entry into the industry faced by firms and to the
promotion of competition in particular industries or at the aggregate level.
The concept of labor market reform is associated to the reduction of the
bargaining power of workers/unions, either by deregulation or by imposing
appropriate regulation.89 An higher market power by firms and/or workers,
i.e. an higher price and/or wage markup, tends be positively associated with
the market’s regulatory burdens. Both product and labor market reforms
typically reduce market regulation and positively affect competition, lower-
ing price and wage markups, and improving overall economic efficiency.90
At a microeconomic level, there is a large evidence that market deregu-
lation tends to lower markups and, hence, to foster total factor productivity
gains.91 Most studies follow what Joskow and Rose (1989) call a ”before-and-
after” approach; this approach is an analysis of changes in regulatory envi-
ronments over time, i.e., the behavior and performance of firms or markets
before and after the introduction or elimination of some regulation. Stud-
ies at a macroeconomic level are much more scarce. In the most important
study at a macro level, Griffith and Harisson (2004) have concluded that a
tight regulation has a significant positive effect on markups, especially when
tightness applies to the ease of starting a new business, to administrative
bureaucracy and to labor market rules.
Overall, it seems fair to argue that structural market reforms inducing
89Although regulatory reform formally means the improvement of regulatory quality
(institutions or processes) and deregulation means complete or partial elimination of reg-
ulation, these terms are usually presented in the literature as synonyms (OECD (1997)).
90See Gersbach (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Blanchard (2004) and Schi-
antarelli (2005).
91See, for example, Martins et al. (1996), Blöndal and Pilat (1997), Joskow and Rose
(1989), Gönenç et al. (2001) and Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005).
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higher competition/lower markups, generate lower prices, stimulate product
demand, investment and output, pushing employment up: ”market deregu-
lation and increased competition might help to reduce unemployment by im-
proving employment prospects” (Solow (2000), p.5).
In spite of the potential medium- to long-run benefits, political support for
a structural market reform can not be taken for granted, as reforms typically
entail short-term costs. First, productivity improvements may result in some
job destruction in the short-run, as real wages fail to adjust downwards and
less efficient firms are pushed out from the market. Second, as it reduces total
rents, deregulation tends to decrease the part of rents accruing to workers.
Third, product market reforms may be blocked by the influence of vested
interests, some of them with strong political power, seeking protection from
competition − the lobbying power of existing incumbents.
In order to promote the reforms’ success and by obvious political reasons,
the lack of political support requires the implementation of transfer schemes
aimed at compensating reform losers, both firms and workers; hence, reforms
call for higher levels of government spending.92 Furthermore, the rise in
unemployment that may follow the reforms also increases public spending.
This line of reasoning suggests that it may not be possible to carry on
a successful fiscal consolidation simultaneously with extensive supply-side
reforms. However there are, at least, three reasons that may reverse this
reasoning. First, increasing factors’ productivity may compensate the tran-
sitional costs of structural reforms (Duval (2008)). Our model specification
and the results of some simulations in chapter 4 may be seen in the light
of this argument. If government compensations take the form of highly-
productive spending, it is possible to have a successful fiscal consolidation
shifting from unproductive to productive spending and simultaneously higher
productivity levels, mitigating the reforms’ short-run costs. Second, a very
weak initial state of public finances can also be determinant for the success
of the fiscal consolidation as the inevitability of consolidation reduces the po-
92These transfer schemes are basically in agreement with the ”two-hands approach”,
firstly put forward by Blanchard et al. (1986). This approach advocates that the suc-
cess of structural supply-side policies is linked with some degree of complementarity with
expansionary demand-side policies.
135
litical power of blockers (Alesina et al. (2008)). Third, some authors showed
that there are substantial spillover effects between reforms (product market,
labor market, fiscal and financial), and that these spillovers may effectively
reduce, or even, eliminate the transitional costs (Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005), Berger and Danninger (2007)).93
We thus put forth the hypothesis that a successful fiscal consolidation
may take place simultaneously with structural supply-side reforms. Besides
the literature reviewed, there seems to exist an important historical evidence
suggesting that some of the most successful fiscal consolidations of the last
decades involved extensive programs of labor market and product market re-
forms and, hence, of increased market competitiveness. Some authors have,
indeed, closely linked fiscal reforms to market reforms: ”the key lesson for pol-
icymakers is that successful reform programs consist of internally consistent
mixtures of labor market, fiscal, and product market reforms that complement
and reinforce each other” (Annett (2007), p.19).
6.2 Fiscal Consolidation and Markets’ Competition
On the basis of the literature and arguments reviewed in the previous section,
we now use our new-Keynesian DSGE model with productive public inputs
to simulate a fiscal consolidation jointly with market reforms that enhance
competition. Our purpose is, as before, to establish conditions under which
fiscal consolidations may generate non-Keynesian effects, now in the context
of increasing competition in labor or product markets.
As in the previous chapters, we will simulate a set of alternative fiscal
shocks that, as seen in chapter 4 (figures 4.1 and 4.2), mimic a fiscal con-
solidation. The novelty in this chapter is that the fiscal consolidation is
associated to a reduction of price and wage markups that induces higher
steady-state levels of investment and output. Therefore, the model now con-
93Two examples often referred to are the following: (i) by reducing firing costs, a labor
market reform may decrease the costs associated with the reallocation of labor across
firms and sectors induced by a product market reform; (ii) by reducing labor demand and,
hence, increasing the probability of unemployment, a fiscal consolidation may reduce the
blocking power of workers with respect to a labor market reform.
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siders a possible structural effect of the fiscal consolidation over price and
wage markups, a junction of a demand side intervention and a supply side
effect that is new in the literature. It should be noted, at this point, that
with the aim of detecting the effects of each channel per se, we only consider
this transmission mechanism in this chapter, and have purposely switched-off
any transmission via the interest rate channel explored in chapter 5. This
does not imply that in real world fiscal consolidations both channels can not
be simultaneously active.
Technically, the analysis is similar to the one developed in chapter 5.
First, we assume a link between the fiscal consolidation and the decrease in
price and wage markups. Second, we describe the models’ long-run relation
between price and wage markups and equilibrium output, in order to account
for the changes in the steady-state induced by the changes in the markups.
Third, the transition path to a new steady-state after a fiscal consolidation
is then derived by adding-up the dynamics presented in chapter 4 and the
transition of the economy into the new steady-state.
In order to keep the analysis systematic, we consider, as before three
alternative types of fiscal consolidations: i) a non-productive government
spending shock; ii) a weakly productive government spending shock; and iii) a
weakly-productive public employment shock. It should be noted that this is,
again, a conservative approach regarding the possible arise of non-Keynesian
effects; in fact, shifting from less to more productive public spending creates
by itself, as seen in chapter 4, non-Keynesian effects; and such a shift could
be a realistic scenario in the context of structural reforms, as reviewed above
in the literature. Since the simulations now involve the improvement of
competition in the product and labor market, differently from the previous
chapters we will only consider the scenario of monopolistic competition in
the labor market.
6.2.1 Fiscal consolidation and price and wage markups
Unlike the case of the relation between public debt and long-term interest
rates, analyzed in chapter 5, it is not possible to find in the literature em-
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pirical estimates of the link between fiscal policy and markups. Since our
model has been calibrated for the Euro Area, in order to establish such a
link, we conjecture that a reasonable effect of the simulated structural mar-
ket reforms would be to reduce the markups to the US levels. Hence, we run
our simulations assuming that the larger effect that the fiscal consolidation
and structural reform program can induce is to change both the price and
wage markups from their original calibrations (Euro Area based) to values
that would correspond to calibrations for the US economy.
As shown in table 3.1, the price and wage markup values were set at,
respectively, 1.35 and 1.3, following the values used by Bayoumi et al. (2004)
and Jonsson (2007), which have been estimated for the Euro Area. The same
authors also presented the corresponding values for the US, which are 1.23
and 1.16, respectively for the wage markup and the price markup. Hence
a change from European to US levels implies reducing the price and wage
markups by, respectively, 8.9% and 10.8%. These values are summarized
in table 6.1. Later on this section, we will consider different values for this
reduction, as a sensitivity check.
TABLE 6.1 - Benchmark levels for the price and wage markups
Euro Area United States Percentual Deviation
Price Markup (λw) 1.35 1.23 -8.89%
Wage Markup (μ) 1.30 1.16 -10.77%
Source: Bayoumi et al  (2004) and Jonsson (2007)
6.2.2 Steady-State Analysis
The steady-state of the model has already been described in chapter 5.
The compilation of all equations and the analytical solution for the model’s
steady-state are shown in appendix A.5. The most relevant equations for in-
specting the steady state impact of a change in the price and wage markups
are:
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As equations (107), (108) and (109) show, a decrease in either the price
markup (μ) or the wage markup (λw) induces an increase in the steady-state
levels of investment and output.
A lower price markup generates a decrease in prices and, thus, an higher
real wage and a lower interest rate, the latter due to the monetary policy
reaction. This leads to an increase in the steady-state values of private
consumption and investment. As a result, the steady-state output increases.
As regards the reduction in the wage markup, the first impact is over
real wages. Given the initial level of labor productivity, a lower real wage
generates lower marginal costs which induces an upward pressure on profits.
This leads to higher steady-state levels of private consumption, investment
and output.
6.3 Dynamic effects of fiscal consolidations
This section reports the effects on output, private consumption and invest-
ment of the three types of fiscal consolidation mentioned in the previous
section.
Recall that these fiscal consolidation shocks are the following: i) a non-
productive government spending shock (γ = 0); ii) a weakly-productive gov-
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ernment spending shock (γ = 0.05); and iii) a weakly-productive public
employment shock (ν = 0.05). All simulations are run in a model with
monopolistic competition both in the products and in the labor market.
In the following sub-sections, the analysis will be sequentially conducted
for three scenarios, the first two more conservative and the third correspond-
ing to a more throughout and ambitious program of structural reforms, in-
cluding a fiscal consolidation, a product market reform and a labor market
reform. In the first, we assume that the fiscal consolidation only reduces
the price markup; in the second, the fiscal consolidation reduces the wage
markup; in the third, both markups are reduced.
The dynamics of the transitional paths are essentially explained by the
short-run dynamics presented in chapter 4, but the economy is now converg-
ing to a higher new steady state. The new steady-state values depend on
the relative impact of each markups’ reduction. As expected, a simultaneous
decrease of both markups induces a larger effect on potential output. To
anticipate a crucial result of the following simulations, it is noteworthy that,
in our model, the impact on potential output of the 8.9% reduction of the
price markup is almost twice as large as the impact of the 10.8% reduction
of the wage markup.
6.3.1 Increasing product market competition
Figures 6.1 to 6.3 show the new steady-state and the transitional path for
each of three fiscal consolidation shocks, in the context of a simultaneous
reduction of the price markups from 1.35 (Euro Area level) to 1.23 (US
level).
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FIGURE 6.1 - Non-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.2 - Weakly-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.3 - Weakly-productive public employment
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
143
The main conclusions from the simulations may be summarized as follows.
First, consolidation strategies based on the reduction of non-productive
government spending or weakly-productive public employment when coupled
with a product market reform, generate non-Keynesian effects on impact
(i.e. an increase in output immediately after the fiscal shock). The effects
of consolidation via public employment are especially noteworthy, as they
are in sharp contrast to those obtained when no market reform occurs (see
figure 4.9). In short, the impact on investment and output induced by the
reduction in the price markup compensates the strong negative effect on
investment induced by the public employment contraction.
As a sensitivity check, we have computed the threshold of price markup
reduction that would assure non-Keynesian effects on impact. It turns out
that a reduction of 5.5% and 4.6% when the consolidation is based, respec-
tively, in non-productive government spending and weakly-productive public
employment, would generate immediate non-Keynesian effects. On the one
hand, this implies that milder reforms (involving about a half of the re-
duction in the markup) would be consistent with immediate expansions of
output in spite of public spending/employment cuts. On the other hand, this
means that market reforms are essential for the existence of instantaneous
non-Keynesian effects.
Second, when the consolidation is based on the weakly-productive gov-
ernment spending, output exceeds its original steady-state level 1 year after
the shock. While one year is a reasonable period to classify these effects as
non-Keynesian, it must be stressed that this would only happen if the price
markup is effectively reduced to the US level.
6.3.2 Increasing labor market competition
Figures 6.4 to 6.6 show, for each of the fiscal shocks leading to consolidation,
the new steady-state and the transitional path, according to our model, when
a labor market reform changes the wage markup from 1.3 (Euro Area level)
to 1.16 (US level).
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FIGURE 6.4 - Non-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.5 - Weakly-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.6 - Weakly-productive public employment
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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The main conclusions from the simulations may be summarized as follows.
First, when fiscal reform is combined with a labor market reform, only
consolidation strategies based on weakly-productive public employment gen-
erate non-Keynesian effects on impact (i.e. immediately after the fiscal
shock). Truly, as when no increase in labor market competition occurred
(see figure 4.9), the impact on investment is negative. However, the overall
impacts are sufficient to generate an output level above the original steady-
state level. Our sensitivity checks have shown that the baseline markup
reduction is close to the minimum consistent with instantaneous expansions
of output (9.3% versus 10.8%).
Second, a consolidation based on non-productive government spending
generates non-Keynesian effects in the second quarter and a quite rapid tran-
sition to the new steady-state. Hence, this is a combination that clearly
generates non-Keynesian effects.
Third, when the consolidation is based on the weakly-productive govern-
ment spending, output exceeds its original steady-state level only 2 years
after the shock. In the dynamics, the strong impact on investment, already
documented in figure 4.10, turns out to prevail. The timing of the impact on
output hardly allows classifying its expansion as a non-Keynesian effect.
Overall, combining the fiscal consolidation with a labor market reform of
a reasonable magnitude is by and large less likely to generate non-Keynesian
effects than a combination of a fiscal consolidation and a product market
reform of a realistic magnitude. The main explanation, within our model,
seems to be that the latter entails a much larger increase in the steady-state
output.
6.3.3 Increasing overall competition
Figures 6.7 to 6.9 show, for each of the fiscal shocks leading to consolida-
tion, the new steady-state and the transitional path, when consolidation is
combined with a broad structural reform that reduces markups both in the
products and in the labor market.
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FIGURE 6.7 - Non-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.8 - Weakly-productive government spending
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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FIGURE 6.9 - Weakly-productive public employment
Steady-State
IRFs - Transitional path
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The main conclusions from the simulations may be summarized as follows.
First, a comprehensive structural reform including fiscal consolidation and
a deregulation of markets, leading to a reduction of both the price markup
and the wage markup to the US levels, would generate non-Keynesian effects
on impact in all analyzed consolidation strategies.
Our sensitivity analysis has further indicated that non-Keynesian effects
on impact would require a substantially lower variation in the markups: 3.8%,
6.4% and 3.1%, respectively, for consolidations based on non-productive
government spending, weakly-productive government spending and weakly-
productive public employment.94. Moreover, if one accepts that an expansion
of output above its initial level within a year is a time horizon that classi-
fies as a non-Keynesian effect, the required reduction of the markups is of,
respectively, 0%, 5.3% and 2.7%.
Second, the magnitude and timing of the expansion in output is sub-
stantially larger when the fiscal consolidation is based on reductions in non-
productive spending or weakly-productive employment. In turn, cuts in pro-
ductive spending, even if weakly productive as we consider, generate a smaller
immediate reaction and a far more gradual convergence to the (15% superior)
steady-state level of output.
6.4 Summary and Final Remarks
This chapter has explored yet another possible transmission mechanism,
among those identified in chapter 2, for the investment channel of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations — the insertion of the fiscal consoli-
dation in a broader economic reform. Such a reform program would involve
not only the fiscal reform but also a deregulation of markets designed to
increase their degree of competition. In a DSGE model such as ours, such
reforms could appear in the (intermediate) products market as well as in the
labor market, and would imply a reduction of (price and wage) markups.
In order to motivate the chapter, we reviewed the literature on the rela-
tion between fiscal and market reforms. We first looked at a line of literature
94We here assume that the relative (percentage) change in both markups is equal.
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that posits some possible direct effects of fiscal reform on the degree of com-
petition and efficiency. While this literature is ambiguous as regards the
impact of fiscal consolidations on the product market competition, it more
clearly argues in favor of a direct increase in the labor market competition
resulting from the fiscal consolidation; in short, consolidations — especially
when based in public employment cuts — causes an immediate fall in labor
demand and a higher probability and cost of unemployment, which contracts
workers’ and unions’ power. A second type of literature focuses on the like-
lihood that fiscal consolidations may be embedded in a wider program of
reforms involving an overall quest for higher efficiency. We have highlighted
reasons for a possible lack of political support for such reform programs,
which would indicate that higher public spending would be needed in order
to compensate for the short-run social impacts of markets reforms, thus in-
validating the consolidation; yet, we have also uncovered arguments in favor
of the hypothesis that a simultaneous fiscal consolidation would minimize
or even eliminate the transitional costs of reforming markets. Moreover, we
have identified important historical evidence of such comprehensive reform
programs.
A problem with the literature on the topic explored in this chapter is
the absence of estimates for the magnitude of reduction of markups possibly
associated with fiscal consolidation and reforms. Given that we had initially
calibrated the markups with estimates obtained with Euro Area data, and
given that according to the empirical evidence the markups are lower for the
US case, we have tackled this issue assuming that a reform would correspond
to a reduction of the markup from Euro Area to US levels.
The chapter then contributes to the literature by simulating a fiscal con-
solidation shock in the new-Keynesian DSGE model developed in chapter 4
(the baseline model of chapter 3 enriched with productive public spending
and employment) under a simultaneous reduction of the markup in at least
one market (product, labor) from Euro Area to US levels. Thus, in addition
to the standard demand-side effects and the effects on total factor produc-
tivity considered since chapter 4, we now include a structural supply-side
effect that aims at mimicking a deregulation of markets and the consequent
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increase in efficiency and in the steady-state level of output.
Technically, the procedures in this chapter are similar to those in the
previous one, and develop in three steps. First, we calibrate the change
of markups according to the referred evidence for the Euro Area and the
US. Second, we derive the steady-state of the economy explicitly obtaining
the relation between the markups and the main macroeconomic variables.
Third, we derive the transitional path from the initial steady-state to the
final steady-state when a fiscal shock occurs.
Following the approach of the previous chapter we have considered three
alternative fiscal shocks leading to the fiscal consolidation, namely reductions
in weakly-productive public spending, in unproductive public spending and
in weakly-productive public employment. All shocks have been simulated in
three alternative scenarios of market reforms: a pure product market reform
(reduction of price markup); a pure labor market reform (decline of wage
markup); and an overall markets reform (decline in both price and wage
markups).
Differently from the previous chapters, the labor market has been as-
sumed throughout to have a structure of monopolistic competition, as the
focus here has been set precisely on reforms and changes to the degree of
competition. Differently from chapter 4 and likewise chapter 5 we have not
simulated any spending shift but merely cuts in one class of public expendi-
ture, in order to offer a systematic assessment of the marginal effects of the
market reforms.
Table 6.2 summarizes the results, with, for the sake of comparability, a
notation as similar as possible to that of table 5.4.
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TABLE 6.2 -    Non-Keynesian effects in a NK-DSGE model with productive
public spending and employment and a markup channel: price 
and/or wage markups reduced from Euro Area to US levels
Productive Price Wage Price and wage
elasticity markup markup markups
γ=0 (+++) (++) (+++)
γ=0.05 (++) (+) (+++)
Employment ν=0.05 (+++) (+++) (+++)
Notes: (+++): output exceeds initial level on impact.
(++): output exceeds initial level within 2 to 4 quarters after the fiscal shock.
(+): output exceeds initial level within 4 to 8 quarters after the fiscal shock.
Spending
Fiscal shock
The simulations have shown that consolidations based on cuts in non-
productive spending or weakly-productive public employment, when com-
bined with an increase in competition in the products market, generate
non-Keynesian effects immediately. In fact, immediate expansions of out-
put would arise even if the price markup fell slightly more than half the
way through the reduction from Euro Area levels to US levels. When the
fiscal consolidation is based on cuts in weakly-productive spending, output
firstly contracts and then surpasses its initial level, on the way to the higher
steady-state, 4 quarters after the shock. While this timing still qualifies as
a non-Keynesian effect, it is clear that the more productive is the reduced
public sending the more ambitious must product markets reforms be in order
to avoid the traditional contraction of output.
The impact of the labor market reform — according to our wage markup
calibrations — on the economy’s steady-state is smaller than the impact of
the product market reform. As a result, and given the specific market under
reform in these simulations, only when the fiscal consolidation is based on
the reduction of public employment do non-Keynesian effects hold at impact.
Fiscal consolidations based on reductions of public spending combined with
a fall in the wage markup only generate non-Keynesian effects in the case
of non-productive spending. In consolidations based on cuts to productive
spending simultaneously with an increase in competition in the labor market,
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output only exceeds its initial steady-state level two years after the beginning
of the reforms, which can not be classified as a non-Keynesian effect.
As the last column in table 6.2 shows, when fiscal consolidation is con-
ducted within a global reform program involving deregulation and higher
competition in all markets, the model predicts immediate non-Keynesian ef-
fects irrespectively of the class of public expenditure reduced. Our sensitivity
analysis has shown, moreover, that in the case of such a global program of
reforms, the degree of markup reduction required for output not to contract
is between thirty and seventy percent of the reduction from Euro Area to US
levels.
To sum-up, the simulations in this chapter suggest that fiscal consolida-
tions based on spending contraction need not depress output, if adequately
combined with structural reforms increasing the competition in the markets.
On the basis of our model and calibrations, it seems that product market
reforms have a higher potential to generate non-Keynesian effects of fiscal
consolidations in the Euro Area. Finally, one major economic policy con-
clusion from these simulations is that the more comprehensive the market
reforms, the higher the probability of success of the consolidation and the
lower the sacrifice demanded to economic agents.
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7 Fiscal Consolidations: Lessons From Some
European Cases
"In particular, (...) the composition of the adjustment appears as the
strongest predictor of the growth effect: all of the non-expansionary
adjustments were tax based and all of the expansionary ones were
expenditure based. (...) wage agreements seem also to be important,
although a couple of cases show that, alone, they are not sufficient. (...) In
all of the expansionary cases, governments and unions agreed on wage
moderation policies." (Alesina and Ardagna (1998), p.516)
While until the early 1970s most developed countries exhibited balanced
fiscal budgets overall - as the build-up of the welfare state coincided with a
high and steady growth during the 30 glorious years - many went into increas-
ing deficits afterwards. In fact, in the wake of the two oil shocks, both spend-
ing and taxes increased dramatically, but revenues were constantly lower than
expenses. In parallel, there were significant changes in the composition of
public budgets, with transfers (particularly social security contributions) in-
creasing much more than any other component of spending, closely followed
by the government wage bill. In contrast, public investment has fallen as
a share of GDP. Governments have become “more and more ‘redistributive
machines’” (Alesina and Ardagna (1998), p.494).
In the early 80s, the resulting large stocks of public debt, combined with
high real interest rates, created a potentially explosive debt problem. To
tackle this problem, some governments implemented harsh fiscal adjustments
aimed at reducing fiscal deficits and bringing the debt-to-GDP ratio down-
ward and to a controlled path. This was a first wave of policies aiming at
restoring sound public finances (European Commission (2007)).
In Europe, the consolidation efforts were reinforced in the first half of
the 1990s, drove by the need to ensure compliance with the fiscal criteria set
out in the Maastricht Treaty. Member states wanting to be a part of the
EMU were required to have a deficit-to-GDP ratio no higher than 3%, and
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a debt-to-GDP ratio below or approaching a reference level of 60%. This
was a second wave of fiscal policies aiming at the control of public deficits
and debt. Besides the EMU countries’ effort, also the US, under President
Clinton’s administration, achieved an outstanding fiscal consolidation, in the
mid-90s.
After the EMU has been established, in 1999, the consolidation efforts
were initially relaxed. Yet, in order to meet the fiscal impositions of the
Stability and Growth Pact, and given the implicit financial liabilities posed by
ageing populations, many EMU members faced again the need to implement
major consolidations. This was a third wave of policies aiming at the control
of the weight of public debt. This new wave has been, yet, less widespread,
less transparent and less sustained; this was the case for some countries in
the early 2000s and is surely the case for all in the current financial crisis, in
which fiscal stimulus are part of the fight against the crisis.
A fiscal consolidation is a hard decision for a government to make because
standard Keynesian theory indicates that it will have a dampening effect
on output and on employment. Moreover, if the consolidation induces an
economic contraction it has a lower probability of success and thus of political
support, as it complicates the stabilization of the deficit-to-GDP or debt-to-
GDP ratios in two ways: (i) directly, by decreasing the denominator (or its
growth rate); and (ii) indirectly, by triggering the automatic fiscal stabilizers
that induce lower levels of receipts and higher levels of spending (higher
unemployment benefits, for example).
However, as reviewed in chapter 2, there is no consensus on the size or
even the sign of the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity. Indeed, as
we have shown, in the context of our new-Keynesian DSGE model, in the
previous chapters, under certain circumstances a fiscal consolidation can have
expansionary effects on output, i.e. non-Keynesian effects. We have claimed,
in fact, that a successful fiscal consolidation, i.e. a sizable and persistent
fiscal contraction, can generate non-Keynesian effects, essentially through an
investment channel. In chapters 4 through 6 we further identified conditions
under which, in our model, such non-Keynesian effects may arise. Specifically,
they are highly dependent on the composition of the fiscal adjustment, the
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initial state of public finances and some supply-side structural effects, linked
with markets’ competition.
In this chapter, we present an overview of some particular fiscal consol-
idations in European countries. We first highlight their basic features and
regularities, discriminating successful from unsuccessful, and expansionary
from contractionary consolidations. Then we check if the conditions that we
have identified in the previous chapters match the features of the different
classes of consolidations in these specific European cases.
Since the third wave of European fiscal consolidations was interrupted
due to the current financial crises and depression, we limit our discussion
to some fiscal consolidations that happened in the 1980s and early to mid
1990s (the first and second waves). We closely follow the evidence presented
in Alesina and Perotti (1997a) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and discuss
eight fiscal consolidations: Belgium (1984-85), Denmark (1983-86), Greece
(1986-87), Ireland (1983-84), Ireland (1987-89), Italy (1994-95), Netherlands
(1991) and Sweden (1986-87).
7.1 Successful Versus Unsuccessful Consolidations
In chapter 4 we have assessed the ability of cuts in public spending and
employment, for a realistic range of their impact on productivity, to generate
fiscal consolidations, defined as a sizeable and sustained deviation of the
debt-ratio from its starting level. We have concluded that cuts in the less
productive government spending and employment (unproductive spending
and weakly productive employment) are more likely to generate strong and
persistent fiscal consolidations, while cuts in more productive public spending
or employment generate a rather limited and not sustained response of debt,
and may even induce a medium- to long- term increasing path for debt. We
now look at the selected European fiscal consolidation episodes in order to
access their success and cross-check it with the conditions detected in chapter
4.
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Defining episodes of successful fiscal consolidations There is no com-
monly agreed definition of a successful consolidation in the literature. The
usual definitions typically imply one of two conditions: (i) the cyclically ad-
justed primary balance (CAPB) as a percentage of GDP or the debt-to-GDP
ratio is reduced by some specified amount during and, possibly after the
tightening period (a definition that emphasizes the size of the consolidation);
(ii) for some period after the consolidation the CAPB does not deteriorate
by more than some specified amount (a definition that emphasizes the persis-
tence of the consolidation). For example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) define
a consolidation as successful if in the three years after the tightening period
the ratio of the CAPB-to-GDP is, on average, at least 2 pp above the initial
level, or the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least 5 pp below the initial level; for
European Commission (2007) a fiscal consolidation is successful if there is an
improvement of the CAPB-to-GDP ratio of at least 1.5 pp, and in the three
years after the end of the consolidation episode the CAPB-to-GDP ratio does
not deteriorate by more than 0.75 pp.
In order to systematically determine how successful the eight episodes of
consolidation have been, we have used a criterion based on three conditions
that corresponds to a combination of the definitions in Alesina and Ardagna
(1998) and European Commission (2007): (i) the tightening period is char-
acterized by an improvement of, at least, 2 pp in the CAPB-to-GDP ratio;
(ii) in the two years after the end of tightening period the CAPB-to-GDP
ratio increases at least 1 pp; and (iii) in the two years after the tightening
period, the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least 5 pp below the initial level. Our
criterion is slightly more demanding than each of the individual definitions
in which it is based.
On the basis of our criterion, we have furthermore established a classi-
fication of the consolidations according to their degree of success. A fiscal
consolidation is classified as ”very successful” if it satisfies all the three con-
ditions, as ”moderately successful” if it satisfies two conditions, or as ”un-
successful” when it does not satisfy more than one condition. According to
this taxonomy, in the selected eight consolidation episodes we have identi-
fied three ”very successful” consolidations (Denmark, 1983-86; Ireland, 1987-
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89; and Sweden, 1986-87), two ”moderately successful” consolidations (Bel-
gium, 1984-85; and Italy, 1994-95), and three ”unsuccessful” consolidations
(Greece, 1986-87; Ireland, 1983-84; and Netherlands, 1991). A summary is
shown in table 7.1.
Table 7.1 - Fiscal consolidations in some European countries: successful versus unsuccessful
Changes in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit-to-GDP and in the debt-to-GDP (percentage points)
Country Debt Successful
and Tightening Two years after Two years after or
tight period period the tightening the tightening Unsuccessful
Belgium, 1984-85 - 3.9 - 1.8 + 9 (++)
Denmark, 1983-86 - 5.6 - 4.4 - 6 (+++)
Greece, 1986-87 - 2.0 + 1.0 + 17 (+)
Ireland, 1983-84 - 3.2 - 0.4 + 12 (+)
Ireland, 1987-89 - 5.7 - 2.1 - 15 (+++)
Italy, 1994-95 - 1.5 - 2.0 - 6 (++)
Netherlands, 1991 - 2.0 - 0.3 + 1 (+)
Sweden, 1986-87 - 4.0 - 1.6 - 13 (+++)
Notes:      (+++) Very successfull consolidation: satisfied three conditions for a successful consolidation
                   (++)  Moderately successful consolidation: satisfied two conditions for a successful fiscal consolidation
                    (+)  Unsuccessful consolidation: satisfied one condition for a successful fiscal consolidation
Source: Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
and author's taxonomy and calculations
Cyclically adjusted primary deficit
Determinants of fiscal consolidation success A wide variety of eco-
nomic, political, and institutional factors have been identified as relevant
for the success of a fiscal consolidation. These include the initial macroeco-
nomic and fiscal conditions, the monetary stance, the adoption of structural
reforms, and political factors.95 However, as seen in chapter 4, there is a con-
sensus in the literature that to begin with the success of a fiscal consolidation
clearly and foremost depends on the ”quality” of the fiscal adjustment, i.e.
the composition of the fiscal adjustment. Hence our choice of a gradual ap-
proach, in this chapter, closely following the path that we have gone through
in the previous chapters. In this section, we merely focus on the composition
of the fiscal adjustment − which puts us in the framework of chapter 4 −
95For a review of the literature see, for example, European Commission (2007) and
Kumar et al. (2007).
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in order to present a first gauge of the consolidation’s success; we leave for
the next section a more detailed analysis of each consolidation, involving the
initial conditions (chapter 5) and structural reforms (chapter 6), which in
addition to the composition are needed for an identification of conditions for
non-Keynesian effects.
In the literature, ”good quality” fiscal adjustments are defined as those
with a strong emphasis on government spending cuts rather than on rais-
ing taxes, and particularly on the reduction of less productive expenditures
(current public consumption and transfers) and some politically sensitive
items of the budget, such as the government wage bill. We have inspected
the characteristics of the selected eight consolidation episodes regarding the
composition of the fiscal adjustment, and present in table 7.2 a summary of
our findings.
Table 7.2 - Fiscal consolidations in some European countries: composition of the fiscal adjustment
Country
and Expenditure Revenue Government Public
tight period based based wage bill investment
Belgium, 1984-85 ? ? ? ?
Denmark, 1983-86 ? ? ?
Greece, 1986-87 ? ?
Ireland, 1983-84 ? ? a)
Ireland, 1987-89 ? ? ? ? ?
Italy, 1994-95 ? ? ?
Netherlands, 1991 ? b)
Sweden, 1986-87 ? ? c)
a) Sharp reduction in public investment compensating an increase in transfers.
b) Large increase in transfers (especially unemployment benefits).
c) Slight decrease in the government wage bill that continued after the tightening.
Source: Author's calculations
Adjustment basis
Mixed
Expenditure cuts
Transfers Others
The three most successful consolidations portray a scenario of somewhat
mixed features: one has been based on expenditure cuts (Ireland, 1987-89),
another has been revenue based (Sweden, 1986-87) and the third consolida-
tion has been based on a mix of expenditure cuts and tax rises (Denmark,
1983-86). Yet, when very and moderately successful consolidations are con-
sidered, a common set of features arises: all have been, to some extent,
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based on a reduction in transfers and/or of the government wage bill. In
contrast, the unsuccessful consolidations, have been entirely based on tax
rises (Netherlands, 1991), or have involved some important cuts in the more
productive spending: public investment (Greece, 1986-87; Ireland, 1983-84).
Overall, the results of our simulations in chapter 4 are consistent with
this overview of the selected consolidations: the most successful consolida-
tions are associated to cuts in the less productive government spending and
employment; differently, cuts in more productive public spending generate
rather limited and not sustained consolidations.
7.2 Expansionary Versus Contractionary Consolidations
The simulations with our new-Keynesian DSGE model throughout chapters
4-6 have allowed for a number of conclusions, of which we highlight three:
(i) if the consolidation is conducted simultaneously with a structural change
in the fiscal budget in favor of more productive spending then the model
predicts non-Keynesian effects; (ii) if the initial state of the public finances
is such that the long-run interest rate is sensitive to changes in the level of
the public debt, so long as the consolidation is credible and based in cuts
either on unproductive spending or weakly-productive public employment,
non-Keynesian effects are predicted; and (iii) fiscal consolidations based on
spending contractions need not depress output, if adequately combined with
structural reforms increasing the competition in the markets. We now look
at the selected European cases of fiscal consolidation in order to assess their
short-run impacts on output and cross-check their main characteristics with
those identified in our model as susceptible of generating non-Keynesian ef-
fects.
Defining episodes of expansionary fiscal consolidations As happens
in the definition of a successful consolidation, the definition of expansion-
ary fiscal consolidations is somehow heterogeneous in the literature. The
most simple definition identifies an expansionary consolidation as one that
generates a positive output growth during and after the fiscal tightening (Eu-
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ropean Commission (2003)). In turn, some authors call for a more refined
measure and argue that the relevant GDP growth is the difference to some
benchmark, such as to the G7 or OECD average growth rate. For example,
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) define a fiscal consolidation as expansionary if
the average growth rate of GDP in the period of tight and in the two years
after, in difference from the G7 average, is larger than the average value
before the tightening period.
In order to thoroughly determine whether a fiscal consolidation has been
expansionary or contractionary, we use a criterion that analyzes both the
GDP growth rate and its difference to the G7 average growth rate. We
furthermore define a classification of the consolidations according to which
an ”expansionary consolidation” induces an increase in the GDP growth rate
both in the tightening period and in the two subsequent years, as well as a
positive differential with the G7 growth rate. If it only accomplishes one of
the conditions, we define the consolidation as ”moderately expansionary”. A
contractionary consolidation occurs in the cases where the GDP growth rate
declines in all periods, during or after the tightening. Table 7.3 summarizes
our assessment of the selected consolidations.
Table 7.3 - Fiscal consolidations in some European countries: expansionary versus contractionary
                   (changes from the period before the tightening in percentage points)
Country Investment Consumption
and growth growth Expansionary
tightening Tightening 2 years after Tightening 2 years after Tightening Tightening or
period period the tightening period the tightening period period Contractionary
Belgium, 1984-85 + 0.5 + 0.7 - 2.1 -1.1 + 5.2 + 1.7 (+)
Denmark, 1983-86 + 2.7 - 0.3 - 0.2 - 3.5 + 11.5 + 4.6 (+)
Greece, 1986-87 - 2.4 + 1.3 - 1.5 + 1.5 - 15.8 - 1.9 (+)
Ireland, 1983-84 - 0.7 - 2.0 - 3.9 - 4.4 - 13.0 + 4.1 (-)
Ireland, 1987-89 + 5.0 + 4.9 + 4.4 + 5.9 + 16.0 + 3.3 (++)
Italy, 1994-95 + 3.7 + 2.5 + 2.5 + 1.8 + 25.5 + 4.3 (++)
Netherlands, 1991 - 2.1 - 3.6 - 1.2 - 2.3 - 3.1 - 0.8 (-)
Sweden, 1986-87 - 0.3 - 0.7 + 0.6 - 0.5 - 4.2 + 2.4 (-)
NOTES: a) Difference between the country's GDP growth rate and the average G7 GDP growth rate
(++) Expansionary consolidation
(+) Moderately expansionary consolidation
(-) Contractionary consolidation
Source: Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
and author's taxonomy and calculations
GDP GDP
growth growth (G7) a)
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In table 7.3 one can clearly identify two ”expansionary consolidations”
− Ireland, 1987-89 and Italy, 1994-95 − and two ”contractionary” − Ire-
land, 1983-84 and Netherlands, 1991. These extreme cases suggest, more-
over, prima facie evidence of the relevance of the investment channel in the
transmission of non-Keynesian effects that we have chosen to explore in this
thesis. In fact, the ”expansionary consolidations” feature the higher increase
in investment (and of the two ”contractionary consolidations” the first fea-
tures one of the largest fall in investment, even though with an increase in
consumption, and the second features a larger fall in investment than in
consumption).
The table suggests a positive link between unsuccessful and contrac-
tionary consolidations: all the unsuccessful consolidations were contractionary
to the exception of Greece (1986-87); yet it should be noted that the Greek
case is rather exceptional, as the expansion in the two years after the tight-
ening was due to a sharply expansionary fiscal policy in 1988, reverting the
failed attempt of consolidation. Hence, we conclude that a sizable and persis-
tent consolidation seems to be a pre-requisite for the arise of non-Keynesian
effects, just as argued in chapter 4.
Truly, success of the consolidation is not enough to generate non-Keynesian
effects. Of the three successful consolidations detected in the previous sec-
tion, only Ireland (1987-89) proved to be clearly ”expansionary”, while the
Danish consolidation can not be considered "expansionary" and the Swedish
can not even be considered ”moderately expansionary”. That a successful
consolidation seems to be necessary but not sufficient for the arise of non-
Keynesian effects is in accordance to conclusions obtained in chapter 4.
Conditions for expansionary fiscal consolidations We now provide, in
table 7.4, a systematic assessment of the eight selected consolidations regard-
ing their characteristics in the light of the simulations in chapters 4 through
6 of the thesis; the first column identifies the nature of each consolidation
regarding the deficit composition, while the second column states whether
long-run interest rate effects such as those simulated in chapter 5 existed; fi-
nally, the third column identifies the episodes that have coincided with labor
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or products market reforms, at least in the form of agreed wage and/or price
moderation. Table 7.4 summarizes the evidence allowing for a detection of
features present in the selected consolidations.
Table 7.4 - Fiscal consolidations in some European countries: some more evidence
Country
and
tight period Yes No Yes No Yes No
Belgium, 1984-85 ? a) ? ?
Denmark, 1983-86 ? b) ? ? c)
Greece, 1986-87 ? ? ?
Ireland, 1983-84 ? ? ?
Ireland, 1987-89 ? ? ?
Italy, 1994-95 ? ? ?
Netherlands, 1991 ? ? ?
Sweden, 1986-87 ? ? ?
a) Public investment was also decreased
b) About half of the adjustment has come from higher tax revenues
c) Wage agreement with unions abandoned immediatly after the tightening period
Source: Author's taxonomy and calculations
Markets' competition:
price or wage moderation
Consolidation: decreasing Long-term real interest rates:
transfers or government wage bill decrease of spread to G7
Focusing first in the identified ”successful consolidations”, a noteworthy
feature of the Ireland 1987-89 episode is that, contrary to what had happened
in 1983-84, the Irish government implemented an extensive reform program
(”Programme for National Recovery”) that included a fiscal reform, a labor
market reform and a product market reform. Among its main measures were
a sharp reduction of public employment, legislative changes that lastingly
embedded significant cuts in public transfers, a centralized policy of wage
moderation, a tightening of the eligibility for social security benefits, pri-
vatizations and public-private partnerships, as well as a reform of the tax
system that allowed Ireland to have the lowest corporate tax scheme in the
EU. The result was ”a prime example of how expenditure retrenchment as a
part of a broad and deep structural and macroeconomic reform agenda can
coincide with a swift and sustained economic recovery” (Hauptmeier et al.
(2007), p.307). In short, from the conditions detected in chapters 4 through
to 6, only those studied in chapter 5 were not present in Ireland (1987-89).
In Denmark 1983-86, while during the tightening period GDP increased,
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in the following years there was a downturn in GDP. During the tighten-
ing period, public wage indexation was suspended, public employment was
frozen and a wage moderation policy was imposed. The combination of these
policies with a strong fiscal consolidation and the decrease in the long-run
real interest rate (about 4 pp) induced an higher output growth. However,
the confrontational approach with unions leaded to industrial unrest and ul-
timately failed: in 1987 unions asked for and obtained larger wage increases
(Annett (2007)). The end of wage moderation led to an increase in the rel-
ative labor costs, restrained investment and induced a lower output growth.
In short, the consolidation had all the identified conditions for success, but
turned out to fail in the subsequent years because of the lack of their sus-
tainability.
The Swedish 1986-87 consolidation has been contractionary essentially
because of the same problem of the Danish consolidation except that in the
case of Sweden the timings were even worse: there was no agreement between
unions and the government and, hence, there was no wage moderation. In-
creasing labor cost induced a loss of competitiveness and a strong decrease
in private investment, which generated a recession.
Alongside, with these successful but not expansionary fiscal consolida-
tions, we also find two ”moderately successful” consolidation cases that can
be considered expansionary: Belgium, 1984-85 (”moderately expansionary”)
and Italy, 1994-95 (”expansionary”). These cases have two common charac-
teristics: (i) the long-term real interest rate have decreased after the tight-
ening; and (ii) the fiscal consolidation was part of a broad structural reform
with special emphasis in the labor market. In Belgium, there was a broad
wage agreement with unions and a large restructuring of labor markets, which
included the recourse to active labor market policies and a reform of the so-
cial benefits system (Hauptmeier et al. (2007)). In Italy, the labor market
reform, which included the abolition of the system of automatic wage indexa-
tion, was accompanied by the liberalization of product and financial markets
(European Commission (2007)). Hence, in table 7.4 all columns of relevant
conditions for non-Keynesian effects are ticked. In relation to our study in
this thesis, this means that all the transmission mechanisms of chapters 4
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through 6 were somehow present.
Overall, the episodes here assessed strongly suggest that the probability
that a successful consolidation is expansionary increases with the presence
of the transmission mechanisms that we have identified in chapters 5 and
6, related with the impact of the fiscal consolidation on long-term interest
rates and with the insertion of the fiscal consolidation in a broader economic
reform.
7.3 Summary and Final Remarks
In this chapter we have studied the main features of eight selected episodes
of fiscal consolidations belonging to the first (80s) and to the second (early-
90s) wave of European recent fiscal consolidations. The purpose has been
to check whether their success (unsuccess) and non-Keynesian (Keynesian)
effects associate with the conditions detected with our model and the sim-
ulations of the several transmission mechanisms for the investment-channel
of non-Keynesian effects throughout chapters 4-6. Hence, the chapter was
meant to somehow suggest indirect evidence of the realism of our model, its
calibrations and its dynamics following alternative types of fiscal consolida-
tions.
We have studied eight heterogeneous episodes well documented in recent
literature: Belgium (1984-85) Denmark (1983-86), Greece (1986-87), Ireland
(1983-84 and 1987-89), Italy (1994-95), the Netherlands (1991) and Sweden
(1986-87); these encompass cases of successful as well as unsuccessful consol-
idations and cases of expansionary as well as contractionary consolidations.
In order to systematically study the historical episodes in light of our
theoretical framework, we have suggested a specific criterion and taxonomy
for the degree of success of consolidations; and, similarly, for the degree of
presence of non-Keynesian effects. The first classification allowed for clas-
sifying the episodes as ones of “very successful consolidation”, “moderately
successful consolidation” and “unsuccessful consolidation”; the second al-
lowed for a distinction between “expansionary consolidations”, “moderately
expansionary consolidations” and “contractionary consolidations”.
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We detected three episodes of “very successful” consolidations (Denmark
(1983-86), Ireland (1987-89) and Sweden (1986-87)), two “moderately suc-
cessful” consolidations (Belgium (1984-85) and Italy (1994-95)), and three
“unsuccessful” consolidations (Greece (1986-87), Ireland (1983-84) and the
Netherlands (1991)). The inspection of the characteristics of these episodes
allowed for a set of results that are overall in accordance with the conclu-
sions of our modeling strategy and simulations in chapter 4. On the one
hand, unsuccessful consolidations have typically been based on the increase
of taxes and/or a reduction of public investment. On the other hand, re-
garding the very successful consolidations, just one case — Ireland (1987-89)
— matches perfectly the pattern uncovered in chapter 4, as in Sweden (1986-
87) a large increase in taxes has occurred and in Denmark (1983-86) a mixed
spending-taxes strategy has been followed. However, successful consolida-
tions are overall associated to cuts in less productive spending (e.g. social
transfers) and in public employment (and the public wage bill) — a condition
clearly uncovered in chapter 4.
We detected two episodes of “expansionary consolidations” (Ireland (1987-
89) and Italy (1994-95)), three episodes of “moderately expansionary con-
solidation” (Belgium (1984-85), Denmark (1983-86) and Greece (1986-87))
and three episodes of “contractionary consolidations” (Ireland (1983-84), the
Netherlands (1991) and Sweden (1986-87)). A first conclusion has been that
success seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fiscal consol-
idations to create non-Keynesian effects; in fact, while all unsuccessful con-
solidations have generated the standard Keynesian effects, not all successful
consolidations created persistent non-Keynesian effects (Denmark (1983-86)
and Sweden (1986-87)); moreover, both “very successful” (Ireland (1987-89))
and merely “moderately successful” consolidations (Belgium (1984-85) and
Italy (1994-95)) may bring in non-Keynesian effects.
The main features of each of these episodes are overall in accordance with
our model and simulations in chapters 4 through 6. In fact, fiscal consoli-
dations that led to non-Keynesian effects involved not only a shift of the
budget composition toward “quality”, but at least one (and generally two)
of the other transmission mechanisms studied in chapters 5 and 6 — a de-
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crease in long-run interest rate and a reform program increasing competition
in labor and/or product markets. The establishment of wage moderations,
especially when in the context of a broad reform program and an enduring
socio-political pact has been particularly relevant for the existence of non-
Keynesian effects (Ireland (1987-89), Italy (1994-95) and, although with a
smaller impact, Belgium (1984-85)). The cases of Denmark (1983-86) and
Sweden (1986-87) provide a counterfactual proof to this argument, as their
failure to maintain a market reform and nominal restraint in the years im-
mediately after the consolidation effort seem responsible for the subsequent
reduction of output.
Finally, the path of private investment and consumption during the tight-
ening period strongly supports the choice in this thesis to focus on the
investment-channel for the transmission of non-Keynesian effects. On one
hand, the two expansionary consolidations (Ireland (1987-89) and Italy (1994-
95)) recorded the highest increases of investment and the moderately expan-
sionary consolidations by Belgium (1984-85) and Denmark (1983-86) have
also been associated with a larger expansion of investment than consump-
tion. On the other hand, all consolidation episodes that failed the three or at
least two of the three transmission mechanisms for the investment-channel
studied in chapters 4-6 resulted in a reduction of private investment (Greece
(1986-87), Ireland (1983-84), the Netherlands (1991) and Sweden (1986-87)).
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8 Conclusion
This thesis has studied the investment-related channel for non-Keynesian ef-
fects of fiscal policy, with the aim of identifying the conditions under which
a fiscal consolidation may have expansionary effects on short-term output.
When this research started, this question was of extreme relevance for policy-
making, since some European countries were (and others should be) conduct-
ing a consolidation of their public finances and naturally wanted to under-
stand how to avoid its Keynesian effects. Presently, as the 2007/08 financial
crisis developed into a global depression, fiscal sustainability has transitory
lost importance. In fact, policy makers now hope that their widespread fiscal
stimulus programs do have strong Keynesian effects on output and employ-
ment.
Yet, the contributions of this thesis for policy-making are intact. First,
because it is now clear that large fiscal adjustments cannot be avoided, in
most European countries, in the coming decades. High and growing current
levels of deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios, combined with medium-
and long-term spending pressure on public finances, related, inter alia, to
population ageing, urge the need for fiscal consolidations, sooner or later.
Second, because the identification of the circumstances under which a fiscal
consolidation has expansionary effects, implicitly corresponds to a detection
of conditions for a Keynesian behavior of the fiscal policy. For example, our
finding that the highly-productive public spending generates strong Keyne-
sian effects leads to the case for an important role of public investment in
the current fiscal stimulus programs.
In parallel to the economic policy motivations, this research was also
drived by empirical and theoretical reasons, namely the fact that an ex-
tensive empirical and annedoctal evidence of episodes of non-Keynesian ef-
fects of fiscal consolidations still lacks convincing explanations and mod-
elling. The underdevelopment of the theoretical studies on non-Keynesian ef-
fects of consolidations seemed particularly clear as regards investment-related
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channels; and, moreover, as regards their modelling in the context of new-
Keynesian DSGE models allowing for a more thorough treatment of fiscal
policy. Against this background, we have developed a new-Keynesian DSGE
model with an expanded fiscal block, able to account for the interactions be-
tween a fiscal consolidation and the most relevant macroeconomic variables,
qualitatively and quantitatively. The model developed in this thesis is, on
the one hand, based on a well established state-of-the-art literature of new-
Keynesian DSGEmodels, and, on the other hand, improves such a framework
with the inclusion of new features based on the literature on non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal policy.
For reasons made clear in chapter 2 — essentially the scarcity of studies
of this channel, relative to the consumption one, in spite of its promising
role, at least in our view — from its onset this thesis has studied possible
investment-related transmission mechanisms for non-Keynesian effects. In
the context of the developed model, in addition to the usual wealth effect,
this channel involves transmission mechanisms operating through the inter-
temporal relation between investment decisions, the real interest rate and
expectations of future profits.
On the one hand, if a fiscal consolidation would induce a decrease in the
real interest rate, a direct positive impact on investment would arise. Truly,
this effect is usually small, unless a successful fiscal consolidation reduces the
probability of default on government bonds, decreases the risk premium and
induces a decrease in the long-term real interest rate. This is the hypothesis
studied in chapter 5: in cases where the initial state of public finances is
highly unfavorable, the long-term interest rates may react to a sustained
change in the level of public debt, and thus a consolidation may trigger an
upward pressure on private investment
On the other hand, if a fiscal consolidation were to directly affect the pri-
vate factors’ productivity, or were to indirectly improve productivity through
an enhancement of the efficiency of markets, another sort of positive effect
on private investment would arise. Such an effect would work either through
a reduction in the marginal cost of labor — a pressure on real wages — or
through an increase in the marginal productivity of labor, resulting either
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way in an increase in the expected value of the net marginal product of cap-
ital. These are the hypothesis of chapters 4 and 6. In chapter 4 we model
the direct contribution of public spending and employment to private inputs’
productivity and study consolidations that shift the composition of the fis-
cal budget in favour of higher quality expenditure. In chapter 6, we consider
fiscal adjustments embedded in a deregulating reform that improves the com-
petition in markets — labor, products or both — and thus improve the overall
competitiveness of the economy.
In order to analyze these alternative demand- and supply-driven trans-
mission mechanisms of the investment channel, the thesis progresses in a mix-
ture of cumulative and alternative developments of the model established in
chapter 3. Specifically, the developments introduced in chapter 4 have been
retained throughout the rest of the thesis, while the analysis of chapter 5
and 6 are conducted as alternative research paths. In each chapter, from
4 to 6, the model is used to simulate several policy experiments of fiscal
consolidations and highlight conditions for non-Keynesian effects.
The first structural change to the baseline model, made in chapter 4 in
order to study the direct productivity transmission mechanism, has consisted
of the inclusion of government spending and public employment in the pro-
duction function of intermediate goods. Although such a specification implies
that both classes of public expenditure have a direct impact on total factor
productivity, following the literature we have allowed such impact to have dif-
ferent degrees of relevance. More specifically, we have split public spending
into highly-productive and weakly or non-productive spending, and public
employment as strongly and weakly productive, calibrating each class with
appropriate elasticities.
In chapter 4 we reviewed the literature and found a growing consensus
that the success of a fiscal consolidation depends on the "quality" of fiscal
adjustments, i.e. on shifts in the budget composition acting on the less
productive forms of expenditure. Then, we have used the enhanced model
to simulate fiscal consolidations through persistent cuts in public spending
and employment of the various productivity impacts. In accordance with the
literature, we found that fiscal adjustments with a strong emphasis on less
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productive public expenditure cuts, including some politically sensitive items
of the budget such as the government wage bill, do generate more successful
fiscal consolidations. We have confirmed this result in the study of some
European fiscal consolidations of the last decades, in chapter 7.
Chapter 4 has shown that consolidations based on reductions of a pure
class of expenditure generate, as a rule, the Keynesian short-run contrac-
tions of output. However, it has illustrated that the less productive the
public expenditure is, and the more competitive the labor market is, the
more favorable is the reaction of private investment. We went a step further
and simulated consolidations conducted simultaneously with a shift in the
composition of the fiscal budget in favor of more productive spending, to
find that in such cases the model does predict non-keynesian effects.
A second transmission mechanism for the investment channel operates
via the interest rate effect of the consolidation. This is twofold: first, there is
a cyclical effect, as the monetary policy reacts to the disinflationary impact
of the aggregate demand contraction reducing the short-term interest rate;
second, there may be a structural effect, as the consolidation reduces the
risk premium on government bonds and thus lowers long-term interest rates,
establishing a steady-state with a higher output level. While the former is
typically small, in chapter 5 we have studied conditions for the latter to be
of importance.
In order to do so, we have enhanced the model with a direct relation
between the level of the public debt and the steady-state interest rate, which
we have calibrated according to estimates in the literature. The simulations
have suggested that, when the initial state of the public finances is such that
the long-run interest rate is sensitive to changes in the level of the public debt,
so long as the consolidation is based in cuts either on unproductive spending
or weakly-productive public employment, non-Keynesian effects do arise. In
contrast, fiscal consolidations entirely based on cuts in productive spending
do not generate non-Keynesian effects. Our simulations have also considered
alternative scenarios concerning the credibility of the fiscal consolidation; as
expected, the lower the credibility the less prevalent are the non-Keynesian
effects.
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In chapter 6 we have deactivated the interest rate mechanism of chap-
ter 5 and focused on a third transmission mechanism: the hypothesis that
fiscal consolidations combined with structural reforms creating a more com-
petitive environment, either in the product market or in the labor market,
may be non-Keynesian. In the previous chapters we had some signs that in
highly competitive labor markets the fall in the real wage induced by the fis-
cal contraction would stimulate private investment. This chapter has taken
a step beyond and studied the effects of consolidations that are politically
designed in combination with structural reforms that improve markets’ effi-
ciency - thus mixing a demand side intervention and a supply side reform,
an analysis hardly seen in the literature.
After assuming, for the sake of calibration, that the simulated reform
would change the degree of competition from European to US levels, we
have simulated several consolidation strategies in different contexts of struc-
tural reforms involving the labor and/or the products market. Our results
have suggested that fiscal consolidations based on the contraction of expendi-
ture need not depress output, if adequately combined with structural reforms
increasing the competition in the markets. Furthermore, we have reached a
conclusion of the outmost economic policy relevance: the more comprehen-
sive the market reforms, the higher the likelihood of an expansionary fiscal
consolidation.
In sum, the analysis in this thesis suggests that for a fiscal consolidation
to be non-Keynesian, a strong positive response of investment seems to be
a basic ingredient; albeit one that can not be created exclusively through
a single of the studied transmission mechanisms. The assessment of some
recent episodes of fiscal consolidations in European countries, in chapter 7,
has offered additional evidence of this conclusion. Successful consolidations
with non-Keynesian effects are typically associated with the presence of the
three transmission mechanisms of the investment-channel studied throughout
chapters 4-6. In particular, while the choice of an adequate composition of
the shifts in the fiscal budget is necessary, it is not sufficient; the consolidation
must be credible and coupled with a comprehensive reform program.
Both the model that we have built and the analysis that we have con-
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ducted with it provide a useful basis for future research. The most immediate
extensions of this thesis are, probably, twofold: first, to further develop the
modelling of the role of the government in the economy, for example by con-
sidering an explicit role for public investment; and second, to extend the
analysis of historical episodes (conducted in chapter 7) so as to include the
third wave of European fiscal consolidations, which began in the early 2000s.
A somehow less immediate extension would deal with the credibility of
the fiscal consolidation, which seems to be crucial for the appearance of non-
Keynesian effects. A recent body of literature has shown that fiscal sustain-
ability is linked with strong and effective elements of fiscal governance, such
as fiscal rules. Fiscal rules avoid temporal inconsistencies and enhance the
transparency of fiscal policy, by providing a clear benchmark against which
the results can be compared, thus providing a credible fiscal environment. As
our model incorporates a very simple fiscal rule, there is room for a more de-
tailed characterization of its fiscal rule, including the study of different rules
— probably allowing for further conclusions on the conditions under which a
fiscal consolidation may generate non-Keynesian effects.
Another path for future research would be to address the question of the
political support for the fiscal consolidation, which may be crucial for its
success. Addressing this question would require conducting an welfare anal-
ysis, identifying losers and winners of the consolidation. In fact, fiscal policy
consolidations of a different nature can have distributional effects among dif-
ferent types of households. The diversity of impacts should be taken into
account in the design of policies, because of its social relevance, as well as
because it may be important for determining the political support of each
particular fiscal action. Yet, such an analysis would require a model of het-
erogeneous agents, an avenue of research that, as far as we know, has not
been pursued in analysis of fiscal policy in the framework of new-Keynesian
DSGE models.
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Appendix
A.1 Linearization of the inflation equation
The inflation equation derives from the linearization and aggregation of equa-
tions (38) and (40). The first-order condition for firms’ profit maximization
(38), can be expressed as:
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(110)
with,
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with the second expression implying that Xp0t = 1 and X
p
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Expanding the left-hand side of the equation (110),
Et
¡ept + βξpeptXp1t + β2ξ2peptXp2t + β3ξ3peptXp3t + ...¢ (111)
and using the first order Taylor approximation,
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2ξ2p + ...
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If we linearize the equations for Xit around the steady state we get,
cXp1t = γpbπt − Etbπt+1;cXp2t = γpEtbπt+1 + γpbπt − Etbπt+2 − Etbπt+1;
(...) (113)
Knowing that,
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then after inserting expressions (113) and (114) into (112), and rearranging,
we obtain:
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Expanding the right-hand side of equation (110),
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and applying the first order Taylor approximation,
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Using (114) and rearranging we get,
dMCt + Et ∞X
i=1
h
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Aggregating the two linearized sides of equation (110), i.e., equations
(115) and (118), and rearranging, gives:
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which is equivalent to:
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bept = (1− βξp)dMCt − βξpγpbπt + Et hβξp(1− βξp)dMCt+1 + β2ξ2p(1− βξp)dMCt+2+
+...+ βξp(1− βξpγp)bπt+1 + β2ξ2p(1− βξpγp)bπt+2 + ...¤ . (120)
Dividing both sides of equation (39) by Pt(1−ε), and rearranging,
1 = ξp
"
(Pt−1)
γp+1
Pt (Pt−2)
γp
#(1−ε)
+ (1− ξp)(ept)(1−ε). (121)
Knowing that around the steady state,
1 = ξp + (1− ξp)(ep)(1−ε) =⇒ (ep)(1−ε) = 1 (122)
using the first order Taylor approximation,
0 = ξp
³ bPt − bPt−1´− γpξp ³ bPt−1 − bPt−2´− (1− ξp)bept (123)
and rearranging,
bept = ξp(1− ξp) ¡bπt − γpbπt−1¢ . (124)
Finally, aggregating the linearized equations (120) and (124),
(1− βξp)dMCt − βξpγpbπt + Et hβξp(1− βξp)dMCt+1+
+ β2ξ2p(1− βξp)dMCt+2 + ...+ βξp(1− βξpγp)bπt+1
+β2ξ2p(1− βξpγp)bπt+2 + ...¤ = ξp(1− ξp) ¡bπt − γpbπt−1¢ (125)
leading this equation by one period and multiplying both members by βξp,
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Et
h
βξp(1− βξp)dMCt+1 − β2ξ2pγpbπt+1 + β2ξ2p(1− βξp)dMCt+2+
+ β3ξ3p(1− βξp)dMCt+3 + ...+ β2ξ2p(1− βξpγp)bπt+2 +
+β3ξ3p(1− βξpγp)bπt+3 + ...¤ = βξ2p(1− ξp) ¡Etbπt+1 − γpbπt¢ (126)
subtracting (126) from (125) and rearranging,
ξp(1 + βγp)
1− ξp
bπt = ξpγp
1− ξp
bπt−1 + βξp
1− ξp
Etbπt+1 + (1− βξp)dMCt. (127)
Knowing from equation (34) that,
MCt =
1
eεat
w(1−α)t r
kα
t α
−α(1− α)−(1−α)
the linearization around the steady state of this last equation can then be
expressed as:
dMCt = (1− α)bwt + αbrkt − εat . (128)
Replacing dMCt in equation (127) by the corresponding expression (128),
and rearranging, we finally obtain:
bπt = γp
1 + βγp
bπt−1 + β
1 + βγp
Etbπt+1 +
+
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)¡
1 + βγp
¢
ξp
£
(1− α)bwt + αbrkt − εat ¤+ ηpt . (129)
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A.2 Linearization of the real wage equation (monopo-
listic competition in labor market)
The process of linearization of the real wage equation is similar to the one
presented before for the inflation equation, and we have decided to skip some
steps in what follows. Equation (23), can be expressed as:
Et
∞X
i=0
βiξiw
∙eωtwtXwit UCt+i(1 + τ ct+i)
¸
= Et
∞X
i=0
βiξiw
"
(1 + λw,t+i)
U lt+i¡
1− τnt+i
¢#
(130)
where,
eωt = ewtWt , wt = WtPt , Xwit =
³
Pt−1+i
Pt−1
´γw
Pt+i
Pt
, U∗Ct+i =
UCt+i
(1 + τ ct+i)
and U∗lt+i =
U lt+i¡
1− τnt+i
¢ .
The last expression implies that Xw0t = 1 and Xwi = 1, i = 0, 1, 2, ....
Linearizing the left-hand side of equation (130), using the first order Tay-
lor approximation, and rearranging:
beωt + bwt + Et "(1− βξw) ∞X
i=0
βiξiw
dU∗Ct+i
#
+ Et
" ∞X
i=1
βiξiw (γwbπt+i−1 − bπt+i)
#
.
(131)
Applying a similar procedure to the right-hand side of equation (130), we
get:
Et
"
(1− βξw)
∞X
i=0
βiξiw
dU∗lt+i
#
. (132)
Aggregating the two linearized sides, i.e., equations (131) and (132), and
rearranging,
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beωt = −bwt + Et( ∞X
i=1
£
βiξiw (bπt+i − γwbπt+i−1)¤
+(1− βξw)
∞X
i=0
h
βiξiw
³dU∗lt+i −dU∗Ct+i´i
)
. (133)
Dividing both sides of equation (24) by (Wt)−1/λw,t and rearranging,
1 = ξw
"
wt−1
wt
(Pt−1)
γw+1
Pt (Pt−2)
γw
#−1/λw,t
+ (1− ξw)(eωt)−1/λw,t . (134)
Knowing that around the steady state,
1 = ξw + (1− ξw)(eω)−1/λw =⇒ (eω)−1/λw = 1 (135)
using the first order Taylor approximation and rearranging,
beωt = ξw
(1− ξw)
bwt − ξw
(1− ξw)
bwt−1 + ξw
(1− ξw)
(bπt − γwbπt−1) . (136)
Finally, aggregating the linearized equations (133) and (136), transform-
ing and rearranging,
bwt = 1
1 + β
bwt−1 + β
1 + β
Et bwt+1 + γw
1 + β
bπt−1 − 1 + βγw
1 + β
bπt + β
1 + β
Etbπt+1
−(1− ξw)(1− βξw)
ξw(1 + β)
³bwt +dU∗Ct − cU∗lt ´ . (137)
Knowing that,
UCt =
∂U
∂Ct
= eε
b
t (Ct − hCt−1)−σc (138)
and
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−U lt = −
∂U
∂lt
= eε
b
teε
N
t lσNt (139)
then,
dU∗Ct = − σc1− h ³ bCt − h bCt−1´− τ c1 + τ cbτ ct + εbt (140)
and,
cU∗lt = σNblt + τn1− τnbτnt + εNt + εbt . (141)
Inserting expressions (140) and (141) into equation (137) and using equa-
tion (21) in order to transform the labor supply lt into the labor demand Nt,
we obtain:
bwt = β
1 + β
Et bwt+1 + 1
1 + β
bwt−1 + β
1 + β
Etbπt+1 − 1 + βγw
1 + β
bπt
+
γw
1 + β
bπt−1 − (1− βξw)(1− ξw)
(1 + β) ξw
³
1 + (1+λw)σNλw
´ × (142)
×
∙bwt − σN bNt − σc
1− h(
bCt − h bCt−1)− τ c
1 + τ c
bτ ct − τn1− τnbτnt − εNt
¸
+ ηwt .
A.3 The effects of (positive) government revenue (tax
rates) shocks
Similarly to the case of government spending shocks, the baseline model
predicts that (positive) shocks to different tax rates do not lead to non-
Keynesian effects over output, although the Keynesian multiplier is rather
small. However, the effects of the three types of distortionary taxation are
somewhat different:
(i) In a perfectly competitive labor market, a labor income tax rate shock
(figure A1) leads clearly to Keynesian effects. Both consumption and in-
vestment decrease, via a direct negative effect on disposable income and via
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an increase in the interest rate, caused by an higher inflation generated by
the increase in real wages and, hence, marginal costs. In a monopolistic
competitive labor market (figure A2), the negative effects over consumption
and, particularly, investment are less marked as there is a much lower and
smoother effect on real wages, marginal costs, inflation and the interest rate;
(ii) In the case of a capital income tax shock, in a perfectly competitive
labor market (figure A3), there is some evidence of expansionary effects on
impact over consumption but not over investment. By increasing the cost of
capital, and thus reducing investment and the capital stock, the shock leads
to a decrease in the marginal productivity of labor, and thus in wages. This
leads to a reduction of marginal costs, inflation and, hence, the interest rate,
generating a substitution effect that raises private consumption, but that
is not sufficient to offset the negative direct effect over investment. Lower
marginal costs also induce an increase in profits that generates a partially
offsetting effect on private investment. In the presence of a monopolistic com-
petitive labor market (figure A4) the amplitude of the real wage decrease is
reduced and, hence, the effect on profits is lower, generating a larger decrease
in investment;
(iii) Finally, in the case of a consumption tax shock, in a perfectly com-
petitive labor market (figure A5) there is evidence of expansionary effects
on investment. The decrease in the interest rate, which contributes to an
higher investment, is not enough to offset the negative direct effect over con-
sumption, though. The results are similar for the alternative labor market
specification (figure A6).
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FIGURE A1 - Labor income tax shock
(perfectly competitive labor market)
FIGURE A2 - Labor income tax shock
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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FIGURE A3 - Capital income tax shock
(perfectly competitive labor market)
FIGURE A4 - Capital income tax shock
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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FIGURE A5 - Consumption tax shock
(perfectly competitive labor market)
FIGURE A6 - Consumption tax shock
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
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A.4 Budget deficits/debt and long-term interest rates:
a summary
Cohen and Garnier (1991) G7, 1971-90 Deficit 40 to 55 bp
Elmendorf (1993) US, 1971-87 Deficit 40 bp
Ford and Laxton (1995) 9 developed, 1977-93 Debt 15 to 50 bp
Helbling and Wescott (1995) 8 developed, 1963-90 Debt 10 to 20 bp
Knot and de Haan (1995) 5 EU, 1960-89 Deficit 40 to 60 bp
Orr et al  (1995) 17 OECD, 1981-94 Deficit 15 bp
Vamvoukas (1997) Greece, 1950-93 Deficit 20 bp
Cebula (2000) US, 1973-95 Deficit 86 bp
Reinhart and Sack (2000) 19 OECD, 1981-2000 Deficit 9 bp
Reinhart and Sack (2000) G7, 1981-2000 Deficit 12 bp
Lindé (2001) Sweden, 1982-96 Deficit 20 bp
Chalk and Tanzi (2002) EU-11 + UK, 1970-98 Debt 1 to 6 bp
Canzoneri et al  (2002) US, 1992-2002 Deficit 41 to 60 bp
Afonso and Strauch (2003) Port. + Germ., 2002 Deficit 5 to 10 bp
Laubach (2003) US, 1976-2003 Deficit 20 to 40 bp
Laubach (2003) US, 1976-2003 Debt 5 bp
Bernoth et al (2004) EU, 1991-2002 Deficit 3 to 5 bp
Egen and Hubard (2004) US, 1976-2003 Deficit 20 to 40 bp
European Commission (2004) Euro-11, 1990-2002 Deficit 15 to 20 bp
Faini (2004) Euro-11, 1979-2002 Deficit 35 bp
Faini (2004) Euro-11, 1979-2002 Debt 5 to 7 bp
Hauner and Kumar (2006) G7, 1960-2005 Deficit 13 to 24 bp
Kinoshita (2006) 19 OECD, 1971-2004 Deficit 20 to 25 bp
Kinoshita (2006) 19 OECD, 1971-2004 Debt 1 to 5 bp
Ardagna et al (2007) 16 OECD, 1960-2002 Deficit 10 bp
Ardagna et al (2007) 16 OECD, 1960-2002 Debt 0 to 4 bp
Chinn and Frankel (2007) 7 developed, 1988-2004 Debt 8 to 11 bp
Aisen and Hauner (2008) 60 countries, 1970-2006 Deficit 16 to 26 bp
Schuknecht et al (2008) Euro-13, 1991-2005 Deficit 4 bp
Ardagna (2009) 16 OECD, 1960-2002 Deficit 25 to 33 bp
Note: The values represent the impact on long-term interest rates of a 1 pp change in the budget deficit or debt to GDP ratio
Table A.1 - Budget Deficits/Debt and Long-Term Interest Rates
Reference Sample Impact on Interest RatesDeficit/Debt
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A.5 The steady-state of the model
In this appendix we show the equations that allow us to solve the steady-
state of the model in chapter 5. This version of the steady-state has thirteen
variables (Y , C, R, I, K, q, rk, N , w, Np, Ng, Glp and Ghp) and thirteen
equations, as follows:
R =
1
β
, (143)
q = 1, (144)
rk =
1
β − δτk + δ − 1
1− τk , (145)
I = δK, (146)
wNp
rkK
=
1− α
α
, (147)
1
μ
= w(1−α)
³
rk
´α ³
Glp
´−γ ³
Ghp
´−η ¡
Ng
¢−ν
α−α(1− α)−(1−α), (148)
£
(1− h)C
¤−σc
(1−τn)w = (1+λw)N
σN
(1+τ c) or
£
(1− h)C
¤−σc
(1−τn)w = NσN (1+τ c),
(149)
Y = K
α
Np
(1−α)
³
Glp
´γ ³
Ghp
´η
N g
ν
, (150)
N = Np +Ng, (151)
and
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C
Y
= 1− G
lp
Y
− G
hp
Y
− I
Y
. (152)
In order to simplifying the algebra, we impose three non-restrictive as-
sumptions concerning the stability of some SS ratios:
C
Y
= γc = 0.6, (153)
Ghp
Y
= γghp = 0.03, (154)
and
Ng
Np
= 0.19. (155)
After combining and rearranging the previous thirteen equations, we ob-
tain the analytical solution for the model’s steady-state. The solutions for
the steady-state values of real wage, private labor, investment and output in
the monopolistic competition scenario are as follows:
w =
α
α
(1−α) (1− α)
³
Glp
´ γ
(1−α)
³
Ghp
´ η
(1−α) ¡
Ng
¢ ν
(1−α)
μ
1
(1−α) rk
α
(1−α)
, (156)
Np =
(1− α)α
³
rk
´α
Y
ααwα
³
Glp
´γ ³
Ghp
´η
Ng
ν
, (157)
I =
α(1−α)δw(1−α)Y
(1− α)(1−α)
³
rk
´(1−α) ³
Glp
´γ ³
Ghp
´η
Ng
ν
, (158)
and
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Y
(σN+σc)
=
(1− τn)w(1+ασN )α(ασN )
³
Glp
´(γσN ) ³
Ghp
´(ησN )
Ng
(νσN )
(1− α)(ασN )
³
rk
´(ασN )
(1− h)σcγσcc (1 + τ c)
³
1 + N
g
Np
´σN
(1 + λw)
.
(159)
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